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Abstract 
 
Taiwan introduced the institution of independent directors in early 2000s in order to deal 
with the ill-designed internal governance system in its Company Act. Although such an 
institution has long been advocated as a good governance practice by the U.S corporate 
conventional wisdom, how it would work and how it has been working in Taiwan is very 
debatable. Generally, the concept of independent directors remains relatively unfamiliar to most 
Taiwanese companies. Statistics data indicate that majority of Taiwanese listed companies have 
never hired independent directors, and almost no companies have independent directors to 
comprise a majority of boards of directors. These facts imply that such an institution has not 
been so desirable in practice. 
Theoretically, it is believed that independent directors will face some inherent limitations 
while carrying out their monitoring tasks. The most serious issue is true independence of 
independent directors from management, even with several mechanisms attempting to ensure 
their independence. Under Taiwan’s current laws and regulations, independent directors have 
few chances getting rid of controlling shareholders’ influence. Hence, it seems unrealistic to 
expect that independent directors will be able to work in a manner that detects and prevents the 
wrongdoing of controlling shareholders and their affiliates. In addition, some features of 
Taiwan’s capital market and the legal environment as a whole, will leave little hope for 
independent directors as effective monitors.  
However, this dissertation conducts an empirical project finding significant correlation 
between the presence of independent directors and firm performance in Taiwanese listed 
electronic companies, which suggests that independent directors may make positive 
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contributions to companies on whose boards they serve. With the presence of block-holders, the 
regression results suggest that the presence of independent directors has significant and negative 
association with firm performance. This suggests that the coexistence of independent directors 
and block-holders may become a problem for companies. This is also consistent with the 
argument that independent directors are not likely to be effective monitors at the presence of 
controlling shareholders (or block-holders).    
In short, the ubiquitous presence of controlling shareholders in Taiwanese companies 
remains a difficult problem for Taiwan’s corporate governance. After the introduction of 
independent directors, how to make them effectively function as expected with the presence of 
controlling shareholders will be tremendously important. Taiwanese policymakers should take 
this into consideration in making future policy of independent directors for Taiwan. Currently, 
Taiwan is in an experimental stage regarding this institution, and has been trying to create a 
friendly environment for independent directors. It is unclear whether this institution will function 
as an effective monitor in a satisfying manner in the future. Taiwan has not been struck by 
serious scandals since the Reba scandal. Politically speaking, policymakers may not have much 
pressure from the voters as a kind of momentum for a more ambitious policy with respect to 
corporate governance, and it is likely that current policy of independent directors will be 
sustained for a while, unless another harmful scandal strikes Taiwan again. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
1.1 The Motivation Behind This Dissertation  
In recent decades, Taiwan’s capital market had been tarnished by a number of corporate 
scandals. Most of these scandals involved false accounting reports and managerial 
embezzlements. These scandals occurred more frequently during the late 1990s, and they 
ultimately forced the government of Taiwan to take steps to improve corporate governance. 
Among these, the scandal involving Procomp Informatics Ltd. (Procomp) in 2004 was the most 
shocking in Taiwanese history. 
Procomp filed for reorganization because the company was unable to pay its debts.  
Investigations revealed that Procomp’s president at the time, Sophia Yeh, had committed 
embezzlement and filed false financial reports for the purpose of defrauding investors.
1
 In 
addition, Procomp’s management allegedly committed several fraudulent sales to overseas 
buyers (i.e., dummy companies in Hong Kong set up by Procomp) so that the illusion of stable 
performance could be maintained. Procomp avoided detection by making misrepresentations in 
its financial statements and by converting their accounts receivable into deposits with financial 
institutions (which co-conspired with Procomp), so that Procomp could show deposits on their 
balance sheets that were not truthful. In fact, Procomp’s assets and cash were misappropriated by 
the company’s management. Unfortunately, these forms of illegal behavior had been going on 
for a very long time, without being noticed. It was believed that the internal monitoring device 
                                                          
1
 OECD, ENFORCEMENT OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN ASIA: THE UNFINISHED AGENDA 49-60 (2007), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/43/15/42365100.pdf (last visited on Sep. 30, 2011). [hereinafter OECD CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE IN ASIA] 
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(i.e., “supervisors”) did little or nothing during the period of time that these crimes were being 
committed.  
Another serious scandal unfolded in 2007. The Reba Group (Reba) filed an application 
for reorganization in court.
2
 Reba’s major shareholders, the Wang family, controlled every 
member of the boards of directors in all of Reba’s affiliates, which were heavily influenced by 
Reba and the Wang Family. The Wang family received assistance from their affiliated 
accountants, who helped the family falsify their trading and financial statements. The family 
even attempted to manipulate the stock prices of the affiliates through insider trading. Some 
members of the Wang family were prosecuted and sentenced, but the main perpetrators (the 
chairman of Reba and his wife) fled to the United States (the U.S.) before the scandal was 
detected by the government. The Reba scandal attracted a great deal of attention from the public 
and investors because the scandal produced huge losses for investors. A total of $2.21 billion 
dollars had been embezzled from the Wang family.
3
 In terms of monetary loss, the Reba scandal 
was the largest one that had occurred in Taiwan.
4
 In addition, the number of people involved in 
this scandal amounted to 107, and all of whom had been indicted on charges of embezzlement 
and violations of banking, accounting, and securities laws.
5
  
It is no question that both the Procomp and Reba scandals have seriously injured the 
credibility of the Taiwanese capital market. Contemporary Taiwanese corporate scandals have 
revealed that the internal checks and balances system designed by the Taiwan Company Act 
                                                          
2
 TAIWAN SECURITY & FUTURE INSTITUTE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN TAIWAN 6 (2010), available at 
http://www.sfi.org.tw/E/Plate.aspx?ID=332 (last visited Sep. 26, 2011). [hereinafter CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN 
TAIWAN] 
3
 John S. Liu & Chyan Yang, Corporate Governance Reform in Taiwan: Could the Independent Director System Be 
an Effective Remedy?, 48 ASIAN SURVEY 816 (2008).  
4
 Id. 
5
 Id. at 817. 
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[GONG SI FA](TCA) was extremely vulnerable and dysfunctional to the extent that company 
managers enjoyed numerous opportunities to defraud investors.
6
 Supervisors (i.e., the statutory 
monitoring device) were usually uninformed about managerial misconduct and, in some cases, 
had even become the accomplices of those who engaged in misconduct.  
Many Taiwanese commentators have suggested that Taiwan develop a more effective 
internal monitoring device. However, there is no universal agreement regarding how to improve 
the current form of internal governance system. Some argue that Taiwan should introduce the 
institution of independent directors which exists in the U.S. because conventional supervisors 
have been proven to be unsuccessful in performing their monitoring tasks. Others contend that 
Taiwan should consider reinforcing the functions of the current statutory monitoring mechanism 
(i.e., supervisors), instead of introducing an institution from another jurisdiction, which may not 
mesh with the legal and business environment in Taiwan.           
There may be no absolute right answer in this debate. As a matter of fact, in response to 
several scandals that have occurred in recent years, Taiwan adopted several reforms intended to 
improve corporate governance by building a robust internal corporate monitoring system. 
Taiwan’s competent authority and legislature have chosen not to go to either extreme and have 
instead decided to develop a new system that combines both of these suggestions. First, some 
                                                          
6
 The English version of the TCA is available at http://eng.selaw.com.tw/FLAWDAT0201.asp (last visited May 15, 
2011). Under the TCA, only four statutory types of companies can be incorporated, and non-statutory forms are not 
allowed. The four types of companies are “Unlimited Company,” “Limited Company,” “Unlimited Company with 
Limited Liability Shareholders,” and “Company Limited by Shares.” The “Company Limited by Shares” is the type 
of company that is suitable for large or publicly-held companies that raise capital from the public. Only companies 
incorporated in this form can go public or be listed afterwards. These types of companies are the most important 
types of business organizations in Taiwan, and are usually the focus of practical and academic discussions by 
corporation law experts. It should be noted, under the TCA, only the “Company Limited by Shares” type of 
company can legally have a board of directors as the necessary executive organ that is responsible for all of the 
affairs of the company. This type of company is the focus of this dissertation, which will refer to a “Company 
limited by Shares” as a “company” when referring to Taiwanese companies, unless otherwise indicated. 
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new provisions seek to enforce stricter qualifications regarding who can be elected as supervisors. 
The issue is finding people who cannot be easily controlled by the management and/or 
controlling shareholders as in the past. There are also some provisions that expand supervisors’ 
span of monitoring authority allowing them to carry out more effective monitoring. Such reforms 
have been proposed for the purpose of institutionalizing more powerful and independent 
supervisors. 
Furthermore, Taiwan has introduced the institution of independent directors using U.S. 
laws as one part of the solutions to the problem of supervisors’ long-term failures. In 2002, the 
Taiwan Stock Exchange (TWSE) (with support from the competent authority) introduced the 
concept of independent directors by promulgating its modified listing rules (Listing Rules) that 
mandated all new applicants (Newly-Listed Companies) appoint at least two independent 
directors when applying to be listed. The Listing Rules specified that non-compliance with this 
requirement regarding the appointment of independent directors would automatically result in 
rejection from listing. The TWSE also recommended that currently listed companies, which were 
not subject to the Listing Rules, should voluntarily hire independent directors as they saw fit. 
The Listing Rules, thus, formally defined and established Taiwan’s independent directors for the 
first time. The appointment of independent directors has since been deemed an indicator of good 
corporate governance practice that can benefit companies.   
Taiwan’s introduction of the institution of independent directors evolved rapidly. In 
addition to the TWSE’s Listed Rules with respect to the mandatory appointment of independent 
directors for Newly-Listed Companies, an amendment to the Taiwan Securities and Exchange 
Act [CHENG JUN GIAO YI FA] (TSEA) in 2006 legally introduced the institution of 
 5 
 
independent directors and the institution of audit committees.
7
 Additionally, Article 14-2 and 
Article 14-3 of the TSEA provide legal authority regarding eligibility, election procedures, and 
the authority of independent directors. Furthermore, companies can set up audit committees to 
replace conventional supervisors, according to Article 14-4 and Article 14-5 of the TSEA.
8
     
The introduction of the institution of independent directors may be the most important 
corporate governance reform in the history of Taiwan’s corporate laws. The concept of 
independent directors is a whole new legal idea in Taiwan that fundamentally changes the 
original intention behind the internal corporate governance system in the TCA, which allows 
supervisors to take charge of oversight and to take action against boards of directors and 
management.  
Traditionally, the original Taiwanese corporate laws imported most ideas from Germany 
and Japan.9 The institution of supervisors is the mechanism under Germany’s two-tier board 
system and has been modified by Japan.10 As Taiwan has been struggling with the failures of 
supervisors and many reforms in this regard seem futile, the U.S. laws are gradually becoming 
more and more important, especially in terms of corporate governance. About two decades ago, 
many Taiwanese scholars chose to study corporate laws in the U.S. instead of in Germany or 
Japan. These scholars tend to advocate U.S. laws replacing some of Taiwan’s flawed regulations, 
especially after the failures of recent reforms regarding supervisors. The developments of 
                                                          
7
 The English version of the TSEA is available at http://eng.selaw.com.tw/FLAWDAT01.asp?LSID=FL007009 (last 
visited Dec. 22, 2011). 
8
 For more details of provisions in the TSEA regarding independent directors and audit committee, please see 3.1.4.  
9
  For example, Taiwanese scholars comment that “[t]he corporate governance institutions of Taiwan demonstrate a 
hybrid mix of German, Japanese, and American influences against traditional Confucian traditions of governance.”  
Wallace Wen-Yeu Wang & Carol Yuan-chi Pang, An Analytical Framework for Controlling Minority Structure and 
Its Application to Taiwan, 6 (2006), available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=903853.  
10
 The supervisor system in both Taiwan and Japan is weaker than in Germany. In Germany, the supervisory board 
has the right to elect and dismiss directors, but Japanese and Taiwanese supervisors have no right to nominate 
directors who must be elected by the shareholder meetings. 
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independent directors in the U.S., thus, have had a great deal of influence on Taiwan’s corporate 
governance policy.11  
The U.S. corporate conventional wisdom believes that the institution of independent 
directors can help companies because independent directors can significantly reduce the agency 
costs that arise out of the separation of ownership and control typically found in modern 
companies. It is the case that most U.S. listed companies have boards of directors primarily 
consisting of independent directors, and insiders have lost their dominance on most corporation 
boards. The appointment of independent directors in U.S. companies is optional and companies 
have freedom to choose their own governance practices at their discretion. However, the 
examples of Enron and other corporate scandals forced the U.S. Congress to enact the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002. This act requires public companies to establish audit committees 
consisting exclusively of independent directors. Self-regulatory organizations such as the NYSE 
and NASDAQ have also set up mandatory listing requirements that require the majority of the 
members of boards of directors be independent directors.   
Such legal developments in the U.S. regarding independent directors have not been 
ignored in Taiwan, whose capital markets have suffered from many corporate scandals. One 
common characteristic in the corporate scandals is the lack of internal monitoring to the extent 
that managers were not worried about being detected and caught. Wrongdoers normally file for 
bankruptcy or just flee the country, and the procedures for recovering damages usually turn out 
to be fruitless.      
                                                          
11
 For more details of why the U.S. laws have increasing influence on Taiwanese corporate laws, please see 4.1.3. 
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Independent directors have evolved in different ways in the U.S. and Taiwan. In the U.S., 
the concept of independent directors has become statutory in SOX, at a time when most listed 
companies have long-term experience with independent directors. Most U.S. companies have 
voluntarily chosen to have independent directors without regulations forcing them to do so. 
When SOX was officially enacted, the presence of independent directors was already pervasive 
in practice.
12
 In contrast, when the TWSE’s Listing Rules of 2002 and the TSEA’s amendment 
of 2006 were made, most listed companies did not have experience with or knowledge of 
independent directors, and the presence of independent directors was uncommon in practice.  
In comparison with the U.S., the introduction of independent directors in Taiwan requires 
a thorough plan to alleviate possible shocks to companies that might result from such a legal 
transplantation. This dissertation seeks to provide a comprehensive study of the institution of 
independent directors and will discuss whether or not independent director reforms in Taiwan 
would solve the current corporate governance problems.   
1.2 Academic Contributions to the Corporate Laws in Taiwan 
Taiwanese corporate laws have been deemed weak and many commentators have called 
for reforms to build a more robust internal governance system. Taiwanese policymakers have 
sought some solutions for dealing with the corporate governance problems. The introduction of 
independent directors is regarded as an important reform of the corporate governance system. 
                                                          
12
 For example, according to the 2004 Korn/Ferry report, targeting 904 boards in publicly-held Fortune 1000 
companies, indicated that SOX and relevant regulations had not impacted the board composition of these companies 
which averagely have 9 outside/independent directors (because the same number had been reported since 1990). 
Scholars argue that SOX appears to mirror the corporate governance trends and its impact had been fairly minimal. 
See Lisa M. Fairfax, Sarbanes-Oxley, Corporate Federalism, and the Declining Significance of Federal Reforms on 
State Director Independence Standards, 31 OHIO N.U.L. REV. 381, 395 (2005). [hereinafter Fairfax, Corporate 
Federalism] 
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However, the concept of independent directors is relatively new in Taiwan. This unfamiliarity 
has led to concerns about whether this concept would work in Taiwan.   
The existing body of literature in Taiwan does not offer any comprehensive studies on the 
institution of independent directors; instead, it usually focuses on very specific issues. The 
institution of independent directors can be understood from several perspectives, and current 
studies have been insufficient for the purpose of providing a complete understanding of 
independent directors. Taiwan is currently in the experimental stage regarding the legal 
transplantation of the institution of independent directors. This dissertation seeks to offer a 
comprehensive analysis of the institution of independent directors and provide some insights 
relevant to Taiwan’s reforms taken in the last decade.    
This dissertation will focus on theoretical studies and will examine several critical issues 
regarding Taiwan’s current policies concerning independent directors. The concept of 
independent directors was developed in the U.S., so a comparative research and analysis will be 
an important part of this dissertation. There will be an empirical project to examine how 
Taiwanese independent directors have functioned so far. In short, this dissertation is expected to 
provide a strong theoretical and empirical basis for Taiwan to consider whether its current 
independent director policy should be sustained or modified.  
1.3 Main Questions to be Explored in This Dissertation 
The introduction of independent directors has a great deal of potential to impact Taiwan’s 
corporate governance system, and Taiwanese policymakers should develop reasonable and 
practicable governance structures as models for use by Taiwanese companies. This dissertation 
will attempt to answer three main questions below. 
 9 
 
1. Given the failures of supervisors, what specific corporate governance problems exist 
in Taiwan? 
2. How do independent directors solve corporate governance problems in theory?  
3. How have independent directors functioned in Taiwan since their introduction from 
the empirical point of view? 
1.4 Definition of Independent Directors to be Used in This Dissertation 
The definition of independent directors can vary when the term is used in different 
contexts.
13
 Different stock exchanges around the world have their own definitions that they use 
to determine who will qualify or be disqualified. For example, the NYSE disqualifies people who 
have material relationships with a listed company from being categorized as independent 
directors.
14
 NASDAQ generally defines an independent director as “a person other than an 
officer or employee of the company or its subsidiaries or any other individual having a 
relationship, which, in the opinion of the company's board of directors, would interfere with the 
exercise of independent judgment in carrying out the responsibilities of a director.”15 Delaware 
cases consider independent directors to be those who do not have conflicts of interest in alleged 
transactions in the litigations. Notwithstanding the differences, it is universally agreed that inside 
                                                          
13
 Lisa M. Fairfax, The Uneasy Case for the Inside Director, 96 IOWA L. REV. 127, 133 (2010). [hereinafter Fairfax, 
Inside Director] 
14
 Section 303A.02 in NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL (as of Nov. 15, 2009): “(a) No director qualifies as 
"independent" unless the board of directors affirmatively determines that the director has no material relationship 
with the listed company (either directly or as a partner, shareholder or officer of an organization that has a 
relationship with the company),” available at http://nysemanual.nyse.com/LCM/ (last visited Sep. 28, 2011). 
15
 Rule 4200 of NASDAQ CORPORTE GOVERNANCE RULE (as of Apr. 15, 2004), available at 
http://www.nasdaq.com/about/CorporateGovernance.pdf (last visited Sep 28, 2011). 
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directors, directors who are current employees of the company on whose board they serve, 
cannot be independent directors.
16
  
Although there is a dichotomy between independent directors and non-independent 
directors, there are other ways to categorize directors using other characteristics of directors. For 
instance, corporate literature usually categorizes directors as inside, outside, and affiliated (gray) 
directors. There is general agreement that inside directors mean those who are officers and 
employees of the company on whose board of directors they serve; otherwise, they are outside 
directors. Affiliated directors are outside directors who have some types of business relationship 
with the company.
17
      
Independent directors and outside directors usually have similar, but different, meanings, 
although these two terms are sometimes used interchangeably. Independent directors are 
normally outside directors who meet the prescribed criteria of independence according to laws, 
regulations, or the listing rules of a given stock exchange. Most the scholarly literature refers to 
independent directors in the sense that such directors have no financial, employment, or business 
ties with the company, the company’s officers, or major shareholders.  
This dissertation focuses on independent directors in Taiwan, where the term 
“independent directors” (“Duli Donse” in Chinese) refers to those who meet the standards of 
independence set by the TSEA and other relevant regulations regarding Taiwanese independent 
directors. Basically, the term “independent directors” has the same or a similar meaning, as 
defined in the scholarly literature.  
                                                          
16
 Fairfax, Inside Director, supra note 13, at 133. 
17
 Donald E. Pease, Outside Directors: Their Importance to the Corporation and Protection from Liability, 12 DEL. J. 
CORP. L. 25, 29 (1987).  
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1.5 Methodology Used in This Dissertation 
This dissertation will analyze the practicality of the institution of independent directors 
by exploring the questions presented above. Much of the research in the dissertation will involve 
comparative studies of Taiwan and the U.S.  
Three research methods that will be used in the dissertation are citation analysis, data 
collection and analysis, and empirical study. Citation analysis focuses on a theoretical foundation 
primarily consisting of the existing body of research literature in the U.S. involving independent 
directors. Taiwanese literature concerning independent directors will also be included. This 
dissertation will examine the benefits that independent directors are able to offer to companies 
from certain theoretical perspectives. 
The data collection and analysis requires an understanding of certain information 
regarding Taiwanese independent directors, and this is in the form of data compiled by this 
dissertation or by some research institutes. This data can provide some facts about Taiwanese 
independent directors and such facts can lead to some implications about the policy of 
independent directors for Taiwan.  
The final approach is the empirical study. The empirical project is expected to explore 
whether independent directors would make economic contributions to the companies on whose 
boards they serve. The most straightforward benefits would involve improvements of firm 
performance. Evidence regarding whether, and how, independent directors have positive or 
negative influence on firm performance is crucial in Taiwan, because it may help point Taiwan 
in a better direction for reforming its corporate governance practices. This dissertation is 
expected to offer empirical evidence that aims to examine how independent directors have 
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worked out in practice. The empirical section of this dissertation will attempt to explore the 
correlation between independent directors and firm performance, and this will be accomplished 
by running OLS regressions.  
1.6 The Structures of This Dissertation  
This dissertation is organized as follows.  
Chapter Two “Corporate Governance Structures in Taiwan and the Governance Problems” 
begins with an introduction to the corporate governance structure designed by the TCA as the 
research background of this dissertation. There will also be descriptions that point out the 
characteristics and problems of Taiwan’s capital market.  
Chapter Three “The Introduction and Evolution of Independent Directors in Taiwan” will 
offer a basic and comprehensive legal background review regarding Taiwan’s introduction and 
evolution of institution of independent directors. 
Chapter Four “The Fundamental Questions Regarding Independent Directors in Taiwan” 
will explore the fundamental questions regarding Taiwanese institution of independent directors; 
they are: Why does Taiwan want independent directors? What problems will Taiwan’s 
independent directors face? Why do companies need independent directors? 
Chapter Five “An Empirical Analysis of the Effectiveness of Independent Directors in 
Taiwan—Do Independent Directors Matter on Firm Performance?” will run an empirical 
analysis that examines the correlation between the presence of independent directors and firm 
performance.  
 13 
 
Finally, Chapter Six “Conclusion” will include the findings in this dissertation.  
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Chapter Two: Corporate Governance Structures in Taiwan and the Governance Problems 
Introducing independent directors fundamentally changes governance structures in 
Taiwanese companies. This chapter features an introductory analysis of Taiwanese corporate 
governance systems that will serve as the foundation for further analyses in this dissertation. The 
beginning of this chapter focuses on internal governance mechanisms (the board of directors and 
supervisors) and their relationships within the context of internal governance. This dissertation 
will then present the facts regarding common types of supervisors’ dysfunctionality in recent 
decades and will offer explanations of such failures. This dissertation will also illustrate 
Taiwan’s recent reforms of the supervisor system and will seek to determine whether or not such 
reforms can cope effectively with Taiwanese governance problems. Finally, this dissertation will 
analyze the features of Taiwan’s capital markets and the problems the country currently faces.  
2.1 Internal Governance Structures in Taiwanese Companies 
2.1.1 General 
Under the TCA, the internal governance system in Taiwanese companies has three 
primary organs: shareholder meetings, boards of directors, and supervisors. The shareholder 
meeting is the uppermost authority that has the power to decide matters regarding certain 
fundamental types of transactions such as mergers, dissolutions, and reorganizations. In addition, 
shareholder meeting is the only organ that can elect and dismiss directors and supervisors. Thus, 
both the board of directors and supervisors are responsible to the shareholders at the shareholder 
meetings. The board of directors, except in cases involving matters reserved for the shareholder 
meetings by the TCA or the articles of incorporation of a given company, has absolute authority 
over the business operations of companies. Supervisors are the statutory monitoring organ and 
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must regularly oversee the conduct of the board of directors and the board-appointed officers 
(refer to Figure 1 for details). 
Figure 1: Three Primary Organs of Taiwanese Companies   
 
Source: Author 
 
Taiwan has essentially adopted a modified two-tier board system. Unlike the German 
two-tier board system, supervisors have no real authority to elect or dismiss board members. 
Board of directors and supervisors are instead parallel, and both are responsible to the 
shareholders during the shareholder meetings. However, it is impossible for those in attendance 
at shareholder meetings to exercise regular oversight of board performance. The TCA provides 
that supervisors engage in monitoring responsibilities to oversee the legality and appropriateness 
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of the conduct of executive boards in the interest of all of the shareholders. Execution and 
monitoring are conducted separately using different devices, and ideally the monitoring device 
can function effectively without interference from those involved in execution. However, the 
reality is that supervisors are usually too weak to detect ongoing wrongdoing in time and 
sometimes are entrapped into becoming the accomplices of wrongdoers. The result has been 
universal admission by Taiwanese commentators that supervisors generally fail to function as 
desired in the role of providing effective and robust monitoring on boards of directors and 
officers. 
Note that legal sources of Taiwan’s corporate laws consist of several codes. In addition to 
the TCA, the TSEA also has certain provisions that preempt articles of the TCA with respect to 
public companies. Thus, although the primary goal of the TSEA is the regulation of the issuance 
and exchange of securities, the TSEA also offers legal resources for public companies. 
Additionally, the TCA and TSEA authorize competent authorities to issue supplemental 
regulations to these two statutes.
18
  
2.1.2 The Board of Directors   
Under the TCA, a board of directors has statutory power with respect to all of the affairs 
of a given company, including all of the powers necessary to appoint and dismiss company 
officers, prepare financial reports, convene annual or provisional shareholder meetings, and 
resolve material and fundamental transactions prior to the review during shareholder meetings.
19
 
In other words, the board of directors generally has unlimited power regarding the operations of 
                                                          
18
 Taiwan’s Ministry of Economic Affairs (“MOEA”) is the competent authority of the TCA, and Financial 
Supervisory Committee (“FSC”) is the competent authority of the TSEA.   
19
 Article 202 of the TCA.  
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the company. The primary exceptions involve specific matters that are proscribed by the TCA or 
the articles of incorporation of the company. Such matters are reserved for the approval by the 
shareholders during shareholder meetings. Proscribed items include fundamental transactions 
such as mergers, reorganizations, liquidations, dissolutions, and powers of electing and 
dismissing directors.
20
  
2.1.2.1 The Minimum Number of Seats on Boards 
There are a statutory minimum number of directors that should comprise the membership 
of a board of directors. The TCA provides that no fewer than three directors should comprise the 
board of directors, and shareholders should elect these members during shareholder meetings 
with the cumulative voting as the default rule (the articles of incorporation can provide 
otherwise).
21
 If the company has “managing directors” who are statutory sub-organs under the 
board of directors, and regularly exercise the power and authority of the board of directors when 
the board of directors is in recess, there should be at least nine directors on board.
22
 There is 
another requirement that public companies must have at least five directors on their boards.
23
   
2.1.2.2 How Boards Exercise Power 
The board of directors convenes meetings to discuss and pass important matters as 
necessary. Unless otherwise provided for in the TCA, resolutions made by the board of directors 
                                                          
20
 According to Article 202 of the TCA, business operations of a company shall be executed pursuant to the 
resolutions to be adopted by the board of directors, except for the matters the execution of which shall be effected 
pursuant the resolutions of the shareholder meeting as required by laws or the articles of incorporation of the 
company.   
21
 Article 198 of the TCA. 
22
 According to Paragraph 2, Article 208 of the TCA, the managing directors shall be elected from among the 
directors, and the number of managing directors shall not be less than three persons but not more than one-third of 
the total number of directors. 
23
 Paragraph 1, Article 26-3 of the TSEA.   
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shall be adopted by a majority of the attendees at meetings attended by a majority of the 
directors.
24
 
Senior officers (i.e., CEOs) are appointed by the board of directors and are the people 
who actually handle the company’s daily affairs and the business operations of the company. The 
board of directors has the authority to dismiss managers at any time without cause if they are 
dissatisfied with their performance. 25  Thus, the board of directors is also responsible for 
monitoring managers.   
2.1.2.3 Qualifications and Disqualifications for Directors  
Under the TCA, any individuals (i.e., “natural persons”) with legally disposing capacity 
can be elected as directors.26 In addition, a director must not be a supervisor and must not have 
any disqualifications of the types specified by the TCA; a director will be automatically 
dismissed as a result of the operation of the law, if he or she has any disqualifications.27   
It should be noted that institutional shareholders (e.g., government and corporate 
shareholders) can be elected as directors or supervisors in their own capacity, but they should 
                                                          
24
 Article 206 of the TCA. 
25
 Article 29 of the TCA. 
26
 Before the amendment of Nov. 12, 2001, only shareholders were eligible to be elected as directors. This elective 
qualification was deleted in a later amendment.     
27
 Such disqualifications include (Article 30 of the TCA):  
1. Having committed an offence as specified in the “Statute for Prevention of Organizational Crimes” and 
subsequently adjudicated guilty by a final judgment, and the time elapsed after he has served the full term of the 
sentence is less than five years;  
2. Having committed the offence in terms of fraud, breach of trust or misappropriation and subsequently punished 
with imprisonment for a term of more than one year, and the time elapsed after he has served the full term of such 
sentence is less than two years;  
3. Having been adjudicated guilty by a final judgment for misappropriating public funds during the time of his 
public service, and the time elapsed after he has served the full term of such sentence is less than two years; 
4. Having been adjudicated bankrupt, and having not been reinstated to his rights and privileges; 
5. Having been dishonored for unlawful use of credit instruments, and the term of such sanction has not expired yet;  
6. Having no or only limited disposing capacity. 
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appoint representatives to exercise the powers of directors and supervisors for them. 28  In 
addition, institutional shareholders can have their representatives elected to act as directors or 
supervisors.29 Thus, an institutional shareholder may have two or more different representatives 
concurrently elected as director(s) and supervisor(s). Finally, as is the case with individual 
directors, their representatives must not have any of the disqualifications spelled out in Article 30 
of the TCA. During their representatives’ terms of office as directors, institutional shareholders 
have the absolute right to have new representatives take office at any time for the remainder of 
their term.30  This phenomenon severely undermines the effectiveness of internal checks and 
balances within a company; as such, so many Taiwanese commentators have suggested deleting 
Article 27 of the TCA. While this Article provides flexibility for closely held companies, it may 
create corporate governance problems, as explained, for public companies. However, this Article 
remains in place for political reasons. The 2006 amendment to the TSEA has made this Article 
inapplicable to public companies, but this Article remains applicable to non-public companies31 
(refer to Table 1 for more details). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
28
 Paragraph 1, Article 27 of the TCA.  
29
 Paragraph 2, Article 27 of the TCA. 
30
 Paragraph 3, Article 27 of the TCA.  
31
 Article 26-2 of the TSEA. When the government or a juristic person is a shareholder of a public company, then 
except with the approval of the Competent Authority, the provisions of Article 27, paragraph 2 of TCA shall not 
apply, and a representative of the government or juristic person may not concurrently be selected or serve as the 
director or supervisor of the company. 
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Table 1:  Qualifications and Disqualifications for Directors  
 Individuals  Institutional Shareholders  
Qualifications No need to be shareholders; 
Any individual with disposing 
capacity (e.g., over age 20, or 
married) 
Hold at least one share.  
Disqualification
s   
Not a supervisor; 
Items listed in Article 30 of the 
TCA. 
 
Representatives have items listed 
in Article 30 of TCA, but the legal 
person or government can 
reappoint other representatives at 
any time and take over 
predecessors’ offices for the 
remainder of their terms; 
In public companies, an 
institutional shareholder and their 
representatives who have been 
elected as supervisor(s) cannot 
become a director.  
Source: Author 
 
2.1.2.4 Methods of Electing Directors 
All directors shall be elected at shareholder meetings, and these are usually held 
annually.32 The most frequently-used election method in practice is the cumulative voting, which 
computes the number of exercisable votes by multiplying the number of shares and the number 
of directors to be elected, and the total number of votes may be consolidated to support one 
candidate or may be split up for the purpose of supporting two or more candidates. 33  The 
cumulative voting was the mandatory rule for the election of directors before 2001, because the 
legislation at that time was of the opinion that if there should arise conflicts of interest between 
several groups of shareholders, they could monitor each other. Under the cumulative voting 
                                                          
32
 Article 192 of the TCA. Boards of directors in Taiwanese companies cannot appoint a new director to fill a 
vacancy. Every director should be elected in shareholder meetings.   
33
 Article 198 of the TCA.  
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system, minority shareholders or their representatives have more opportunities to be elected as 
directors and could, thus, act as watchdogs for the interests of all of the shareholders.  
However, this mandatory rule has been criticized, because it may unduly interfere with 
the internal affairs of the company. Additionally, boardroom harmony is also essential for 
efficient decision-making on the part of boards. Thus, the 2001 amendment to the TCA makes 
this election method the default rule. Companies can get it around by specifically adopting 
another election method as set forth in their articles of incorporation. As a matter of fact, 
cumulative voting remains the most frequently adopted practice. 
In addition to cumulative voting, the 2005 amendment to the TCA also introduced the so-
called “candidates nomination system,” which allows only certain types of eligible persons to 
enjoy the right to propose the slate of director candidates from which shareholders shall pick 
candidates to elect.34 Such a system can only be adopted by public companies, and such a form 
of adoption shall be expressly stipulated in the articles of incorporation. Under this system, only 
shareholder(s), individually or aggregately, who hold 1% or more of the total number of 
outstanding shares of the company and the board of directors have right to propose a slate.  
Directors can serve up to three years, according to the articles of incorporation. Most 
Taiwanese companies stipulate in their articles of incorporation that directors (and supervisors) 
shall enjoy three-year terms. Such terms of office should be fixed for each director unless the 
                                                          
34
 Article 192-1 of the TCA.  
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shareholder meeting amends the articles of incorporation. Unlike U.S. corporate laws, staggered 
boards are not permissible in Taiwan.35 
2.1.2.5 The Role of the Boards of Directors in Taiwan  
Generally, the boards of directors in Taiwanese companies tend to be executive 
(managing) boards, rather than the monitoring (supervisory) boards that are usually seen in U.S. 
companies. Most Taiwanese companies are family-founded and mid-size companies. The 
founding shareholders usually maintain their shareholdings even after the companies go public 
so that they can keep dominance in managing business by electing themselves or their favorable 
persons as directors and managers. As a result, most Taiwanese boards of directors are comprised 
of inside directors. It is also common that a person serves as the board chairman (also the 
president of a Taiwanese company) and CEO within a company and such person normally is the 
controlling or big shareholder who has dominant power in the boardroom (see 2.4 for details).   
The boards of directors in Taiwanese companies are also responsible for monitoring 
managers, because the boards are authorized to dismiss disqualified or underperforming 
managers. However, the main board function is still management. The monitoring function is 
assigned to a statutory monitoring device – supervisors.    
                                                          
35
 Lawrence S. Liu, Chinese Characteristics Compared: A Legal and Policy Perspective of Corporate Finance and 
Governance in Taiwan and China (2001), 10, available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=273174. [Lawrence Liu, 
Governance in Taiwan] 
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2.1.3 Supervisors  
2.1.3.1 Statutory Monitoring Device  
Boards of directors are powerful in business operation in Taiwanese companies. 
Therefore, establishing a checks and balances system within a company requires a statute-
required monitoring organ known as “supervisors,” which has been designed to monitor the 
legitimacy and appropriateness of the conduct of board of directors and board-appointed 
officers.
36
 Supervisors are generally expected to monitor conduct that may be in violation of laws, 
regulations, or the articles of incorporation, and they must also examine and verify the financial 
reports of the company to ascertain that the interests of all of the shareholders have been 
satisfied.
37
 Effective monitoring by supervisors of the behavior of board of directors and officers 
should maximize shareholder interests and decrease opportunities for the board of directors and 
officers to breach the fiduciary duties they owe to the company and shareholders.  
2.1.3.2 Minimum Number of Supervisors and Method of Electing Supervisors  
Every company must appoint at least one supervisor within that company, because this 
statutory monitoring device is required by statute. Public companies must have at least two 
supervisors in order to be in accordance with the TCA. Article 9 of the Listing Rules requires 
Newly-Listed Companies to appoint at least three supervisors when they apply to become listed.  
                                                          
36
 For example, according to the Article 218 of the TCA, supervisors shall supervise the execution of business 
operations of the company, and may at any time or from time to time investigate the business and financial 
conditions of the company, examine the accounting books and documents, and request the board of directors or 
managerial personnel to make reports thereon. 
37
 According to Article 23 of the TCA, both directors and supervisors shall owe duty of care and duty of loyalty to 
the company and shall be responsible for damages incurred by breaches of such duties.   
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Supervisors shall be elected by shareholder meetings under the cumulative voting as the 
default rule (articles of incorporation can stipulate otherwise).
38
 Companies also can opt to adopt 
the candidate nomination system as their method of electing supervisors.    
2.1.3.3 Monitoring Powers of Supervisors 
Supervisors can individually exercise their supervisory powers without obtaining the 
consent of all of the supervisors or the consent of the majority of all of the supervisors,
39
 which 
can eliminate the collective action problem, particularly when the majority of supervisors are 
controlled by, or unduly influenced by, controlling shareholders or management. However, if 
there are different ideas regarding whether or how to exercise monitoring power among several 
supervisors, then that can lead to conflicting and inefficient monitoring. For example, each 
supervisor has the discretionary right to exercise his or her authority on the behalf of the 
company to hire legal consultants or accountants as necessary to help them review and verify 
corporate financial reports,
40
 though inefficiency may result from repeatedly hiring consultants 
and accountants.       
One important weapon of supervisors is the right to verify financial reports prepared by 
the board of directors. Examining financial reports provides supervisors with opportunities to 
uncover hidden misconduct on the part of management. Supervisors are empowered to enjoy 
representation rights regarding the company in certain specific situations involving conflicts of 
interest between directors and the company. In situations such as “self-dealings”41 or company 
                                                          
38
 Article 216 of the TCA. 
39
 Article 221 of the TCA. 
40
 Paragraph 2, Article 218 of the TCA.  
41
 According to Article 213 of the TCA, in case of a lawsuit between the company and a director, the supervisor 
shall act on behalf of the company, unless otherwise provided by law; and the meeting of shareholders may also 
appoint some other person to act on behalf of the company in a lawsuit. 
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litigation against director(s),
42
 supervisors shall be the representatives for the company as the 
default rule so as to avoid potential breaches of the duty of loyalty in cases involving conflicts of 
interest.    
2.2 Dysfunctions of Supervisors 
Supervisors have monitoring power and representation rights, and they are expected to 
robustly and effectively monitor the board of directors and its appointed officers. However, these 
theoretical functions are rarely practiced in reality, and numerous corporate scandals have 
occurred in Taiwan in recent decades. The classic types of scandals have usually involved 
embezzlement by management (board of directors and senior officers) or illegal appropriations 
for unauthorized investments that have served only the interests of management. In the 
meantime, false financial reports have been used to disguise such illegal behavior. If supervisors 
do their jobs properly, they can review financial reports and attempt to uncover irregularities. 
Unfortunately, they usually fail to do their jobs and such failures can sometimes lead to massive 
financial damage being inflicted on investors. 
Many Taiwanese corporate commentators agree that supervisors have not functioned as 
originally anticipated in the TCA. Sometimes the supervisors became the accomplices of those 
who committed crimes. The primary reasons why Taiwanese supervisors fail to do what they 
should do include:  
                                                          
42
 According to Article 223 of the TCA, in case a director of a company that transacts sales with, or borrows money 
from, or conducts any legal act with the company, on his own account or for any other person, the supervisor shall 
act as the representative of the company. 
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2.2.1 Lack of Independence 
The TCA seeks to maintain objective monitoring by supervisors. The TCA, thus, provides 
that a supervisor cannot act concurrently as a director, a managerial officer or other 
staff/employee of the company. 43  Supervisors should exercise power for the benefit of all 
shareholders. In an ideal world, they should not be controlled or influenced by the management 
or any other groups or individuals when they exercise their monitoring powers. Independence is 
required by the TCA, but the current election mechanism for supervisors actually weakens the 
independence of supervisors. According to the TCA, directors and supervisors shall be elected at 
shareholder meetings, and elections for directors and supervisors must be held separately. 
Therefore, shareholder votes should be computed separately for each election. Shareholders can 
manipulate their votes during two different elections so as to secure as many directors and 
supervisors as they desire. Due to the separate elections requirement, it is likely that the 
controlling shareholders or those who hold large blocks of stock will be able to control the 
majority of the board of directors and the majority of supervisors in certain situations. The result 
is that contradictions can occur within the system of checks and balances.  
Even with cumulative voting as the default rule, in which minority shareholders could 
have their favorite candidates elected, and controlling shareholders or those who hold blocks of 
stock could still control the board of directors. Since supervisors are supported by the same 
groups of shareholders, it is difficult to expect them to effectively monitor directors who have 
been captured by the large shareholders. The concentrated nature of ownership structures in most 
Taiwanese companies (even listed companies) has led to the common belief that supervisors can 
be controlled by controlling shareholders and block-holders in certain circumstances.  
                                                          
43
 Article 222 of the TCA.  
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This situation can become even worse. Article 27 of the TCA allows the institutional 
shareholders to have several representatives elected as directors and supervisors. Therefore, some 
directors and supervisors may be elected with the support from the same institutional 
shareholders. It would be unrealistic to expect such supervisors to robustly monitor directors 
with whom they are affiliated.     
In certain extreme cases, a controlling shareholder can control the majority of seats on the 
board of directors and control all of the supervisors, which means that a true system of checks 
and balances does not exist. In practice, the election methods and the concentrated ownership 
structures of Taiwanese companies dictate that supervisors usually have close family or social 
ties with controlling shareholders who support them in elections. Thus, in practice, they tend to 
be figureheads instead of watchdogs for the interests of shareholders.44    
2.2.2 Lack of Adequate Power  
Most commentators agree that supervisors do not have the supervisory power necessary 
to perform their monitoring duties. For example, Article 218-2 of the TCA stipulates that 
supervisors can ask the board or the director(s) whose conduct is allegedly in violation of the 
law, articles of incorporation, or shareholder meetings resolutions to discontinue such conduct. 
However, this will not effectively prevent the board or director(s) from continuing to engage in 
such misconduct. The only method available to supervisors is to claim damages on the behalf of 
the company, but this can be done only after actual damages have resulted from misconduct. In 
some situations, doing this may be too late, because wrongdoers often abscond with money.   
                                                          
44
 OECD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN ASIA, supra note 1, at 21. 
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2.2.3 Asymmetry of Information  
Another difficulty that obstructs supervisors is the asymmetry of information between the 
boards of directors and supervisors. Supervisors are not board members, and they are usually 
sealed off from important information that could otherwise become the basis for launching 
necessary investigations.   
To sum up, the TCA equips supervisors with some monitoring capabilities.45 When the 
board of directors violates laws, regulations or company’s articles of incorporation, supervisors 
may request that the board terminate engaging in such acts. Supervisors also can convene special 
shareholder meetings for the purpose of dismissing directors. Avoiding conflicts of interest 
between directors and the company requires that supervisors, instead of the president, shall act as 
the representatives of the company. Finally, when eligible shareholders (meaning those who have 
continuously held 3% of the company’s shares for more than one year) make a request to 
particular director(s), a supervisor can take legal action against a director of the company. 
However, supervisors usually lack adequate information, independence from directors and 
shareholders, and have insufficient supervisory power. As a result, supervisory failures occur in 
public and private companies, small and large, in Taiwan. 
2.3 Recent Reforms Concerning Supervisors in Taiwan 
Reforms have recently been made in Taiwan for the purpose of remedying supervisors’ 
failures. These reforms fall into three categories: (1) enhancing independence, (2) additional 
supervisory powers, and (3) alleviating asymmetry of information.  
                                                          
45
 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN TAIWAN, supra note 2, at 14-15. 
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2.3.1 Enhancing Independence  
The 2001 amendment to the TCA requires public companies to have more than two 
supervisors.
46
 When there is a minimum of two supervisors, any controlling shareholder is less 
likely to be able to secure all of the seats for supervisors, except for certain types of extreme 
situations in which shareholders hold substantial percentages of shares. In such cases, minority 
shareholders with different interests may have more opportunities to have their candidates 
elected. Therefore, there can be supervisors who represent the interests of splinter groups of 
shareholders, instead of supervisors who work exclusively to promote the interests of controlling 
shareholders. Conflicts of interest among different groups of shareholders should encourage 
them to watch each other, which would allow checks and balances to be maintained for most 
shareholders. The minimum requirement that there be at least two supervisors can allow 
supervisors to share their monitoring workloads, and it better equip them to detect wrongdoing.  
Article 26-3 of the TSEA stipulates that, except when approval from a competent 
authority has been given, a company shall have at least one supervisor who does not have 
relationships with other supervisors and directors, including: (1) spousal relationship; or (2) 
familial relationship within the second degree of kinship. The laws require that ineligible 
supervisors be automatically dismissed. Taiwan’s legislature hopes to enhance supervisors’ 
independence from other supervisors and directors. Requiring that companies hire one qualified 
supervisor with no close family ties to other supervisors and directors is one part of an effective 
checks and balances system. Unfortunately, Taiwanese law ignores the ties with controlling 
shareholders, which has long been a serious problem.    
                                                          
46
 Paragraph 2, Article 216 of the TCA. 
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Section 2 of Article 26-3 of the TESA preempts Article 27 of the TCA. This means that 
representatives of the institutional shareholders may not be concurrently selected to act as 
directors and supervisors in a public company. Therefore, shareholders are eligible for election 
as either directors or supervisors. Institutional shareholders who have their own representatives 
elected as directors are unlikely to support their representatives to be elected as supervisors. It 
should be noted that this article is applicable only to public companies. This means that in non-
public companies the institutional shareholders are allowed to have their representatives elected 
to become directors and supervisors. 
Overall, the lack of independence from controlling shareholders and management has led 
Taiwan to reforms to enhance the independence of supervisors by requiring a mandatory 
minimum number of supervisors in a public company, by demanding at least one supervisor who 
has no close familial ties with directors and/or other supervisors, and by making Article 27 of the 
TCA inapplicable to public companies.   
2.3.2 Additional Types of Supervisory Power 
Recent amendments to the TCA provide supervisors with certain types of power, and 
constitute an attempt to develop a more effective form of monitoring. Situations such as 
directorate elections and lawsuits against directors typically require a resolution by shareholder 
meeting as matter of law. Boards of directors can, thus, avoid potential dismissal and lawsuits 
against themselves by not convening shareholder meetings. The TCA has attempted to deal with 
this problem by providing that when the board of directors refuses to, or is unable to, convene 
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shareholder meeting, supervisors may call a meeting when they deem it necessary for the benefit 
of the company.47 
Supervisors are not board members. They usually have no knowledge of the topics the 
board of directors discusses in the boardroom. Article 218-2 of the TCA specifies that 
supervisors can attend board meetings and deliver their opinions to the board. Attending the 
board meetings provides supervisors with opportunities to detect management misconduct.  
2.3.3 Alleviating Asymmetry of Information 
Article 218-2 of the TCA allows supervisors to obtain access to the agendas discussed in 
boardrooms. The law also requires directors to report to supervisors in certain situations. Article 
218-1 of the TCA specifies that when a director discovers that the company is likely to suffer 
substantial damages, he or she shall report to the supervisors immediately. The director, thus, has 
the legal obligation to report to supervisors and provide them with the necessary information 
immediately in order to allow them to take precautionary steps to prevent possible wrongdoing.  
2.3.4 Other Proposals for Supervisor System Reforms 
2.3.4.1 Independent Supervisors  
In 2002, the Listed Rules began requiring Newly-Listed Companies to appoint not only at 
least two independent directors, but also at least one independent supervisor.  Supervisors may be 
subject to the influence of controlling shareholders, so the idea of independent supervisor was 
introduced to enhance independence of supervisors and thereby allow them to engage in 
objective, effective monitoring. However, Taiwanese policymakers have never adopted this 
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concept. When independent directors were to be codified into the TSEA, independent 
supervisors lost their importance. In 2006, the Listing Rules abandoned the concept of 
independent supervisors as a listing requirement for Newly-Listed Companies.          
2.3.4.2 Supervisory Boards 
Any Taiwanese supervisor can exercise monitoring power in an individual capacity, 
without interference from their fellow supervisors. Hence, when there are multiple supervisors in 
one company, they do their monitoring jobs on their own, and coordination between the 
supervisors may be insufficient to the extent that monitoring efficacy may be reduced. Free-rider 
problems may exist among uncoordinated supervisors. Also, monitoring by individual 
supervisors may be insufficient to fight against the board of directors as a whole.    
Some Taiwanese scholars argue that Taiwan should consider introducing “supervisory 
boards” to replace the current institution of supervisors. The supervisory board system would 
operate in a manner that each supervisor would not exercise power individually, and supervisors 
would instead convene meetings to make resolutions by the majority of supervisors. Just as is the 
case with independent supervisors, supervisory boards have never drawn much attention from 
Taiwanese policymakers. The probable reason is that Taiwanese policymakers have lost 
confidence in conventional supervisors or other similar institutions.  
2.3.4.3 Conclusion 
Several methods have been utilized to reinforce supervisory monitoring, but drawbacks 
remain for the institution of supervisors in the TCA. The standards of independence for 
supervisors are too loose, given that controlling shareholders remain capable of capturing 
 33 
 
supervisors. For example, even under Article 26-3 of the TSEA, having ties to controlling 
shareholders does not disqualify supervisors. The current disclosure rules for Taiwanese listed 
companies require companies to disclose relevant information in their annual reports in cases 
where supervisors have close blood relationships with major shareholders who hold 1% or more 
of the outstanding shares (or are top-ten shareholders). The law does not prohibit controlling 
shareholders from using “bubbleheads” acting on their behalves if they want to avoid compliance 
with disclosure rules.  
Despite recent supervisor system reforms, many commentators still have serious 
reservations regarding the effectiveness of supervisors, and continue to call for additional 
reforms that require companies to appoint independent directors to replace supervisors.  Because 
there are concerns about the legal transplantations of independent directors, Taiwanese 
policymakers have not completely abandoned supervisors.    
2.4 Features of Taiwanese Capital Markets and Corporate Governance Issues 
This section of the dissertation will describe certain features of the Taiwanese capital 
market, in order to facilitate an analysis of Taiwanese corporate governance issues. Such features 
include family-controlled companies, cross-holdings and affiliated companies, concentrated 
ownership structures, and the passive role of institutional investors. 
2.4.1 Family-Controlled Companies 
Small- and medium-sized companies comprise over 90% of all of the companies (closely-
held and publicly-held) in Taiwan.
48
 Board members in such companies tend to be family 
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members and outsiders typically do not exert a substantial degree of control over the board of 
directors.
49
 Even after such companies go public or become listed companies, family members in 
some of these companies will retain boardroom dominance by having numerous family members 
and affiliates elected to the boards. Even though family members fail to keep dominance in the 
company after it goes list, they usually keep a substantial amount of shares that can ensure their 
representatives present in the boardroom.  
In general, both advantages and disadvantages exist in such family-controlled companies 
(there is no official definition of family-controlled companies in Taiwanese laws. Here, a family-
controlled company refers to a company whose board of directors is directly or indirectly 
dominated by a given group of family members). On one hand, family members can exert a 
strong leadership style and develop cohesive management teams, and they can run such 
businesses more smoothly than a company that must deal with various factions of shareholders. 
In addition, the presence of a large group shareholder can serve as a governance mechanism for 
policing management.
50
  
One the other hand, the controlling shareholders in a family-controlled company may 
exploit the interests of minority shareholders if no effective monitoring exists. Family-controlled 
companies have aroused concerns about corporate governance, because they have the potential 
for allowing controlling shareholders to gain benefit at the expense of non-controlling 
shareholders.
51
 In Taiwanese family-controlled companies, family members usually do not allow 
outsiders to become supervisors who can interfere with their control of the companies. The 
absence of internal monitoring does not necessarily mean that illegal activities are taking place. 
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However, if family members experience financial difficulties, they are likely to have fewer 
inhibitions about exploiting their positions for personal gain. The Reba scandal provides an 
example of this. All of the supervisors in the affiliates were family members or close relatives. 
When the Wang family faced financial difficulties, they misappropriated corporate assets without 
being monitored.
52
 
In short, a tradeoff can arise when controlling shareholders are present; benefits of 
reducing managerial agency costs, and costs of controlling shareholders’ exploitations.53 Non-
controlling shareholders may welcome the presence of controlling shareholders only when the 
benefits exceed the costs.
54
 However, the presence of controlling shareholders is usually less 
admirable in Taiwan, because numerous scandals have turned out to involve controlling 
shareholders.    
2.4.2 Pervasive Cross-Holdings and Affiliated Companies   
Taiwanese companies like to use cross-shareholdings of affiliated companies to 
strengthen their control in the companies. Prior to 2001, the TCA had no provision that 
prohibited cross-shareholding between parent companies and subsidiary companies.
55
 Subsidiary 
companies have been set up as investment companies that buy large amounts of their parent 
companies’ shares, a form of manipulation of the cross-holdings of shares. The directors of the 
parent company usually elect themselves or their affiliates as directors of subsidiaries. This 
allows them to influence how the subsidiaries vote in elections of parent company directors and 
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supervisors. This method allows directors of the parent company to entrench themselves and 
prevent replacement regardless of how poorly they run the company (see Figure 2). 
Figure 2: Entrenchment of the Incumbent Directors of Parent Companies Through Cross-
Shareholdings 
 
Source: Author 
 
The TCA was amended to deal with this problem by prohibiting subsidiaries from 
purchasing shares of their parent companies.
56
 In addition, subsidiary companies shall have no 
voting power vested in the shares issued by their parent companies.
57
  However, companies can 
bypass such prohibitions by setting up several indirectly affiliated companies or by failing to 
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reach the legal threshold (i.e., 50% of the voting shares or the total number of shares of a 
company).  
As a result, there is no generally effective way to avoid such arrangements, and the 
government offers the alternative of choosing to request that, under certain conditions, 
companies disclose whether they have cross-holdings in the affiliated companies. However, a 
controlling company can get around these disclosure rules. Figure 3 shows that E can indirectly 
control Listed Company D through multiple investments. B and C can be elected as D’s directors 
and supervisors under Taiwanese laws, and E can have substantial control over D.  
Figure 3: Investment Arrangements to Control a Company   
 
Source: Author 
 
2.4.3 Ownership Structures  
In comparison with U.S. companies, ownership structures of Taiwanese companies tend 
to be relatively concentrated. The block-holders (meaning those who control more than 5% of 
the outstanding shares) in listed companies are commonplace in the market. For example, among 
Taiwanese listed electronics companies that on average have appointed more than one 
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independent director on a monthly basis during 2005-2008, as shown in Table 2, the mean 
numbers of block-holders among the companies are around 1.8. Such ownership concentration is 
rarely seen in U.S. public held companies.    
Table 2: Numbers of Block-Holders in Taiwanese Electronics Listed Companies with at 
Least One Independent Director (2005-2008) 
The Number of Block-holders 
Year N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
2005 151 .00 9.00 1.9801 1.51644 
2006 157 .00 9.00 1.9299 1.47246 
2007 160 .00 8.00 1.7313 1.37691 
2008 175 .00 8.00 1.7771 1.40669 
                Source: Taiwan Stock Exchange 
 
The concentrated ownership structures of many Taiwanese companies raise concerns 
about Taiwanese corporate governance. One, or a small number of, controlling shareholder(s), 
who directly or indirectly control the boards of directors and supervisors, can easily capture 
some companies. When minority shareholders pay more attention to the stock price than to the 
firm’s performance, the controlling shareholders may take advantage of opportunities to defraud 
investors. 
In Taiwan’s capital market, most of the capitalization of listed companies comes from 
individual investors who tend to focus on the stock price fluctuations of their holdings rather 
than corporate governance issues. In a manner consistent with “rational ignorance,” they believe 
that the expected ﬁnancial beneﬁts of making informed shareholder voting decisions are 
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outweighed by the expense of becoming informed.
58
 They prefer to sell the shares of companies 
that underperform or experience financial crises, but they usually suffer financial losses in the 
corporate scandals.      
2.4.4 Passive Institutional Investors   
In Taiwan, individual investors constitute almost 80% of trading volume, and are the 
major participants in the stock market, with institutional investors owning only a minor portion 
of shares.
59
 For example, Table 3 shows that in 2009, foreign institutional investors held an 
average of 16.4%, and domestic institutional investors held an average of 11.6%, of the overall 
stock market.
60
 As mentioned above, when making investment decisions, individual investors are 
swayed by market sentiments to a greater extent than institutional investors. They often care little 
about the business activities of the companies in which they invest and often fail to vote in 
elections of directors and supervisors.   
In Taiwan, institutional investors are restricted by regulations regarding the shareholding 
limit on the total number of shares they are allowed to own or hold during a certain period.
61
 As 
is the case with individual investors, Taiwanese domestic institutional investors are more 
interested in stock prices than in governance issues. Taiwan’s government recently initiated a 
policy of increasing the role of institutional investors with regard to corporate governance. 
Unfortunately, their ownership remains too limited to advocate in favor of changes in corporate 
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governance.
62
 Also, in the absence of institutional mechanisms to protect interests of foreign 
investors, they will likely have short-term investments rather than long-term investments.
63
  
Table 3: Types of Investors and Trading Value Ratios in the Stock Market
64
 
Year Domestic 
institutional 
investors 
Foreign 
Institutional 
Investors 
Domestic 
Individual 
Investors 
Foreign 
Individual 
Investors 
1999 9.4 2.4 88.2 0 
2000 10.3 3.6 86.1 0 
2001 9.7 5.9 84.4 0 
2002 10.1 6.7 82.3 0.9 
2003 11.5 9.4 77.8 1.3 
2004 11.6 10.9 75.9 1.6 
2005 15.4 14.5 68.4 1.7 
2006 11.0 16.2 70.6 2.2 
2007 13.0 17.6 67.3 2.1 
2008 14.0 22.1 61.7 2.3 
2009 11.6 16.4 72 0 
2010.01-2010.08 13 19.2 67.8 0 
Source: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN TAIWAN, supra note 2, at 8. 
 
Table 4 shows that because appointing independent directors is viewed as a good 
governance practice, foreign corporate/institutional investors generally become more interested 
in investing companies that have independent directors than companies that have no independent 
directors. However, domestic corporate/institutional investors see the appointment of 
independent directors as a minor factor when they make investment decisions. 
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Table 4: Percentages of Average Shareholdings Among Foreign and Domestic 
Corporate/Institutional Investors in Taiwanese Electronic Listed Companies (2005-2006)  
Year Electronic listed companies with 
independent directors 
Electronic listed companies without 
independent directors 
Foreign 
corporate/ 
institutional  
investors 
Domestic 
corporate/ 
institutional 
investors 
 
Foreign 
corporate/institutio
nal investors 
Domestic 
corporate/ 
institutional 
investors 
2005 10.79% 25.22% 9.03% 24.18% 
2006 12.86% 20.55% 10.98% 22.72% 
Source: Taiwan Stock Exchange 
 
2.5 Corporate Governance Problems in Taiwan 
Different ownership structures will lead to different corporate governance problems.
65
 
These features in Taiwan (including family-controlled companies, cross-shareholdings, affiliated 
companies, passive institutional investors, etc.) can facilitate a controlling shareholder to acquire 
a substantial degree of control over boards of directors and supervisors in certain situations.  
The presence of controlling shareholders is often found in Taiwanese companies, even in 
the listed companies. When there are no feasible challenges for the control of controlling 
shareholders and when this control is attained without sufficient equity investment to the extent 
that aligns their interests with the company in which they invest, agency problems arises.
66
 In 
such circumstances, controlling shareholders may potentially exploit other shareholders.  
In such circumstances, the primary Taiwanese governance question is how to build 
internal governance systems that minimize the possibility of exploitations by controlling 
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shareholders and their fellow directors, supervisors, and senior officers. The ownership structures 
and other capital features create many opportunities for controlling shareholders to secure excess 
control (i.e., the difference between control [voting] right and cash-flow right), which facilitates 
potential wrongdoing at the expense of minority shareholders.
67
 
As shown in Table 5, on average, the largest shareholders in the Taiwanese non-financial 
companies control 62.69% of the board seats and 49.55% of the supervisors. Additionally, a gap 
exists between control rights and cash-flow rights in Taiwanese companies. In case a controlling 
shareholder has major shareholdings that align him or her with interests of the company, they 
may actively monitor the management as a corporate governance mechanism that can reduce 
agency costs. However, when a controlling shareholder’s control right exceeds his or her cash-
flow right, his or her interest may deviate from minority shareholders’ interests, which could be 
exploited by the controlling shareholder. The discrepancy between control right and cash-flow 
right provides an incentive and/or opportunity for controlling shareholders to exploit the interests 
of minority shareholders.
68
 This endangers the corporate governance in Taiwan.
69
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Table 5: Board Composition and Ownership Structure in Taiwanese Listed Companies 
 Financial 
Industry 
Non-Financial 
Industry 
Board Composition 
Percentage of Largest Shareholder Serves as 
Director (%) 
59.18 62.69 
Percentage of Largest Shareholder Serves as 
Supervisor (%) 
57.48 49.55 
Number of directors (average) 11.80 7.13 
Number of supervisors (average) 3.29 2.57 
Ownership Structure 
(A)Control Right of Largest Shareholders 
(average) (%) 
24.95 29.81 
(B)Cash-Flow Right of Largest Shareholders 
(average) (%) 
17.17 22.13 
Excess Control (=A-B) (%) 7.78 7.68 
Pyramidal Structure  0.46 0.18 
Cross-Shareholding  0.34 0.33 
Source: YIN-HUA YEH & CHEN-EN KO, DE RI MEI HAN GEGUO DULI DONGSHI, SHENJI 
WEIYUAN HUI JI JITA ZHUANMEN WEIYUAN HUI FAZHI GUIFAN JI SHIWU 
YUNZUO QINGKUANG [THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS, 
AUDIT COMMITTEES AND OTHER FUNCTIONAL COMMITTEES IN GERMANY, 
JAPAN, UNITED  STATES,  AND  KOREA],  294-95 (TAIWAN FSC, 2006). 
 
Take Procomp, for example; Chairwoman Yeh and her brother held 7.83% of Procomp’s 
shares by the time the Procomp scandal broke out, but they secured all of five directors.
70
 This 
situation will create an incentive for them to exploit minority shareholders’ interests. In 
conclusion, in addition to the traditional agency problem that arises out of the differences in 
interests between management and shareholders, the presence of controlling shareholders can 
lead to another serious agency problem for Taiwanese companies. Even when non-controlling 
shareholders support supervisors, the weakness of Taiwan’s current supervisory institution 
appears to be insufficiently reliable in preventing possible exploitations by controlling 
shareholders. In contrast, the institution of independent directors has been deemed an effective 
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solution for dealing with Taiwan’s corporate governance problems, at least in the minds of most 
corporate commentators and policymakers. 
Taiwan’s ownership structure has formed many business groups that make important 
contributions to Taiwan’s economy.71  It is possible for a controlling shareholder in a given 
business group to tunnel out corporate assets of one of the affiliated companies.
72
 Through cross-
shareholding, a controlling shareholder (e.g., a parent company) can control most or all of the 
directors and supervisors in its subsidiary and commit wrongdoing that harms the company’s 
interests, without any internal oversight.   
It is a common practice that major shareholders in Taiwanese companies borrow money 
from banks by pledging their shares. When prices of the pledged shares plummet, such 
shareholders will need money to maintain the prices of the pledged shares to avoid recourse from 
banks. Such pressure usually provides some controlling shareholders in Taiwan with reasons to 
embezzle corporate assets.    
2.6 Summary: History of Taiwan’s Corporate Governance Reforms Regarding the 
Supervisor System 
2.6.1 A Brief History About Politics in Taiwan and Corporate Governance Reforms 
Basically, the calling for corporate governance reforms did not put too much pressure on 
Taiwanese policymakers and legislation to take actions to deal with corporate governance 
problems until the 1990s. For some historical and political reasons, both the administrative and 
legislative powers were monopolized by the ruling party, Kuomintang (KMT), and people in 
Taiwan were not allowed to elect their legislators three decades ago. In 1991, Taiwan dismissed 
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all then-legislators (who were elected when the KMT government ruled Mainland China) in the 
Legislative Yuan, and in 1992 a whole new group of legislators was elected. Henceforth, there 
was an election for legislators every three years (currently, every four years).  
From 1992, more and more Taiwanese listed companies have suffered financial distress 
and most of them have gone bankrupt or ended up in liquidation.73 The number is more than 20 
times that from the previous decade (there were eight cases from 1980 to 1991).74 This kind of 
incident usually results in huge losses for investors. Taiwanese legislation began to feel pressure 
from their voters. However, the policymakers are often conservative when considering the 
reforms.  
Even though Taiwanese voters can elect the president (highest administrative agency) and 
legislators, KMT keeps dominance in both administration and legislation sectors. The voters’ 
anger might not be taken into serious consideration while the policy is made.  
The KMT’s political dominance no longer existed when the Democratic Progressive 
Party (DPP) won the presidential election in 2000. Since then, Taiwan has had two major parties 
(KMT and DPP) in political competition, and the voices of voters draw more and more 
policymakers’ attention.  
As previously mentioned, most Taiwanese corporate commentators believe that the 
weakness of supervisors is one of the reasons leading to many corporate failures and scandals. To 
carry out monitoring tasks effectively, supervisors need strong monitoring power and a 
mechanism that can ensure their independence from the management and controlling 
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shareholders. Prior to 2000, there was almost no reform to deal with these issues. Since 2001, 
Taiwan has launched some reforms to address this matter. For example, in order to maintain 
independence of supervisors, laws require the minimum seats of supervisors for public 
companies (Article 216 of the TCA in 2001 amendment). Additionally, there are laws that have 
established disqualifications regarding supervisors and that ban institutional shareholders’ 
representatives from being directors and supervisors in public companies (Article 26-3 of TSEA 
in 2006 amendment). Furthermore, with an aim at providing supervisors with stronger 
monitoring power, they are allowed to attend board meetings (Article 218-2 of the TCA in 2001 
amendment) and can convene shareholder meetings in emergencies (Article 220 of the TCA in 
2001 amendment). In 2002, TWSE even introduced independent supervisors for Taiwanese listed 
companies. 
During the ruling period by DPP, several shocking scandals (including the Procomp 
scandal) occurred, and the policymakers quickly responded and sought to restore investor 
confidence and soothe voter anger before the next election. The corporate reforms since then 
have been happening faster than before. The voices from voters are becoming more and more 
powerful. For example, after the Reba scandal, lawmakers from the ruling party and opposition 
parties in Taiwan called for then-Prime Minister Su Tseng-chang to take responsibility and 
resign.
75
 
2.6.2 The Discussions of Supervisor System Reforms  
Generally, there are debates about how to improve the supervisor system, and there are 
many choices from which to choose (for example, “supervisory board” and “independent 
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supervisor”). Probably concerned about the new institution that will bring shocks to companies; 
Taiwanese policymakers prefer reforming the traditional supervisor system. There have been a 
few reforms of the supervisor system, but several corporate scandals (including Procomp) have 
proven the failure of such reforms, so policymakers turn to consider the institution of 
independent directors. Having the same concerns as the supervisor system reforms, the 
institution of independent directors is essentially optional for companies (this will be discussed 
further in Chapter 3). 
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Chapter Three: The Introduction and Evolution of Independent Directors in Taiwan 
This chapter will offer a basic and comprehensive legal background review regarding 
Taiwan’s introduction and evolution of institution of independent directors.  
3.1 The Introduction and Evolution of Independent Directors in Taiwan 
3.1.1 2001 Amendment to the TCA  
With regard to corporate scandals, Taiwanese commentators argue that insufficient 
supervisory power is the primary cause of the failures of supervisors, and have advocated giving 
supervisors more powers. For example, it is necessary to provide supervisors with adequate 
information prior to inappropriate or illegal decisions being made by boards, so the TCA 
provides that supervisors can attend board meetings and deliver their opinions.
76
 Article 220 of 
the TCA also gives supervisors an expanded range of discretionary power to decide whether 
provisional shareholder meetings should be held in case of emergencies. It is unfortunate that 
these additional powers still cannot preclude bad board decisions or misbehavior from occurring. 
Supervisors can, at best, function as an alarm system for the interests of shareholders. 
In addition to the 2001 amendment to the TCA, Taiwan has developed various corporate 
reforms that offer supervisors expanded powers, but such reforms ultimately lead to nowhere. 
The non-stop corporate scandals have shown that supervisors are usually unable to prevent 
wrongdoing by boards of directors, managers, and controlling shareholders, and are often unable 
to even warn shareholders before such wrongdoing occurred. Some corporate scandals have 
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attracted a great deal of attention from the public and from corporate scholars who remain 
dissatisfied with the institution of supervisors, even after the 2001 amendment to the TCA.   
Instead of retaining supervisors, many Taiwanese scholars have suggested that Taiwan 
introduce the practice of making use of independent directors, an idea imported from the U.S. 
legal regime, whose corporate governance and internal checks and balances system are deemed 
to be better than those in use in Taiwan. Prior to the 2001 amendment to the TCA, holding shares 
was a prerequisite for election as a director or supervisor. This requirement was deleted in the 
TCA, and some scholars believed that meant that the TCA had officially introduced independent 
directors.
77
 However, many commentators disagreed with this argument. Finally, the competent 
authority clearly stated that the concept of independent directors was not an official part of the 
TCA.    
3.1.2 First Initiative—TWSE’s Listing Rules and Recommendations for Best Governance 
Practice 
On Feb. 12, 2002, the TWSE officially introduced the institution of independent directors 
by promulgating Listing Rules requiring Newly-Listed Companies to appoint at least two 
independent directors when they apply for listing reviews, and their applications will be rejected 
for non-compliance.
78
 The requirement regarding the appointment of independent directors is an 
important initiative in Taiwan’s recent corporate governance reforms during the last decade, 
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because it fundamentally changes the traditional governance system that was specified in the 
TCA, which does not have any relevant provisions regarding independent directors. Even more 
important, most of Taiwan’s companies were unfamiliar with, or lacked knowledge of, this 
institution. Newly-Listed Companies are subject to the Listing Rules, and have no option but to 
hire at least two independent directors for their boards in order to pass a listing review by the 
TWSE.  
However, mandatory appointments of independent directors apply only during listing 
reviews, and Newly-Listed Companies may choose to not retain independent directors afterwards 
at their own discretion. Also, the Listing Rules are not applicable to companies listed before Feb. 
12, 2002, but such companies can voluntarily opt to appoint independent directors and set up 
special committees as they see fit.
79
 
Since 2002, both appointment of independent directors and establishment of special 
board committees have been recommended by the TWSE and competent authority. Under the 
instructions of the competent authority (i.e., FSC), TWSE and GreTai Securities Market (a 
Taiwan OTC exchange) (GTSM), in 2002, jointly issued “Corporate Governance Best-Practice 
Principles for TWSE/GTSM Listed Companies (Best Practice Principles)” recommending that a 
listed company appoint independent directors and set up special committees.
80
 In the meantime, 
the FSC amended the regulations governing the annual reports and the public reports of listed 
                                                          
79
 The TWSE was hesitant to request all listed companies to appoint independent directors due to a fierce opposition 
from companies. However, the TWSE adopted a “comply or disclose” policy requiring disclosure of “independence” 
of directors and supervisors.  
80
 According to Article 28 of the Best Practice Principles, for the purpose of developing monitoring functions and 
strengthening management mechanisms, the board of directors of a TWSE/GTSM listed company may, taking into 
account the basis of the size of the board and the number of the independent directors, set up special committees of 
various functions to be stipulated in the articles of incorporation. Article 29 of the Best Practice Principles provides 
that it is advisable that a TWSE/GTSM listed company make it the first priority to set up the audit committee. The 
2002 edition of the Best Practice Principles is available at http://eng.selaw.com.tw/ShowHistory.asp. (last visited 
Oct. 31, 2011). 
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companies and required companies to disclose information of independent directors and 
supervisors.
81
 The information disclosed will be sufficient for investors to determine whether a 
company has appointed independent directors in accordance with TWSE’s Listing Rules or Best 
Practice Principles. 
3.1.3 Taiwan Government’s Policy of Introducing Independent Directors  
Taiwan’s Executive Yuan (i.e., highest administrative department) sought to build a 
better governance system in Taiwan, and passed a 2003 resolution called “Accountability of 
Companies in Taiwan: Policy Agenda and Action Plan to Strengthen Corporate Governance 
(Governance Policy).” This resolution declared a plan to introduce independent directors by 
amending the TSEA.
82
 The Governance Policy declared that one of Taiwan’s important policies 
was to strengthen corporate governance mechanisms. Such mechanisms included: gradually 
establishing a system of independent directors and supervisors; allowing the establishment of a 
one-tier board structure; allowing public companies to form permanent functional committees to 
replace boards of managing directors; expanding the introduction of nominees for independent 
directors and supervisors; and, promoting the procurement of liability insurance for directors and 
supervisors.
83
 Based on the Governance Policy, it was clear that Taiwan’s government decided to 
introduce independent directors as a method of developing better corporate governance systems 
in Taiwanese companies. 
Furthermore, in August 2005, Taiwan’s Executive Yuan demonstrated its determination 
to improve corporate governance by requesting that all “state-run companies” (government is the 
                                                          
81
 Article 10 of “Regulations Governing Information to be Published in Annual Reports of Public Companies (Mar. 
13, 2003).” 
82
 The Governance Policy is available at http://www.cepd.gov.tw/m1.aspx?sNo=0000249&ex=1&ic=0 (last visited 
Sep. 26, 2011). 
83
 Id. at 7-8. 
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sole or controlling shareholder)
84
 appoint independent director(s) as good models for other 
companies in Taiwan.    
3.1.4 Codification of Independent Directors—2005 Amendment to the TSEA 
After the Procomp scandal, other similar scandals were uncovered in 2004. One 
Taiwanese commentator thus concluded that “2004 seemed like the year of fraud.”85  These 
scandals emerged years after the promulgation of the Listing Rules and induced Taiwan to 
further codify independent directors in the 2005 Amendment to the TSEA. This Amendment has 
become the primary legal source concerning Taiwanese independent directors.
86
 
Article 14-2 of the TSEA provides that a public company may amend its articles of 
incorporation to appoint independent directors. The competent authority (i.e., FSC), if necessary, 
can require companies to appoint independent directors, not less than two in number and not less 
than one-fifth of the total number of directors, after reviewing the company’s scale, equity 
structure, type of operations, and other relevant factors. Thus, the appointments of independent 
directors are not mandatory in most public companies. Public companies can legally have 
independent directors by voluntarily amending their articles of incorporation or by mandatory 
orders from the competent authority. 87  It should be pointed out that independent directors 
appointed prior to the enactment of the TSEA do not automatically become independent directors 
                                                          
84
 In Taiwan, many businesses of electricity, water, and gasoline service are monopolized by state-run companies. 
The government usually is the sole or largest shareholder that can control the whole company.     
85
 OECD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN ASIA, supra note 1, at 49. 
86
 The Amendment regarding independent directors and audit committee took effect on Jan. 1, 2007. 
87
 According to a directive issued by FSC on Mar. 28, 2006, financial corporations (including financial holding 
companies, banks, securities dealers, insurers) and public corporations with paid-in capital exceeding 50 billion New 
Taiwan Dollars (approximately 1.66 billion US dollars) must have independent directors in accordance with Article 
14-2 of the TSEA. On Mar. 22, 2011,  this directive was replaced by a new directive which requires financial 
corporations and public corporations with paid-in capital exceeding 10 billion New Taiwan Dollars (approximately 
0.33 billion US dollars) must have mandatory independent directors. 
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under the TSEA unless they are reelected in compliance with independent standards and election 
procedures set by the TSEA.  
Unless being requested by the competent authority, the appointments of independent 
director are optional for most Taiwanese public companies. Once a company opts to appoint 
independent directors, some election procedures and eligibilities must be applied in accordance 
with Article 14-2 of the TSEA. Specifically, the company should expressly add a clause 
regarding the appointment of independent directors to its articles of incorporation. The 
“nomination candidate system” is mandatory for electing independent directors.  
A candidate must have either professional expertise (legal, accounting, financial, or the 
like) or working experiences related to the business with which the company involves.
88
 A 
candidate must not have any sorts of proscribed “ties” with company or its affiliates and the 
insiders.
89
 
                                                          
88
 Article 2 of Regulations Governing Appointment of Independent Directors and Compliance Matters for Public 
Companies (Independent Directors Regulations) (Mar. 28, 2006), an independent director of a public company shall 
meet one of the following professional qualification requirements, together with at least five years work experience: 
1. An instructor or higher in a department of commerce, law, finance, accounting, or other academic department 
related to the business needs of the company in a public or private junior college, college, or university; 
2. A judge, public prosecutor, attorney, certified public accountant, or other professional or technical specialist who 
has passed a national examination and been awarded a certificate in a profession necessary for the business of the 
company. 
3. Have work experience in the area of commerce, law, finance, or accounting, or otherwise necessary for the 
business of the company. 
Independent Directors Regulations are available at http://eng.selaw.com.tw/FLAWDAT01.asp?LSID=FL038791 
(last visited Oct. 05, 2011). 
89
 Article 3 of Independent Directors Regulations: During the two years before being elected or during the term of 
office, an independent director of a public company may not have been or be any of the following: 
1. An employee of the company or any of its affiliates. 
2. A director or supervisor of the company or any of its affiliates. The same does not apply, however, in cases where 
the person is an independent director of the company, its parent company, or any subsidiary in which the company 
holds, directly or indirectly, more than 50 percent of the voting shares. 
3. A natural-person shareholder who holds shares, together with those held by the person's spouse, minor children, 
or held by the person under others' names, in an aggregate amount of one percent or more of the total number of 
issued shares of the company or ranking in the top 10 in holdings. 
4. A spouse, relative within the second degree of kinship, or lineal relative within the fifth degree of kinship, of any 
of the persons in the preceding three subparagraphs. 
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However, appointing independent directors does not involve replacing supervisors. 
Unless a company sets up an audit committee, supervisors remain necessary. Thus, some 
Taiwanese companies may concurrently have supervisors and independent directors and both are 
monitoring devices. Article 14-3 of the TSEA states that when a company selects independent 
directors, the legal effect is that some proscribed matters shall be submitted to the board of 
directors for approval by resolution (unless approval has been obtained from the competent 
authority).
90
  
Attending board meetings, in which the proscribed matters are to be resolved, gives 
independent directors opportunities to review whether such matters are contrary to the interests 
of shareholders. Once they determine that they have some concerns about a particular matter, 
they can deliver a dissent opinion or qualified opinion that shall be noted in the minutes of the 
board meetings, in accordance with the TSEA. The result of having separate monitoring devices 
is that independent directors and supervisors may have their own primary monitoring 
responsibilities.   
                                                                                                                                                                                           
5. A director, supervisor, or employee of a corporate shareholder that directly holds five percent or more of the total 
number of issued shares of the company or that holds shares ranking in the top five in holdings.  
6. A director, supervisor, officer, or shareholder holding five percent or more of the shares, of a specified company 
or institution that has a financial or business relationship with the company. 
7. A professional individual who, or an owner, partner, director, supervisor, or officer of a sole proprietorship, 
partnership, company, or institution that, provides commercial, legal, financial, accounting services or consultation 
to the company or to any affiliate of the company, or a spouse thereof. 
90
 The matters include:  
1. Adoption or amendment of an internal control system; 
2. Adoption or amendment of handling procedures for financial or operational actions of material significance, such 
as acquisition or disposal of assets, derivatives trading, extension of monetary loans to others, or endorsements or 
guarantees for others; 
3. A matter bearing on the personal interests of a director; 
4. A material asset or derivatives transaction; 
5. A material monetary loan, endorsement, or provision of guarantee; 
6. The offering, issuance, or private placement of any equity-type securities; 
7. The hiring or dismissal of an attesting CPA, or the compensation given thereto; 
8. The appointment or discharge of a financial, accounting, or internal auditing officer; 
9. Any other material matter required by the competent authority; 
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Independent directors who are also board members can function in different ways than 
supervisors within the context of monitoring. For example, prior notices must be sent to 
independent directors before board meetings, so if the company fails to do so and absentee 
directors fail to attend meetings, any resolutions that are arrived at during such meetings should 
be void. Additionally, independent directors can vote in the boardroom and are supposed to be 
provided with sufficient information prior to making decisions. Independent directors can at least 
have their opinions recorded in the board minutes so as to alert shareholders when the board of 
directors makes any suspicious decisions (see Figure 4). 
Figure 4: Two Monitoring Devices Exist Within a Company Which Appoints Independent 
Directors 
 
Source: Author 
 
Board of directors 
Matters specified in Article 14-3 of TSEA 
Supervisors 
Should be approved by majority of board 
Independent directors can deliver dissent 
or qualified opinions   
 May monitor all conduct of 
board and officers; 
 May attend the board meetings; 
 May request information from 
the management; 
 May stop the board and its 
members from proceeding with 
misconduct; 
 May convene shareholder 
meeting in emergencies.  
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3.1.5 Codification of Audit Committee—2005 Amendment to the TSEA  
In addition to independent directors, the 2005 amendment to the TSEA also introduced 
the “audit committee,” which could completely supplant supervisors. The audit committee 
should consist of a minimum of at least three independent directors, and one of them should have 
a professional background in finance or accounting. Companies are free to have an audit 
committee if they deem it appropriate, unless requested to do so by the competent authority.91  
A company with an audit committee should no longer have supervisors, legally speaking. 
This indicates that Taiwanese policymakers believe that the functions provided by both an audit 
committee and supervisors may completely overlap and be interchangeable, and the audit 
committee can assume all of the tasks that supervisors are supposed to handle. 
Article 14-5 of the TSEA stipulates that if a company establishes an audit committee, the 
proscribed matters shall be subject to the consent of one-half or more of all audit committee 
members and be submitted to the board of directors for a resolution.
92
 Therefore, a member of 
the audit committee who is also an independent director can both deliver opinions regarding 
proscribed matters, and can also vote on such matters. The proscribed matters relate to conflicts 
                                                          
91
 At present, no Taiwanese company is required to establish the audit committee. 
92
 According to Paragraph 1, Article 14-5 of the TSEA, the matters include (same as matters in Article 14-3 of the 
TSEA, except for items 2 and 10):  
1. Adoption or amendment of an internal control system;  
2. Assessment of the effectiveness of the internal control system;  
3. Adoption or amendment of handling procedures for financial or operational actions of material significance, such 
as acquisition or disposal of assets, derivatives trading, extension of monetary loans to others, or endorsements or 
guarantees for others;  
4. A matter bearing on the personal interests of a director or supervisor;  
5. A material asset or derivatives transaction;  
6. A material monetary loan, endorsement, or provision of guarantee;  
7. The offering, issuance, or private placement of any equity-type securities; 
8. The hiring or dismissal of an attesting CPA, or the compensation given thereto;  
9. The appointment or discharge of a financial, accounting, or internal auditing officer;  
10. Annual and semi-annual financial reports;  
11. Any other material matter required by the company or the competent authority. 
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of interest, fundamental transactions, or financial report integrity. An audit committee should be 
the gatekeeper who can review the legality or appropriateness of these matters.  
However, except for annual or semi-annual reports, even if such matters fail to be 
approved by the audit committee, they can be ratified by two-thirds or more of all directors, but 
the resolution of the audit committee shall be recorded in the minutes of the board meetings
93
 
(see Figure 5).  
Figure 5: Legal Procedural Requirements for Board Decision-Making for Companies with 
Audit Committees 
 
Source: Author 
 
                                                          
93
 According to Paragraph 2, Article 14-5 of the TSEA, with the exception of subparagraph 10 (i.e., Annual and 
semi-annual financial reports), any matter under a subparagraph of the preceding paragraph that has not been 
approved with the consent of one-half or more of all audit committee members may be undertaken upon the consent 
of two-thirds or more of all directors, without regard to the restrictions of the preceding paragraph, and the 
resolution of the audit committee shall be recorded in the minutes of the directors meeting. 
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3.1.6 Mandatory Establishment of Remuneration Committee 
Article 14-6 of the TSEA was added in 2010 and required all listed companies to 
establish remuneration committees.
94
 Given the authorization derived from that Article, the FSC 
issued the “Regulations Governing the Appointment and Exercise of Powers by the 
Remuneration Committee of a Company Whose Stock is Listed on the Stock Exchange or 
Traded Over the Counter (Remuneration Rules),” in order to set the legal standards for corporate 
compliance.
95
  
Note that remuneration committee members are not directors but are instead appointed by 
the board of directors. The committee shall consist of not fewer than three members. Committee 
members must meet certain legal requirements regarding professionalism,
96
 disqualifications,
97
 
and standards of independence.
98
 When the board of directors declines to adopt, or seeks to 
                                                          
94
 This Article will take effect on Jan. 01, 2012. 
95
 The Remuneration Rules are available at http://law.moj.gov.tw/Eng/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?PCode=G0400149 
(last visited Oct. 02, 2011). 
96
 According to Article 4 of the Remuneration Rules, a remuneration committee member shall meet one of the 
following professional qualification requirements, together with at least 5 years work experience:  
1. An instructor or higher in a department of commerce, law, finance, accounting, or other academic department 
related to the business needs of the company in a public or private junior college, college, or university.  
2. A judge, public prosecutor, attorney, certified public accountant, or other professional or technical specialist who 
has passed a national examination and been awarded a certificate in a profession necessary for the business of the 
company.  
3. Have work experience in the area of commerce, law, finance, or accounting, or otherwise necessary for the 
business of the company. 
97
 According to Article 4 of the Remuneration Rules, a person to whom any of the following circumstances applies 
may not serve as a remuneration committee member; if already serving in such capacity, the person shall be 
dismissed:  
1. Any of the circumstances in the subparagraphs of Article 30 of the TCA.  
2. Any violation of the remuneration committee member qualification requirements set out in the Rules. 
98
 According to Article 6 of the Remuneration Rules, during the 2 years before being appointed or during the term of 
office, a remuneration committee member shall not have been or be any of the following: 
1. An employee of the company or any of its affiliates. 
2. A director or supervisor of the company or any of its affiliates. The same does not apply, however, in cases where 
the person is an independent director of the company, its parent company, or any subsidiary in which the company 
holds, directly or indirectly, more than 50 percent of the voting shares. 
3. A natural-person shareholder who holds shares, together with those held by the person's spouse, minor children, 
or held by the person under any other's name, in an aggregate amount of 1 percent or more of the total number of 
issued shares of the company or ranking in the top 10 in shareholding. 
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modify, a recommendation made by the remuneration committee, it shall require the consent of a 
majority of the directors in attendance at a meeting attended by two-thirds or more of the entire 
board. The board shall specifically explain whether the remuneration passed by the board 
exceeds in any way the recommendation of the remuneration committee. If the remuneration 
passed by the board of directors exceeds the recommendation of the remuneration committee, the 
circumstances and causes for the difference shall be specified in the board meeting minutes and 
shall be disclosed within two days after the resolution by the board of directors. Note that the 
remuneration committee members are neither directors nor independent directors. However, 
according to the Remuneration Rules, when a company appoints independent directors, at least 
one independent director shall participate in the remuneration committee, and the entire 
membership shall unanimously elect the independent director to serve as the chairman on the 
committee.
99
 
3.1.7 Supplements to the Institution of Independent Directors in Taiwan 
3.1.7.1 Database for Independent Directors and Independent Supervisors 
After the introduction of the institution of independent directors, Taiwan should consider 
whether there is sufficient number of qualified candidates on the market. The TSEA’s limitation 
on the number of companies on whose boards independent directors can serve raises concerns 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
4. A spouse, relative within the second degree of kinship, or lineal relative within the third degree of kinship, of any 
of the persons in the preceding three subparagraphs. 
5. A director, supervisor, or employee of a corporate shareholder that directly holds 5 percent or more of the total 
number of issued shares of the company or ranks in the top 5 in shareholding. 
6. A director, supervisor, managerial officer, or shareholder holding 5 percent or more of the shares, of a specified 
company or institution that has a financial or business relationship with the company. 
7. A professional individual who, or an owner, partner, director, supervisor, or managerial officer of a sole 
proprietorship, partnership, company, or institution that, provides commercial, legal, financial, or accounting 
services or consultation to the company or to any affiliate of the company, or a spouse thereof. 
99
 According to Article 8 of the Remuneration Rules, when a company has selected independent directors, at least 
one independent director shall participate on the remuneration committee, and the entire membership shall 
unanimously elect the independent director to serve as the convener and meeting chair.  
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about whether or not there is a sufficient supply of qualified personnel.100 For example, the 
number of currently TWSE-listed companies is 774, and there are 590 GTSM (OTC) companies 
(as of Sep., 2011). The Governance Principles suggest that every listed or GTSM company 
should have at least two independent directors. Assuming that each director serves at only one 
company, there exists a need for more than 2,700 independent director candidates. Furthermore, 
public non-listed companies may also require independent directors on their board for better 
internal governance.  
In order to deal with this issue, the SFI, at the request of the FSC, established a database 
called “Independent Directors/Independent Supervisors Registry.”101 The qualifications for being 
registered in the database include both independence and professionalism in accordance with the 
standards of independence set forth by the TSEA and the relevant regulations. Therefore, public 
companies may choose to select appropriate independent directors from those in the database, 
without having to examine the qualifications of every single candidate. There is currently 
information about 2,677 qualified candidates in the database.102 
3.1.7.2 Legal Incentives  
The separation of ownership and operational control is common in modern companies. 
However, the TSEA requires that directors as a group must hold a minimum percentage of 
company’s shares that ranges from 0.2% up to 1.5%, based on the amount of a company’s paid-
in capital, and the same rule applies to supervisors. Directors and supervisors are subject to fines 
if they fail to maintain the proscribed minimum ownership requirements. The Rules and Review 
                                                          
100
 According to Article 4 of Independent Directors Regulations, no independent director of a public company may 
concurrently serve as an independent director of more than three other public companies. 
101
 The database is available at http://www.sfi.org.tw/ewatch/main.asp (last visited Oct. 3, 2011). 
102
 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN TAIWAN, supra note 2, at 15.  
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Procedures for Director and Supervisor Share Ownership Ratios at Public Companies 
(Ownership Rules)103 was amended in 2006 in order to lower the minimum requirements for 
companies that appoint more than two independent directors. This is accomplished by applying a 
discount on the number of shares that directors and supervisors are required to maintain.104 If a 
public company sets up an audit committee, the requirements for the shares held by supervisors 
shall not apply.105 In addition, if the number of independent directors in a non-financial company 
exceed one-half of the total number of director seats and establish an audit committee, the 
minimum requirements for both directors and supervisors shall not apply.106 
3.1.8 Current Policy 
There are three levels of inﬂuence on Taiwanese corporate governance, in terms of legal 
compliance. 107  First, the TCA and TSEA set out the basic governance system with which 
companies must comply. Most of provisions in the TCA or the TSEA are mandatory, but some 
are optional for companies that want to develop the best possible governance practices. As will 
be explained later, Taiwanese companies have four statutory governance models from which to 
choose, and each company can decide which model is best for compliance with related 
provisions. The TCA or TSEA basically provide rigid configurations of four models that offer 
companies little room for accommodating their particular needs. For example, non-public 
companies cannot appoint independent directors; even when the majority of the board of 
                                                          
103
 The Rules are available at http://eng.selaw.com.tw/FLAWDAT0202.asp (last visited Oct. 3, 2011). 
104
 According to Paragraph 2 of Article 2 in the Ownership Rules, The shareholdings of independent directors 
elected by a public company shall not be counted in the total referred to in the preceding paragraph; if a public 
company has elected two or more independent directors, the share ownership figures calculated at the rates set forth 
in the preceding paragraph for all directors and supervisors other than the independent directors and shall be 
decreased by 20 percent. 
105
 Paragraph 3, Article 2 of the Ownership Rules. 
106
 Paragraph 4, Article 2 of the Ownership Rules. 
107
 Jill F. Solomon et al., Corporate Governance in Taiwan: Empirical Evidence from Taiwanese Company 
Directors, 11 CORP. GOVERNANCE 235 (2003).   
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directors are independent, supervisors are still necessary; an audit committee and supervisors 
cannot coexist within one company; and, every listed or GTSM companies must establish a 
remuneration committee.  
Second, the TWSE has listing requirements that apply to listed companies. Most of the 
listing requirements are mandatory. However, a few of them are suggestions. Listing Rules 
regarding independent directors should be mandatory, but are only applicable when companies 
apply for listings. Therefore, in terms of internal governance system, Taiwan’s listing rules are 
basically suggestive in nature. 
Third, there exists a voluntary code of recommended practices, particularly for listed 
companies. Article 27 of the Best Practice Principles suggests that listed companies can set up 
audit, nomination, risk management and other functional committees based on their beliefs 
concerning corporate social responsibility and sustainable operations or set up committees for 
environmental protection or other types of activities.  
When there is no legislation governing “nominations,” “risk management,” and 
“environmental protection” board committees, the Best Practice Principles provide listed 
companies with guidance that can help them develop optimal governance practices. Such 
Principles, however, have a little impact in practice. For example, as of October 2011, only two 
listed (and one GTSM) companies have established nomination committees, and only four listed 
companies have set up the governance committee.   
 As noted above, the current types of corporate governance structures commonly found 
among Taiwanese companies can be classified as follows: (1) regarding non-public companies, 
the only choice is to have supervisors, but such companies can still have unofficial independent 
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directors at their discretion, because the TSEA is not applicable to these companies; (2) public 
companies subject to the TSEA can have independent directors in legal capacities, and regardless 
of whether they have independent directors on a mandatory or voluntary basis, necessary 
procedures and requirement must be complied with in order to make such appointments legally 
meaningful. In the meantime, supervisors remain necessary; (3) public companies that have audit 
committees, whether on a mandatory or voluntary basis, cannot legally have supervisors under 
the TSEA. Companies in such circumstances adopt so-called “one-tier boards” (Table 6 for 
details). 
Table 6: Companies Categorized by Types of Internal Governance Systems 
 Board of directors Independent 
Director(s) 
Supervisor(s)  
(1)Non-public 
company 
Required (more 
than 3 directors) 
(Paragraph I of 
§192 of the TCA) 
N/A Required (more than 
1 supervisor) 
(Paragraph I of §216 
of the TCA) 
(2)Public 
company w/o 
independent 
directors 
Required (more 
than 5 directors) 
(Paragraph I of 
§26-3 of the TSEA) 
N/A Required (more than 
2 supervisors) 
(Paragraph II of §216 
of the TCA) 
(3)Public 
company w/ 
independent 
directors 
Required (more 
than 5 directors) 
(Paragraph I of 
§26-3 of the TSEA) 
Not less than two in 
number and not less 
than one-fifth of the 
total number of 
directors (Paragraph I 
of §14-2 of the 
TSEA) 
Required (more than 
2 supervisors) 
(Paragraph II of §216 
of the TCA) 
(4)Public 
company w/ 
audit 
committee 
Required (more 
than  5 directors) 
(Paragraph I of 
§26-3 of the TSEA) 
Not less than three 
and at least one of 
whom has  
accounting or 
financial expertise 
(Paragraph II of §14-
4 of the TSEA) 
N/A (Paragraph I of 
§14-4 of the TSEA) 
Source: Author 
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3.2 Summary  
In Taiwan, there was a constitutionality issue regarding TWSE’s mandatory policy of 
independent directors.
108
 Some argue that TWSE’s Listing Rules may be unconstitutional and 
violate the freedom of Newly-Listed Companies to run business because of the mandatory 
appointment of independent directors as requested by the Listed Rules. To avoid that dispute, 
Taiwan’s competent authority decided to create legal sources for appointing independent 
directors by amending the TSEA.
109
  A total of 4.46% of listed companies were involved in 
financial distress in the year 2001. Most of these companies ended up in liquidation or 
bankruptcy. A total of 41 companies out of the 919 listed companies recorded having financial 
troubles. Corporate governance reform was urgently needed, and an independent director system 
was believed by Taiwanese authorities to be one of the solutions to the problems. 
Under the circumstances in which supervisors are disappointing to policymakers, 
independent directors seem to be the only hope for Taiwan. Especially after the Procomp scandal, 
it was agreed upon by most commentators and policymakers to introduce independent directors. 
The voices against independent directors existed, but they were weak. The policy of the 
introduction of independent directors has been confirmed several times in the government’s 
documents such as the Governance Policy. The question here is not whether Taiwan should 
introduce independent directors, but how Taiwan will go about introducing independent directors.       
                                                          
108
 For general discussion, see Lawrence S. Liu, Tsai Jin Gaiko Yu Shienfa Chinyo—Yi Duli Donsei Jinron Jiaguan 
Yu Jiron Bingo Wei Chunshin [financial reform and constitutional constraints—focusing on independent directors, 
taking-over of financial institutes, and merger and acquisition of financial institutes], CONSTITUTIONAL 
INTERPRETATION: THEORY & PRACTICE, Vol. 4, 115, 122-33 (2005). [Lawrence Liu, Financial Reform and 
Constitutional Constraints] 
109
 However, Liu argues that the mandatory appointment of independent directors required by the Listing Rules has 
no constitutionality issue at all. Id.   
 65 
 
Taiwanese policymakers appear to favor independent directors, so it is no question that 
independent directors should be introduced. But how? Most discussions are related to the 
inherent limitations of independent directors, such as lack of adequate time, lack of incentive, 
and lack of expertise. For example, during the legislation of provisions regarding independent 
directors in the TSEA, the legislators expressed concern about the effectiveness of independent 
directors. No one can be certain whether independent directors will devote their time to 
monitoring in a satisfactory manner. Another question is whether there are adequate candidates 
who can carry out the monitoring tasks so that possible wrongdoing can be prevented. The 
introduction of independent directors in the TSEA is greatly motivated by the Procomp scandal, 
which involves fake overseas accounts. Assuming 1,000 companies need to appoint two 
independent directors and an independent director can serve up to five companies, there should 
be at least 400 eligible independent directors. It is doubtful that there are 400 candidates who 
have professional abilities to detect wrongdoing such as those that take place in the Procomp 
scandal.        
Whether to adopt a mandatory policy is also a hot topic. In the initial bill proposed by 
Taiwan’s FSC, all public companies were required to appoint independent directors comprising 
one-fourth of board seats. In the meantime, some important board decisions need to be approved 
by half of independent directors. However, this bill encountered great opposition from the private 
sector, which put a great deal of pressure on legislation not to pass the bill. To most Taiwanese 
companies which never appoint independent directors, the appointment of independent directors 
seems very burdensome because they are concerned about additional seeking and hiring costs of 
independent directors and the possible maladjustment working with independent directors who 
have veto power.   
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To reduce such concerns, the FSC re-proposed a bill that required public companies to 
hire two independent directors and deleted the provision authorizing independent directors’ veto 
power in major board decisions. However, companies remained concerned about the mandatory 
appointment of independent directors, and opposed the bill. Finally, the FSC gave up the 
mandatory policy and presented a watered-down bill forming current setting that made the 
appointment of independent directors optional for public companies.   
Likewise, the first tentative draft of the Principles of Corporate Governance by the 
American Law Institute (ALI) adopted a mandatory policy to require independent directors to 
comprise a majority of the board of directors in publicly-held companies, but the ALI’s proposal 
regarding the board structure had been criticized by scholars.
110
 Finally, the drafters changed the 
mandatory proposal into recommendations of corporate practice. As a matter of fact, the 
emergence of independent directors is due to shareholder pressure.
111
 Shareholders have not 
encountered strong opposition from management.
112
 In the last three decades, U.S. boards 
became increasingly independent and such changes in board composition cannot be done without 
the acquiescence of incumbent inside directors and management.
113
  
Currently, Taiwan’s policy of independent directors authorizes the FSC to request public 
companies to have independent directors if necessary. The plan is to call for independent 
directors step-by-step to avoid too many shocks to the companies. In 2011, the FSC issued an 
order requiring non-financial companies with paid-in capital of more than 10 billion New 
Taiwanese Dollars (NTD) to appoint independent directors (replacing an old directive of 2006 
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requesting companies with paid-in capital of more than 50 billion NTD subject to mandatory 
appointment of independent directors). It is very likely that the FSC will request more and more 
companies to appoint independent directors. 
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Chapter Four: The Fundamental Questions Regarding Independent Directors in Taiwan 
This chapter will explore the fundamental questions regarding the Taiwanese institution 
of independent directors. These questions are: Why does Taiwan want independent directors? 
What problems will Taiwan’s independent directors face? Why do companies need independent 
directors? Finally, this chapter will present data to present the facts about independent directors 
in Taiwan, and reach some implications from the data. 
4.1 Question One: Why Does Taiwan Want Independent Directors? 
4.1.1 Serious Financial Distress and Corporate Scandals  
As calculated in a research, from 1992 to 2005, a total of 211 listed companies suffered 
financial distress and most of them went bankrupt or ended up in liquidation.114 The number is 
more than 20 times that of the previous decade (there were 8 cases from 1980 to 1991).115 After 
several shocking scandals occurred, Taiwan sought to quickly restore investor confidence and 
soothe voters’ anger before the next election by introducing independent directors to deal with 
then severe corporate governance problems.116  
It appears that Taiwanese policymakers favor the institution of independent directors 
because they see it as a better governance mechanism for building an effective internal checks 
and balances system for Taiwanese companies. However, some interest groups oppose any 
aggressive policies of government that promote independent directors and put political pressure 
on legislation. Taiwanese legislators usually have friendly, close relationships with businessmen 
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who provide them with political donations and even bribes when legislators run elections.117 
Such businessmen usually control several companies, and they tend to prefer traditional 
supervisors to independent directors with whom they are unfamiliar.  
Pressure from businessmen and other concerns made Taiwanese legislation reject a bill 
that required at least one-fourth of boards to be comprised of independent directors in all listed 
companies and required audit committees consisting entirely of independent directors to replace 
supervisors.118 The next year, the FSC re-submitted a watered-down bill that became the current 
system of independent directors in the TSEA, in order to secure its passage through the 
legislation.119 The result of compromises between policymakers and the corporate sector (and 
their political allies) leads to the current set-up.120 
4.1.2 Dissatisfaction with Supervisors and Weaknesses of Other Governance Mechanisms 
There is no doubt that the institution of independent directors is just one of several 
governance mechanisms dealing with the agency problem and other corporate governance issues. 
Other alternative mechanisms, however, are less likely to occur in Taiwan. Probably like 
independent directors in the U.S., Taiwanese institution of independent directors wins the 
position of monitor because policymakers believe that what independent directors can do better 
than other potential monitoring mechanisms.121    
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There are several corporate governance mechanisms that have been discussed in the 
scholarly literature, including institutional investors, the presence of block shareholders, product 
market, and the takeover market. As explained in Chapter Two, institutional investors have been 
passive regarding governance issues of Taiwanese companies.122 Although shareholder activism 
has been advocated for several years, the functions that institutional investors seek to have as a 
governance mechanism remain weak. In addition, the presence of block shareholders is a greater 
concern than a governance mechanism in Taiwan. The product market may influence to the 
extent to which a company improves board effectiveness in order to maintain its competitive 
advantages, but such a mechanism would function in a very limited manner.  
Finally, the market for control can be a mechanism that disciplines underperforming 
management. Poor managerial performance may lead to a hostile takeover or proxy contest that 
can replace the underperforming management.123 However, such mechanism is expensive, and 
the takeover and proxy contest are usually invoked only when the managerial underperformance 
or wrongdoing is so harmful to the firm that the firm’s shares are in trade at a substantial 
discount.124 In Taiwan, there are few cases of hostile mergers and acquisitions, which would 
operate to improve the effectiveness of board functions.125 Generally speaking, the takeover 
market in Taiwan is considerably inactive, so its function is very limited. Another possible 
mechanism is governmental monitoring in some forms. The current dominant policy around the 
world prefers deregulation, which makes reliance on a government agency to monitor managerial 
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performance politically not viable.126 On the contrary, independent directors can be instruments 
of accountability that “will lessen the need for government to play a significant role.”127  
Like the U.S., SOX was enacted in the wake of Enron and WorldCom scandals, in order 
to improve the integrity of the corporate decision-making process in response to corporate 
scandals after Enron, 128  Taiwan should have a similar goal. In order to restore investor 
confidence, the role of independent directors in Taiwan’s listed companies should be 
strengthened to improve board decision-making and its oversight of management. 129  Many 
scholars argue that such an institution is best enforced by the market rather than by legislation.130 
The internal mechanisms seeking to reduce agency costs include contracts, the market for 
corporation control, and the managerial labor market. The more effectively these mechanisms 
function, the more limitedly independent directors can benefit companies. 131  As mentioned 
above, unfortunately, the alternative corporate governance mechanisms are too weak and little 
should be expected in Taiwan. Taiwanese policymakers, thus, turn to emphasize the importance 
of independent directors. 
4.1.3 U.S. Influence on Taiwanese Corporate Governance Reforms 
The governance system designed in the original version of the TCA imported many 
traditional ideas from Germany and Japan. The institution of supervisors is a mechanism derived 
from the mix of German and Japan’s supervisory board. Several decades ago, most Taiwanese 
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corporate scholars went to Germany and Japan for advanced studies. However, increasing 
numbers of Taiwanese scholars have chosen to study corporate law in the U.S. in recent years, 
instead of Germany and Japan.132  
When Taiwan struggled with the failures of the supervisor system and reforms of such 
system appear fruitless, the U.S. laws have gradually become more and more important. In the 
meantime, corporate scholars who studied in the U.S. have advocated that U.S. laws replacing 
flaws in Taiwanese corporate laws. In contrast, scholars who studied in Japan tend to oppose 
importing the concept of independent directors and advocate further reforms of the supervisor 
system.133 Prior to the official introduction of independent directors in the TSEA, Professor 
Huang (who studied in Japan) argued that Taiwan’s then-board of directors should be a managing 
device rather than monitoring device, and it would be confusing to introduce independent 
directors (monitors against management) onto the board of directors.134  Professor Lin (who 
studied in Japan) also contended that Taiwan transplanted its internal governance system 
primarily from Japan and it was inappropriate to introduce independent directors replacing 
supervisors.135  
  Several failures of recent reforms on the supervisor system have led U.S. laws be able to 
attract greater attention from Taiwanese policymakers. Thus, the U.S. developments regarding 
independent directors have gradually influenced Taiwanese corporate governance policies. In 
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addition, investment by U.S. institutional investors (e.g., Citigroup Global Markets, Goldman 
Sachs, Morgan Stanley, Merrill Lynch, etc.) recently accounted for more and more percentages 
of Taiwan’s capital market. Many investors suggest that foreign institutional investors should 
induce Taiwanese companies to develop better governance practices. Table 7 shows that Morgan 
Stanley Capital International (MSCI) has a division known as MSCI Taiwan which favors 
investments in Taiwanese listed companies that have appointed independent directors.  
Table 7: Taiwanese Listed Companies (MSCI Taiwan)
136
 
 Companies with 
independent director(s) 
Companies without 
independent director(s) 
Number of invested 
companies  
69 53 
Percentage of investment 76% 24% 
        Source: MSCI Taiwan 
  
Independent directors in the U.S. are deemed a good governance practice by both 
corporate practice and academia, because they can help reduce agency costs and benefit 
shareholders. In addition, independent directors can be an effective mechanism for protecting 
shareholders.137  
ALI suggests that “the board of every large publicly held corporation should have a 
majority of directors who are free of any significant relationship with the corporation's senior 
executives.” 138  The primary U.S. stock exchanges, the NYSE and NASDAQ, have set up 
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mandatory listing requirements that the majority of the board of directors must be independent 
directors.
139
 Most big corporations have voluntarily appointed independent directors. For 
example, the “General Motors Company Board of Directors Corporate Governance Guideline” 
stipulates that there must be a majority of independent directors on the board. 140  A large 
institutional investor, the California Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS), states 
that independence is the cornerstone of accountability and independent boards are essential 
components of sound governance structures.141 CalPERS also suggests that boards consist of at 
least a majority of independent directors.142 This investor further suggests that “boards should 
strive to obtain board composition made up of a substantial majority of independent directors.”143 
Likewise, many influential institutes have similar opinions regarding the importance of 
independent directors in the corporate governance context.144   
After major corporate scandals such as Enron and WorldCom, U.S. Congress enacted 
SOX in 2002, which requires publicly-traded companies to establish audit committees consisting 
exclusively of independent directors. Despite criticism by many corporate scholars, 145  the 
enactment of SOX indicates the importance of independent directors. SOX attempts to prevent 
fraud by “leaving the audit committee comprised of independent directors as the last line of 
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defense in circumstances where officers have conspired to falsify financial statements.”146 The 
board compositions on Delaware companies continue to reflect the trend that the CEO is the only 
non-independent director on board.
147
 
Given the development of independent directors in the U.S., including policies requiring 
independent board majorities by the NYSE and NASDAQ, and the enactment of SOX, Taiwan 
introduced independent directors as an experimental solution to the governance problems that 
Taiwan has faced.   
4.1.4 Regulation Competition in East Asian Countries  
The institution of independent directors has been debated in recent decades in Taiwan 
and neighboring East Asian countries, including China, Japan, and Korea. After the financial 
crisis of 1997, corporate laws regarding corporate governance in East Asia have been converging 
with U.S. laws, which are seen as legal structures that offer investors better levels of 
protection.
148
 The quality of corporate governance may be likely to affect a country’s ability to 
attract international capital.
149
 Countries in East Asia like Japan, South Korea, and China all 
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established the independent director system between 1999 and 2003
150
 Following this 
development, Taiwan also began a series of actions to introduce independent directors.
151
 
4.1.4.1 China  
On August 6, 2001, the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) issued the 
"Guiding Opinion on Establishing the Independent Director Institution in Listed Corporations 
(Guiding Opinion),” which recommended that all listed companies revise their articles of 
incorporation by appointing at least two independent directors by June 30, 2002, and establish 
boards of directors consisting of at least one-third independent directors by June 30, 2003.
152
 
Most listed companies followed the recommendations, although the Guiding Opinion was not 
legally binding.
153
 The result is that there are two separate supervisory mechanisms in place in all 
listed companies: the supervisory board (i.e., the statutory monitoring device) and independent 
directors.
154
  The Guiding Opinion was simply an administrative mandate.  
In 2005, China amended its Company Law (CCL) to provide legal enforceability. The 
CCL clearly stipulates “all listed companies should appoint independent directors.”155 Therefore, 
legally speaking, listed companies have no choice but to appoint two supervisory institutions: 
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independent directors on the board of directors and a supervisory board. The result was that 
although the institution of independent directors was formally codified, such codification had no 
additional legal effect, because all listed companies were already in compliance with the Guiding 
Opinion. The Guiding Opinion still governs matters related to independent directors until such 
time as the State Council, which is authorized by the CCL to issue rules, issues new regulations.  
4.1.4.2 Hong Kong  
The listing rules of Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKSE) (1) require that every board of 
directors of a listed issuer must include at least three independent non-executive directors; and, 
(2) at least one of the independent non-executive directors must have appropriate professional 
qualiﬁcations or accounting or related ﬁnancial management expertise.156 In addition, the HKSE 
also suggests that an issuer appoint independent non-executive directors representing at least 
one-third of the board.
157
  
4.1.4.3 Japan  
In 2002, Japan introduced the institution of independent directors, and companies were 
allowed to choose between (1) US-style board with three committees (audit, nomination, and 
remuneration) that are composed mainly by independent directors (company with committees 
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system); and, (2) traditional statutory auditor (supervisor, also known as kensayaku) system 
without any independent directors.
158
   
Japanese companies listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE) are required to secure at 
least one independent director or one statutory auditor (i.e., a device responsible for auditing a 
company’s compliance with laws and regulations). They are permitted to attend board meetings, 
but do not have votes.
159
 Until now, most Japanese companies have chosen to retain the 
traditional statutory auditor system instead of adopting the board committee system.
160
 
It is worth to note that Taiwan’s reform regarding the introduction of independent 
directors in the TSEA basically resembles the reform adopted in Japan, because companies have 
the option to choose whether to have a U.S.-style board structure and traditional board structure 
and supervisor system.
161
 
4.1.4.4 Korea 
The institution of outside directors was introduced in Korea in 1998 as part of the 
government’s corporate restructuring policies, after a financial crisis of 1997 occurred in East 
Asia. Article 542-8 of Korean Commercial Act stipulates that (1) listed companies shall ensure 
that outside directors make up not less than one-fourth of the total number of directors, except in 
cases determined by “Presidential Decree” in consideration of the magnitude of assets. Some 
listed companies, as requested by “Presidential Decree,” shall appoint at least three outside 
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directors and the number of outside directors shall account for more than half of the total 
directors.
162
   
Korea Exchange Listing Regulation provides that the number of outside directors of a 
listed corporation shall be at least one-fourth of the total number of directors. However, the 
number of outside directors of the listed corporations specified in Article 542-8(1) of the 
Commercial Act shall be at least three persons, which shall be the majority of the total number of 
directors.
163
  
4.1.4.5 Summary  
The illustrations above show that the convergence of corporate governance in the East 
Asia should have motivated Taiwan to launch reforms of the institution of independent directors. 
Given the trend in favor of independent directors, Taiwan seeks to maintain its competitive 
advantages in terms of corporate governance in the capital markets in East Asia and in the rest of 
the world as well.164 For example, a recent research targeting Korean large listed companies 
found that firms with 50% outside directors had a 40% increase in stock price.165 The authors 
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suggest that the presence of a majority of outside directors (i.e., the board independence) predicts 
higher share prices in emerging markets.166  
Corporate governance practices worldwide are evolving gradually toward a similar 
pattern. 167  Under the competition in the globalized financial markets, many Taiwanese 
companies hope to attract funds from international capital markets because investors tend to 
reward firms who appoint independent directors for better corporate governance. 168  Also, 
creditors who recognize the value of independent directors are willing to extend credit on 
cheaper terms to firms that hire more independent boards. 169  As described by Delaware 
Chancellor Allen, "[t]he evolution of a global market and the growth of institutional investors … 
are dynamic … They will, they are now, pushing in the direction of greater efficiency and greater 
accountability.”170 As a result, better corporate governance would increase the competitiveness of 
Taiwanese corporations.171  
4.2 Question Two: What Problems Will Taiwan’s Independent Directors Face? 
Theoretically, whether or not independent directors can serve as effective monitoring is 
an open question.172 Like independent directors in the U.S., Taiwanese independent directors also 
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face the same limitations. In addition, Taiwanese independent directors should face other 
problems arising from Taiwan’s legal and business environment distinctive from those in the 
U.S. The beginning of this part will have a review of the debates in the U.S., and later there will 
be an analysis addressing problems that Taiwanese independent directors would face. 
4.2.1 The Theory About the Weakness of Independent Directors 
Some U.S. scholars argue that independent directors cannot provide effective monitoring 
of management based on the following inherent limitations.173   
4.2.1.1 Lack of Adequate Time 
Many independent directors are employed part-time by their companies and do not have 
enough time to do more than review business decisions.174 They do not have enough time to 
make business decisions. An independent director may also work as a full-time employee for 
another company, or may be concurrently hired by several companies.175 They usually cannot 
devote most of their time to one company on whose board they serve.176  
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monitors that derive from the complexity of modern business organizations and the volatility of the markets in 
which they operate.” Simon Deakin, What Directors Do (and Fail to Do): Some Comparative Notes on Board 
Structure and Corporate Governance, 55 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 525, 541 (2010).  
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 Ribstein, supra note 145, at 26. 
175
 Lewis D. Solomon, Restructuring the Corporate Board of Directors: Fond Hope-Faint Promise?, 76 MICH. L. 
REV. 581, 585 (1977). 
176
 E.g., Professors Lipton and Lorsch argued that “the most widely shared problem directors have is a lack  of time 
to carry out their duties […] In essence, the limited time outside directors have together is not  used  in a meaningful 
exchange of ideas among themselves or with management/inside directors. Martin Lipton & Jay W. Lorsch, A 
Modest Proposal for Improved Corporate Governance, 48 BUS. LAW. 59, 64-65 (1992); Professor Lin argued that 
“even if [independent directors] have the expertise, these directors' busy schedules may preclude them from 
devoting sufficient amounts of time to thoroughly review management's proposals. Laura Lin, The Effectiveness of 
Outside Directors as A Corporate Governance Mechanism: Theories and Evidence, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 898, 914-15 
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To work effectively, independent directors must be willing to devote a substantial amount 
of time to the company.177 In the U.S., the lack of time has been a more serious problem for the 
effectiveness of independent directors, since the introduction of Sarbanes-Oxley in 2002. “The 
time required for audit committee meetings has at least doubled,” so “[t]he [independent] 
directors‘ committee work usually cannot be completed in the allotted time, and their discussions 
often end up being truncated or spilling over into hastily arranged teleconferences.”178 
4.2.1.2 Lack of Important Information or Industry-Specific Knowledge 
Effective monitoring is theoretically premised on accessibility and availability of the 
company’s information.179 Independent directors are outsiders who rely on information provided 
by insiders.180 If management refuses to provide important information to independent directors, 
or intentionally hides such information, it is difficult for them to effectively monitor the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
(1996). In short, “outside directors presently lack the time to monitor, except during corporate crises, because they 
are either CEOs themselves or hold equally demanding full-time positions.” Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, 
Reinventing the Outside Director: An Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. REV. 863, 884 (1994). 
          According to the Section 4 of “Independent Directors Regulations,” no independent directors can serve more 
than three companies.  Taiwanese policymakers have same concern about the time constraints that independent 
directors usually face. However, setting a maximum number of companies on which an independent director can 
serve would not be enough to provide sufficient incentives for independent directors. Many commentators believe 
that “carrot and stick” approach should be utilized to provide independent directors with more incentives to 
stimulate the effectiveness of independent directors (this will be discussed later). Some research literature, however, 
argues that independent directors can best use their limited time by making business decisions. See Robert J. Haft, 
Business Decisions by the New Board: Behavioral Science and Corporate Law, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1, 5 (1981). 
177
 Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., Director Liability, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1011, 1040 (2006) (citing Bob Mendelsohn’s 
speech). 
178
 Jay W. Lorsch & Robert C. Clark, Leading from the Boardroom, 86 HARV. BUS. REV. 104, 107 (2008). However, 
some scholars indicated that directors have been serving on fewer and fewer boards since SOX, and that would help 
boards maintain a performance advantage. Prentice & Spence, supra note 164, at 1865.  
179
 E.g., Deborah A. DeMott, Reweaving the Corporate Veil: Management Structure and the Control of Corporate 
Information, 41 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 182, 184 (1977). Toda and McCarty suggest that “[o]utside independent 
directors also need to be provided with necessary, full, timely, and accurate information while employees and 
managers need access to board members.” Makoto Toda & William McCarty, Corporate Governance Changes in 
the Two Largest Economies: What’s Happening in the U.S. and Japan?, 32 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 189, 228 
(2005). As agreed by independent director advocates, even a board with a majority of directors who are independent 
can’t “perform its monitoring function without objective data on the financial results of the managers' stewardship.” 
Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Modernization of Corporate Law: An Essay for Bill Cary, 37 U. MIAMI L. REV. 187, 206 
(1983). [hereinafter Eisenberg, Modernization of Corporate Law] 
180
 Ribstein, supra note 145, at 26. 
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company. Even though independent directors can actively collect information, unless they have 
enough time to do so at a company, they usually have insufficient information to make 
discriminating choices that cab benefit shareholders.181 In addition to the lack of information, the 
amount and complexity of the data independent directors receive may be another difficulty that 
most independent directors would encounter.182   
Today, most directors of the U.S. listed companies are completely “independent.” Due to 
current strict standards of independence, many directors lack industry-specific experience and 
knowledge.183 Even if independent directors are provided with comprehensive, well-organized 
data, they will still be unable to process such data.184 The current viewpoint of policymakers 
regarding corporate governance is that independence is superior to working knowledge of the 
company, and has become the principal criterion for appointing directors.185 
Finally, public companies are growing bigger and their businesses are more complex than 
last decades.186 That may require independent directors “to keep up with various facets of their 
businesses and industries.” 187 As a matter of fact, expecting an independent director in an 
automobile manufacturer to know the details of a new engine technology may be unrealistic.188  
                                                          
181
 Frank H. Easterbrook, Managers’ Discretion and Investors’ Welfare: Theories and Evidence, 9 DEL. J. CORP. L. 
540, 555-56 (1985). 
182
 Lipton & Lorsch, supra note 176, at 65. 
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Univ. Molengraaff Inst. for Private Law Conference on Governance of the Modern Firm 2008, at 26 (Dec. 13, 
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186
 Lorsch & Clark, supra note 178, at 108. 
187
 Id. 
188
 Id. 
 84 
 
4.2.1.3 Structural Bias or Inclination in Favor of Management 
"Structural bias" here can be defined as an inherent prejudice that results from the 
composition and character of the board of directors. 189  In U.S. companies, candidates for 
independent director positions are often nominated by CEOs, and the elections of independent 
directors tend to be greatly influenced by management. 190  For example, a CEO may invite 
favored outside independent directors onto the board by offering generous annual pay, insurance, 
and retirement benefits.191 Additionally, independent directors and CEOs are often friends and 
social acquaintances.192 Directors’ feelings of cordiality and friendliness may develop over the 
years in companies on whose boards they serve, and a bias problem may develop. CEOs may 
nominate directors who are unwilling or unable to monitor the managerial team.193 The bonds of 
friendship and collegiality among directors sometimes are powerful that independent directors 
are unlikely to show the qualities of independence and objectivity in monitoring their colleagues’ 
performance, especially when board culture calls for consistency in the boardrooms. 194  The 
possible result is that directors may be reluctant to challenge management, in the absence of 
obvious evidence.195  
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 Mark A. Underberg, Note, The Business Judgment Rule in Derivative Suits Against Directors, 65 CORNELL L. REV. 
600, 601 (1980). 
190
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AM. J. COMP. L. 257, 266 (2010); Lipton & Lorsch, supra note 176, at 66; Haft, supra note 176, at 21. 
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 William T. Allen, Independent Directors In MBO Transactions: Are They Fact or Fantasy?, 45 BUS. LAW. 2055, 
2057 (1990); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Independent Directors and the ALI Corporate Governance Project, 61 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1034, 1059 (1993). [hereinafter Bainbridge, ALI Governance Project] 
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 Solomon, supra note 175, at 584. 
193
 Allen, supra note 191, at 2057.  
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 Renee M. Jones, Law, Norms, and the Breakdown of the Board: Promoting Accountability in Corporate 
Governance, 92 IOWA L. REV. 105, 142 (2006). [hereinafter Jones, Promoting Accountability] 
195
 Ribstein supra note 145, at 26. 
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The structural bias also can be explained by an implicit conspiracy theory that argues 
directors pursue group interests due to an implicit conspiracy among directors.196 Independent 
directors may be disinterested in some transactions in which they believe have no direct personal 
conflicts of interest, but their decisions might favor other interested directors. 197  Individual 
directors may show favoritism for each other out of solidarity or in return for the expectation of 
similar treatment by other directors. They may do so in order to maintain their positions on the 
board.198 Independent directors may be reluctant to “reduce board cohesiveness by failing to be 
perceived as team players, or by reducing trust within the board.” 199  Some literature also 
indicates that independent directors who can deliver dissenting opinions regarding certain 
suspect transactions may be excessively influenced by the leader of the group. Therefore, 
removing the CEO as a member of the board means that an independent board is more likely to 
engage in frank discord in dissent.200 
With regard to derivative litigation, it is critical that independent directors be able to 
perceive and represent corporate interests when they determine whether or not a shareholders’ 
demand or shareholders’ suit is in the best interests of the company.201 However, Professors Cox 
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 Julian Velasco, Structural Bias and the Need for Substantive Review, 82 WASH. U. L. Q. 821, 856 (2004). 
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 Antony Page, Unconscious Bias and the Limits of Director Independence, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 237, 247 (2009); 
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proximity to management cannot be truly objective. Jonathan R. Macey, Efficient Capital Markets, Corporate 
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 A shareholder should make a demand to the board of directors before bringing a derivative suit on behalf of a 
corporation, unless the shareholder can prove that such a demand is futile. Even in demand futility, a company, 
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and Munsinger concluded that “several psychological mechanisms can be expected to generate 
subtle, but powerful, biases which result in the independent directors' reaching a decision 
insulating colleagues on the board from legal sanctions.”202 There exists skepticism to the effect 
that independent directors might not be objective in derivative suit contexts. According to 
Zapata,203 decisions made by a special litigation committee consisting of independent directors 
receive greater scrutiny. A Delaware court has the discretion to apply its own business judgment 
and second-guess a special litigation committee's decision that has been made by disinterested 
independent directors.204 
In reality, as pointed out by Delaware Chancellor Strine, independent directors are 
usually managers of other corporations, and the social affinities often exist between independent 
directors and managers.205 Outside independent directors may be tied to management in several 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
however, can set up a special litigation committee solely consisting of independent directors to investigate whether 
or not a shareholder’s suit has merit and is in the best interests of the company. After investigations, the committee 
can deliver its recommendation to courts which would give considerable deference to the committee’s 
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LAW. 503, 533-35 (1989). 
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 Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 786 (Del. 1981). 
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 Grover C. Brown et al., Director and Advisor Disinterestedness and Independence under Delaware 
Law, 23 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1157, 1190 (1998). 
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 Leo E. Strine, Jr., Derivative Impact? Some Early Reflections on the Corporation Law 
Implications of the Enron Debacle, 57 BUS. LAW. 1371, 1375 (2002). [hereinafter Strine, Delaware Impact] More 
responsibilities being placed on independent directors will also be a concern about true independence, because 
independent directors may have “to spend so much time on issuer business that because of their increased fees and 
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Accounting, Auditing and Audit Committees After Enron, et al.: Governing Outside the Box Without Stepping Off the 
Edge in the Modern Economy, 43 WASHBURN L.J. 91, 115 (2003) (citing Roberta S. Karmel, Federalization of the 
Law Regarding Audit Committees, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 20, 2003, at 3.). 
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ways so that “it is delusion or pretense to expect them to represent shareholder views,” especially 
in conflict-of-interest transactions.206 
The independent directors may naturally give weight to the points of view of CEOs who 
usually have special knowledge and experience related to the operation of the company.207 In 
many situations, independent directors may be unable to identify and control their own biases. 
The idea of “bounded rationality,” meaning the inability of people to perceive their own ethical 
limitations, has demonstrated that people are unaware of their biases and how their biases affect 
their personal decision-making.208 Independent directors are human beings who are subject to 
this inability and are unable to avoid unconscious bias. The impact of unconscious bias may be 
tremendous to the extent to which the effectiveness of independent directors will be impaired.   
In short, independent directors will face “significant personal costs, both financial and 
psychological, to serving an active, independent role in the boardroom,” and “the personal costs 
of fighting these financial and psychological constraints have been quite high.” 209 Therefore, 
independent directors may “have an incentive to work closely and amicably with management 
and little incentive to challenge it.”210 With an eye on the true utility of independent directors, it 
is very essential to minimize these costs for them.211 
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4.2.1.4 Lack of Incentives  
Independent directors are usually outsiders who have no ownership interest in a 
company.212   How well the firm performs normally does not have any financial impact on 
independent directors. Thus, they may not have any significant economic incentive to discipline 
company management. 213  Outside independent directors also typically lack an affirmative 
incentive to monitor effectively, because they are rewarded with a flat monetary benefit for their 
work.214  
Assuming independent directors have enough incentives to provide active monitoring, 
these incentives will not always ensure optimal levels of monitoring, because boards must 
exercise power by collective actions that will likely to raise a free-riding problem.215 Thus, even 
though faithful and active monitoring may be in line with individual director’s interest, she may 
assume that other colleagues will do the work.216 Therefore, the free-riding problem will likely 
lower the board’s capabilities to offer the optimal levels of monitoring.217 
4.2.1.5 Costs and Benefits  
Adding independent directors to a board may be associated with costs and benefits in 
certain respects.218 Searching for, and hiring, desirable independent directors may be costly. 
                                                          
212
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Benefits may be created by having independent directors if most of them are business experts or 
experienced officers who can provide valuable insights into the business strategies that can 
produce better company performance. 219  However, independent directors may be unable to 
create efficiency in terms of decision-making made by boards of directors. The board of directors 
is a collegial body that uses consensus-based decision-making, and consensus works best where 
team members are given equal access to information and have comparable interests.
220
 In 
comparison with independent directors who are outsiders, inside directors are more likely to have 
comparable access to information and have similar interests,
221
 so scholars argue that 
independent directors may be undesirable in terms of efficient decision-making by boards of 
directors.
222
 
When boards of directors focus on monitoring, it can negatively impact productivity. 
There may be trade-offs for board members between the ability to manage the business and the 
ability to function as an effective monitor.223  Some argue that independence of independent 
directors will only function in the conflicts of interest between management and shareholder, so 
expecting independent directors to make better business decisions and run the company better is 
“to misconceive the role of the independent director and to fetishize independence.”224 
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220
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221
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4.2.1.6 Other Factors  
Even if independent directors are willing to be actively evolved in monitoring 
management, few board meetings are held during a year and most of them are short.
225
 A survey 
indicated that large U.S. manufacturing companies averagely had 14 board and committee 
meetings per year, and the board meeting on average lasted only three hours.
226
 
4.2.1.7 Summary 
Some scholars doubt the functions of independent directors, and argue that their inherent 
limitations are likely to lead to ineffective monitoring. A comprehensive study suggests outside 
directors, in fact, are faced with limited time and information, which hinders them from 
evaluating senior management adequately.227 
Professors Gilson and Kraakman contend that good character and financial independence 
from management may be necessary, but insufficient, conditions for effective monitoring due to 
the inherent limitations of independent directors. 228  The limitations include dependency, 
ideologies and social obstacles to monitoring.229 More specifically, a financially independent 
outside director depends on management in order to maintain tenure as directors. 230  Many 
outside directors of public companies are CEOs of other companies, which makes it unlikely that 
such directors will monitor in a more energetic manner than they believe they should be 
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monitored by their own boards.231  Finally, outside independent directors may be financially 
independent but not socially independent from management.232  
In conclusion, scholars point out the ineffectiveness of independent directors by pointing 
at the collapse of Enron, which had a majority of independent directors on its board of 
directors.233 Like what happened in Enron, “[n]o director can be expected to catch sophisticated 
fraud by company insiders. The head of Enron’s audit committee, Robert Jaedicke, is a professor 
of accounting at Stanford University, who could hardly have been more qualified for the job.”234 
4.2.2 The Theory About Effectiveness of Independent Directors  
Most corporate scholars argue that although independent directors are constrained by 
inherent limitations, the institution is good for companies.  
4.2.2.1 Professionalism and Business Experience 
The board of directors has two basic functions: the advisory function and the monitoring 
function. Boards can produce value for companies in several ways, including providing advice, 
developing long-term business strategies, and offering expertise as needed by companies.235 
Independent directors are usually business veterans or experts in some professional areas that the 
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232
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company needs.
236
 They help management develop business strategies that improve the 
competitive advantages of companies. Their insights can be valuable.237    
Compared to the advisory function, scholars suggest that the board’s monitoring or 
oversight function is paramount.
238
 An independent board consisted by a majority of independent 
directors will be able to prevent self-interested activities that may harm the interests of 
shareholders by offering a robust review of suspicious transactions. Independent directors 
equipped with professional abilities can help board monitoring by reducing the possibility of 
wrongdoing by management. A NYSE report claims that having a majority of independent board 
of directors increases the quality of board oversight and reduces the possibility of damaging 
conflicts of interest.
239
 For example, an independent director with accounting expertise could 
better detect irregularities in financial reports prepared by management than could non-expert 
directors. Furthermore, an independent director’s business experience could offer valuable 
comments regarding how to monitor management.  
Independent directors who ask pointed questions can induce management to consider 
matters about which their staff members do not want to make them think.240 Hard issues are often 
filtered as they make their way up the line towards decision makers.241 During the information-
filtering process, people can slant the facts, and the information may not be completely accurate 
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corporate management. See Robert W. Hamilton, Reliance and Liability Standards for Outside Directors, 24 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 5, 17 (1989). 
237
 E.g., Pease, supra note 17, at 33. 
238
 Eisenberg, Modernization of Corporate Law, supra note 179, at 205.  
239
 Symposium, Panel 2: Corporate Governance Issues, 8 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 49, 61 (2003). [hereinafter 
Corporate Governance Issues] 
240
 Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., supra note 177, at 1039.  
241
 Id. 
 93 
 
by the time it reaches decision-makers.242 Therefore, an independent director must be willing to 
challenge managerial proposals and ask the critical questions that nobody else is asking.  
4.2.2.2 Functions in Emergency 
Some scholars argue that independent directors can perform useful roles in emergencies, 
such as replacing ineffective CEOs, assuring an orderly transition in the event of the retirement 
or death of CEOs, and forming special litigation committees to investigate the merits of 
shareholder demands or lawsuits.243   
4.2.2.3 Conflicts of Interest 
Normally, compared to outsiders, inside directors with firm-specific expertise and 
adequate information are in better positions to exercise business judgment for the company. In 
some situations involved with conflicts of interest between insiders (and management) and 
shareholders, insiders’ judgment may be tainted by personal interest. For example, a hostile 
tender offer creates a conflict of interest between shareholders and managers, and independent 
directors can provide oversight to the extent that protects shareholders’ interests. 244  Thus, 
independent directors can help prevent skewed judgment from being made.
245
 In the U.S., that is 
why there will be nearly insurmountable hurdles for shareholders to challenge board actions 
tainted by conflicts of interest through derivative litigation if independent directors have 
validated such actions. 
                                                          
242
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 Pease, supra note 17, at 33-34. See also Jones, Promoting Accountability, supra note 194, at 114. Some even 
argue that “one of the board's most important functions is to evaluate the performance of the CEO, and to replace an 
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Independent directors usually have substantial experience in making tough evaluative 
judgments, which can affect friends and business colleagues, including decisions such as 
arranging dividends among partners and dismissing long-time employees.
246
 Outside 
independent directors who have invested years in building their reputations, are likely to resign 
themselves to having to make tough, relationship-straining decisions.
247
 For example, the 
Delaware Court generally tends to give more credit to a board consisting of a majority of 
independent directors when assessing the reasonableness of a board’s defensive reactions to a 
hostile takeover.248 Another example is that executive compensation approved by independent 
directors will be more likely assumed reasonable. 
Furthermore, independent directors can evaluate conflict-of-interest transactions within 
the company rather than in a court in the litigation.249 With the presence of independent directors, 
the board of directors will more likely accept an unsolicited takeover offer, because independent 
directors may not easily decide to reject the offer and a CEO’s tenure may already be less secure 
when the independent directors are present.250 Management may have to face more threatening 
discipline from the market.  
Chancellor Strine argues that independent directors are subject to the desire to protect 
their positions. They are, thus, more likely to impartially decide whether or not a bid is in the 
shareholders' best interests,251 as opposed to insider managers who usually have more at stake in 
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terms of financial investment and human capital. Therefore, Delaware law encourages boards to 
delegate the authority to independent directors in responding to takeover.252 Delaware Chancellor 
Allen also observed in the famous RJR Nabisco case, “in which a committee of structurally 
independent directors has appeared to function quite adversarily” and “the outside directors were 
seen as energetically exercising informed and independent judgment in the sale of the 
enterprise.”253   
4.2.2.4 Protecting Shareholders   
Independent directors are anticipated to function in the interests of shareholders, and may 
be able to articulate shareholder concerns and push management towards the maximization of 
shareholder wealth. 254  Robust monitoring of management can help preserve the interests of 
shareholders, and the management integrity can be maintained.
255
 Justice Veasey stressed that 
independent directors could function as an effective stockholder protection device.256 
Independent directors can also be securities monitors who protect securities investors.257 
In some cases, the managers may prefer not to disclose bad news to the public, independent 
directors can provide a check on management who desires to avoid or prolong disclosing bad 
information and ensure the compliance with the disclosure rules.258 Generally, they can enhance 
the reliability of public disclosure made by companies and that will make “stock market prices a 
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more reliable signal for capital allocation and for the monitoring of managers at other firms as 
well as their own.”259 
4.2.2.5 Summary 
Independent director advocates generally admit the inherent limitations that may impair 
their effectiveness, but are of the opinion that board independence is a worthwhile goal.260 
Chancellor Allen states,  
“Director independence does not assure that a director will make a 
better contribution on the board than an insider might make. 
Independent directors may have less information about the firm 
and may, in fact, tend to make less brilliant decisions over time 
than those with a close financial interest in the firm. Nevertheless, 
independence offers to investors some further assurance that the 
governance process has integrity. It is a very imperfect signal of 
integrity, of course. Independent directors can be imperfect in a 
number of ways, as can we all, but their lack of management bias 
does offer investors some protection.”261 
                                                          
259 Gordon, supra note 254, at 1469. 
260
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Whether the majority of the board of directors should be independent is debatable, but 
most academia and business researchers agree that independent directors can help the board 
function effectively,262  as long as some preconditions can be met.  
4.2.3 Preconditions for Effectiveness of Independent Directors 
Assume the theory acclaiming independent directors is accurate, most scholars agree that 
there should be some mechanisms to motivate independent directors to carry out their duties.   
4.2.3.1 Incentives: Carrot vs. Stick 
Like inside directors, independent directors are also agents for shareholders. They may 
seek for their own interests and the agency cost may rise albeit little. In situation that they are 
granted other expansive powers over auditing, director nomination, and executive compensation, 
the costs certainly rise.263 Some scholars argue that independent directors should be compensated 
for time spent on monitoring in order to give them a monetary incentive that will motivate them 
to monitor in an effective manner.264  Independent directors who fail as monitoring watchdogs 
will probably suffer soiled reputations and negative labor market consequences,265 so they have 
incentives to carry out their tasks effectively and avoid colluding with managers to exploit 
shareholders.266 Some argue that independent directors should partially be compensated by the 
equity of the company, so they, as the equity owners, have interests aligned with interests of 
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 Pease, supra note 17, at 31. See also Borowski, supra note 127, at 455-56 (arguing the independent directors can 
play an important, albeit “limited,” role in improving corporate accountability). 
263
 Note, Beyond “Independent” Directors: A Functional Approach to Board Independence, 119 HARV. L. REV. 
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shareholders.267Also, independent directors’ incentives to monitor management include a desire 
to protect their reputation and to maximize the value of their equity holdings in the company.268 
Independent directors have the same fiduciary duties to the company as other directors. 
Some scholars agree that imposing legal liabilities on directors can help motivate them to be 
attentive and careful in order to avoid adverse financial consequences that can result from the 
failures to measure up to legal standards. 269  Likewise, liability encourages the independent 
directors to reject non-arms-length transactions and offers a powerful argument for independent 
directors when insiders propose a dubious transaction.
270
 However, the stick approach cannot be 
overstated because imposing heavy liabilities on directors has certain disadvantages.  
For example, independent directors may be so apprehensive about shareholder lawsuits 
that they might back off from innovative decision-making, which would reduce their 
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effectiveness on behalf of the company. 271  Furthermore, they may spend time collecting 
documents that can be utilized as part of the defense in future lawsuits, which would diminish 
their ability to function.272 Even independent directors are not in a better position than insiders to 
understand the relevant facts and make material decisions, such as mergers or hostile takeovers, 
in the best interests of the company and its shareholders. The courts do not hold them “to a lesser 
standard in being informed and in exercising requisite care in their decisions.” 273  Thus, 
protecting independent directors from potential liabilities is an important issue. 274 Imposing too 
heavy liability on them will provide less incentive for experienced or professional experts to be 
hired as independent directors. 275      
The legal liability risks that independent directors face are higher in the U.S. than in other 
parts of the world.276 For example, even though independent directors in Taiwan are subject to 
various legal rules, they rarely can be liable due to high thresholds for shareholder suits 
(discussed later). 
4.2.3.2 True Independence 
The U.S. corporate conventional wisdom argues that independent directors are 
presumably able to function as an effective monitor because they have no family or financial ties 
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with big shareholders, company officers, and the company. In this sense, there is no question that 
true independence is critical in order for independent directors to function as expected. 277  
Independent directors are specifically assumed to be able to make fairer decisions on 
behalf of the company than inside directors, particularly in situations where conflicts of interest 
between inside directors and the company exist.278 In cases of shareholder lawsuits in which 
directors allegedly breach their fiduciary duties by engaging in transactions that involve their 
self-interest, independent directors are deemed to be the best parties to make the final decisions 
regarding the best interests of the company. If the alleged transactions are reviewed and agreed 
upon by independent directors, the court will not have a second guess on the legality of such 
transactions, which are usually presumed to be in the best interests of the company. Under the 
business judgment rule, which presumes that board decisions are made on a fair, informed, good-
faith basis, decisions by independent directors will receive a great deal of deference by courts, 
and can avoid trivial lawsuits.  
In order for independent directors to maintain true independence, some U.S. scholars 
suggest that there should be a stricter standard for independence.279  In fact, the standards have 
become increasingly stricter.280  There are two primary approaches used to determine which 
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director can be an independent director. The traditional approach used in U.S. litigations is a 
function-specific approach that is used to determine who would qualify as independent directors 
in litigation. Delaware courts tend to defer to business decisions made by the majority of the 
board of directors whose members have no direct and personal interest in the alleged transaction 
and are independent of the defendant directors. The business decisions made by independent 
directors are assumed in the best interest of shareholders. In general, the more independent 
directors are on board, “the more likely it is that board action will find a safe harbor from 
liability in many settings.”281 The approach used by Delaware courts to determine independence 
is situational.282 Specifically speaking, courts will determine whether a particular director is 
disinterested or independent on a case-by-case basis, without a bright-line rule.283 The primary 
questions that are most often asked by courts regarding independence concern what purpose and 
independence from whom.284 A director who is independent in one case may not be independent 
in another.   
Instead of the traditional approach, the SOX and most stock exchanges around the world 
equates independence with outsider status by using a list of several conflicting relationships that 
will disqualify directors from being deemed independent.285 This approach contends that once a 
director is elected as an independent director, the label of independence automatically comes 
with that eligible director unless that director later fails to meet the independence standard. This 
approach, which includes full disclosure of information about directors, can give the public a 
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clear and quick guide to understanding whom and how many independent directors are on board. 
In contrast, courts determine the independence of directors primarily by evaluating the practical 
constraints on a particular director’s ability to function effectively with respect to a specific 
issue.286  
Scholars have criticized the later approach,287 because this definition of independence can 
be over-inclusive or under-inclusive.288 This approach basically emphasizes the importance of 
business relationships between directors and the company, which have the potential to impair a 
director’s ability to function in the interest of the company, regardless of how minor such 
relationships might be. Most of current independence standards fail to address the conflict-of-
interest situations in which independent directors will help to alleviate the agency problem.289 
For example, in terms of executive compensation, the lacks of financial ties to the company and 
familial ties to the executives may not be sufficient to expect independent directors to solve the 
agency problem.290 Instead, whether the financial ties to the executives being compensated exist 
will be critical. It is unfortunate that current independence rules overlook this obvious hole.291 
Additionally, this approach ignores social ties and friendships than can similarly have an adverse 
impact on board function.292 Scholars describe this type of director independence as “cosmetic 
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independence,” arguing that current standards for independence are insufficient to remedy the 
corporate failures of recent years.293       
Even in the U.S., the related-party transactions involving controlling shareholders are 
subject to an entire fairness review, which “reflects a distrust of the statutory mechanisms of 
independent director.” 294  The bottom line is that, theoretically speaking, regardless of how 
precise or strict the independence standard might be directors’ actual independence cannot be 
guaranteed simply by requiring directors to meet independence standards.295 That is to say, even 
using a precise definition of independence and rigorous enforcement does not ensure that 
independent directors will act in a completely independent manner and in the interests of 
shareholders.296  
4.2.4 Problems That Taiwanese Independent Directors Will Face  
Independent directors in both the U.S. and Taiwan inevitably face the same inherent 
limitations, including insufficient time and information, inadequate incentives, structural biases, 
uncertain true independence, and so on. In addition to the above inherent limitations, Taiwanese 
independent directors can also face other problems that can arise in a legal and business 
environment, which differs from that of the U.S. in several critical respects.    
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4.2.4.1 Dominance by Controlling Shareholders 
Controlling shareholders are pervasive in Taiwanese companies, in the sense that they 
usually dominate boardrooms. Therefore, in addition to independence from management, 
independence from big (or even controlling) shareholders also is critical for an effective board 
monitoring, particularly in Taiwanese companies.
 297
 Ironically, Taiwan’s Independent Director 
Rules mandate that companies adopt the “candidate nomination system” in electing independent 
directors. Under such election system, only board of directors and big shareholders (who hold 
more than 1% of a company’s outstanding shares) can propose slates of independent directors. 
Thus, if the majority of incumbent directors and big shareholders have shared interests, truly 
independent directors are less likely to be nominated and elected.
298
 
One primary reason why Taiwan introduced the institution of independent directors is to 
prevent the undue dominance of management and board of directors by controlling shareholders. 
Even in the case of dispersed ownership structures of the U.S. public companies, corporate 
scholars argue that the key to director independence is not the independence of directors from 
management but rather their dependence on shareholders.
299
 Therefore, in Taiwan, director 
independence from shareholders should be an important issue when it comes to independence of 
independent directors.  
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However, the intentions of insiders can determine whether a company will appoint 
independent directors as part of their team (because the articles of incorporation need to be 
amended with support from board of directors and big shareholders). Current regulations 
regarding independence standards stipulate that incumbent directors and big shareholders can 
still appoint candidates who have close social ties to them, which means that they can nominate 
only those candidates whom they can ensure will not monitor them in a robust manner. 
Hence, given these standards of independence, there is no guarantee that independent 
directors will turn out to be truly independent of management and controlling shareholders. 
Managers and controlling shareholders can bypass the independence standards, and the 
independent directors can be captured or influenced by controlling shareholders and management. 
The ownership structures of Taiwanese listed companies are relatively concentrated, so powerful 
shareholders are common in the market and true board independence is less likely to occur in 
reality.    
Unfortunately, Taiwan has no good idea to deal with dominance of controlling 
shareholders. In the U.S., Delaware corporate laws tend to be suspicious of fiduciaries that are 
interested parties or controlled by controlling shareholders.
300
 It appears that independent 
directors may feel that they owe allegiance to the controlling shareholders who support them in 
the elections, rather than the company and its shareholders.
301
 Thus, when a controlling 
shareholder is involved in a deal with the company, the transaction should be reviewed to verify 
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that it is substantively fair even if independent directors negotiated the transaction.
302
 An 
approval by a special committee consisting of independent directors will be necessary.
 303
  
4.2.4.2 Weak Enforcement of Corporate Laws  
Regarding the enforcement of corporate regulations, Taiwan is heavily reliant upon the 
administrative agency in dealing with a company’s internal governance issues. In cases that arise 
from issues concerning the fiduciary duties of directors, shareholders must overcome high legal 
thresholds if they intend to bring an action on behalf of the company (i.e., a derivative suit). Such 
thresholds include holding a minimum of 3% of the outstanding shares of the company, a holding 
period of more than 12 months, demand an action against directors to supervisors, a waiting 
period of 30 days after demand, and rendering a security deposit when the court deems it 
necessary.304 In addition, the plaintiff shareholder may owe liabilities to the defendant directors if 
that shareholder loses the lawsuit.305   
The TCA, thus, sets up an almost impracticable dispute resolution mechanism for internal 
affairs issues. When all of the supervisors have been captured by management or controlling 
shareholders, or are involved in wrongdoing, the only method that shareholders (particularly 
minority shareholders) can use is enforcement by a public agency, meaning the MOEA and FSC, 
which are the competent authorities in Taiwan. However, it is unrealistic to expect too much 
from the public agencies, because an administrative agency as an outsider has difficulty detecting 
wrongdoing when it is in progress secretly. Inside and outside governance mechanisms can 
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supplement each other. However, internal Taiwanese governance mechanisms (i.e., supervisors 
and shareholders) have serious deficiencies and often fail to function effectively. Agencies such 
as the MOEA, FSC, and criminal prosecutors, subject to many limitations, currently do not 
aggressively enforce corporate governance regulations.                
4.2.4.3 Majority of Board Members Not Independent   
Scholars argue that effectuating a board’s monitoring function requires a majority of 
independent directors on board.
306
 Few companies in Taiwan have independent-majority-boards. 
The possible positive effects independent directors might bring to company would be waned 
because the majority of board members are not independent.  
From 2005 to 2008, there were 106 Taiwanese listed companies, which, on average, 
continuously appointed at least one independent director on a monthly basis, as shown in Table 8. 
Here, assuming the board independence means number of independent directors/total number of 
directors, the average mean for board independence is about 0.3, which is far from a majority of 
independent director boards. 
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Table 8: Taiwanese Listed Companies That Have at Least One Independent 
Director (2005-2008)  
 
N Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Board independence (2005) 106    .11 .52 .2938 .08193 
 Board independence (2006) 106 .11 .60 .2908 .08258 
Board independence (2007) 106 .11 .60 .3025 .08850 
Board independence (2008) 106 .13 .60 .3004 .08677 
Source: Taiwan Stock Exchange 
 
Unless independent directors comprise the majority of the board of directors, their 
functions might be quite limited. Given that the board of directors usually needs the approval of 
more than half of the directors in order to exercise power, independent directors actually cannot 
prevent the board from making a mistaken or inappropriate decision. Instead, the only weapon 
that independent directors can use under the TSEA is to deliver the dissent or qualified opinions, 
which should be recorded in the board minutes. Under the TCA, every attending director is 
responsible for the decisions made at that board meeting, except for those who deliver dissenting 
opinions that are recorded in the board minutes with respect to the challenged decision. However, 
some of independent directors may choose to resign in order to avoid possible litigation that may 
arise from mistaken or inappropriate board decisions.   
Given that independent directors are usually in the minority in boardrooms, independent 
directors are unlikely to challenge decisions made by their majority colleagues because they 
cannot determine whether or not decisions might go wrong. As scholars argue, a majority in a 
group is more likely to think and judge independently.
307
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Some scholars suggest that companies should select an independent lead director to chair 
meetings of independent directors, and the reasons why a company has a lead director, and the 
role that the lead independent director plays in the company should be publicly disclosed by the 
company.
308
 Disclosures are intended to inform investors of the facts about a company’s board 
leadership structure and the degree to which the board can exercise independent judgment.
309
  
The introduction of the institution of independent directors in Taiwan is primarily derived 
from the mistrust of boards that consist of insiders. Adding independent directors as watchdogs 
into boardrooms may reduce board harmony, and the adversary relationship between inside and 
outside directors can decrease the efficacy of board monitoring.
 310
   
During a board meeting in presence of majority of inside directors, independent directors 
may not feel comfortable delivering their opinions, because they may be unwilling to offend or 
seem to threaten inside directors (and management), or to embarrass themselves due to their 
relative lack of knowledge.
311
 To discharge monitoring responsibilities, U.S. scholars argue that 
the board of directors will be active, primarily through committees of the board. At least some 
functional board committees (e.g., audit, nominating, and compensation) should be established 
and composed exclusively of such independent directors.
312
    
As compared with the U.S. independent directors, the presence of independent directors 
is uncommon in Taiwan and they rarely comprise majority of board of directors. That may 
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indicate that most Taiwanese companies do not recognize the value of independent directors in 
reconciling conflicts of interest matters.
313
   
Finally, if boards are generally independent of management and controlling shareholders, 
and are actively involved in overseeing managerial behavior, “one might conclude that a board 
controlled by independent directors is a sufficient constraint on management shirking and self-
dealing.” 314  It appears that Taiwanese policymakers anticipate that the good theory of 
independent directors will materialize in Taiwan. However, most Taiwanese companies have 
boards of directors whose majorities are not independent. Furthermore, there are no supplemental 
rules or norms that technically help Taiwanese independent directors facilitate effective 
monitoring, such as a lead independent director, director oversight of legal compliance systems, 
and regular meetings of the independent directors without the presence of the inside directors and 
management.
315
 
This leads to doubts about effectiveness of functions that independent directors could 
have. In order to avoid shocking companies, Taiwanese policymakers compromised to allow 
public companies to decide whether a majority of independent directors would be appropriate for 
their companies’ circumstances.316     
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4.2.4.4 No Strong Power Vested with Independent Directors  
According to the TSEA, independent directors generally have no special investigative 
power without an audit committee. They usually rely on information provided by management to 
help them make proper decisions. With the presence of an audit committee, committee members 
can exercise investigative power, as do supervisors.
317
 However, weak monitoring power is 
partially blamed for supervisors’ failures. Investing supervisor-type powers in committee 
members may be inadequate. Furthermore, the board of directors still can veto the decisions of 
the audit committee with the approval of two-thirds of all of the directors.
318
 Because 
independent directors are not vested with any real investigative power, they are unlikely to 
operate as an effective monitoring device.  
Informational asymmetry is a serious obstacle to the effectiveness of independent 
directors. Recent research indicates this difficulty exists and reduces the functionality of 
independent directors.
319
 The author of this research interviewed several independent directors of 
Taiwanese listed companies, and some of the interviewees expressed their concerns about 
informational asymmetry that exists between independent directors and management.
320
  
One interviewee pointed out, 
“[I]f the company’s management team intentionally allows fraud to 
exist in the process, the independent director has very incomplete 
information. Because they (the management team) will not tell you 
(the independent director). If this deal occurs overseas, in this case 
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the independent director’s ability (to detect fraud) is very weak. In 
an intentionally-fraudulent deal, the independent director is at a 
very weak position. He does not have information, the 
management cannot tell you.”321 
Lin’s research shows that some interviewees found they were unable to “dig deeper” for 
information in the presence of controlling shareholders who dominate both management and the 
boardroom.
322
 Independent directors similarly may be unable to detect conflict-of-interest 
transactions when insiders have an incentive to intentionally hide information about such 
transactions in order to avoid being scrutinized by the competent authority, or are concerned 
about attracting too much public attention. Given the complex ownership structure of Taiwanese 
companies, which involves a variety of methods such as cross-holdings and pyramid structures, 
it may be difficult to identify whether or not the parties involved are “related parties” in the first 
place.
323
   
In the absence of sufficient material information, it may be unrealistic to expect 
independent directors to be able to determine and valuate suspect transactions in an effective 
manner. Given the presence of controlling shareholders, independent directors are likely to be 
kept in the dark when attempting to make decisions. Lin’s research concluded that Taiwanese 
independent directors, who are being deemed to be outsiders by controlling shareholders, in fact 
are ineffective “in overseeing controlling shareholders, especially in detecting unfair related-
party transactions and fraud.”324   
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U.S. corporate scholars recommend that companies both appoint majorities of 
independent directors to their boards and establish some sub-committees consisting solely of 
independent directors, such as audit, compensation, and nominating committee in order to 
facilitate the effectiveness of independent directors.
325
 According to Lipton and Lorsch, the ideal 
U.S. board should be a monitoring board with three important committees composed solely of 
independent directors.
326
 In Taiwan, only audit committee and remuneration committee have 
been introduced by the TSEA. The company can voluntarily establish other types of committees, 
as recommended by the Best Practice Principles. At present, few listed companies have 
established sub-committees (but the remuneration committee is a necessary device for all listed 
companies in accordance to Article 14-6 of the TSEA).     
4.2.4.5 Concerns Arising from Overlapping Monitoring Devices  
Both independent directors and supervisors can legally coexist. According to the TSEA, 
independent directors cannot completely supplant supervisors, which continue to remain 
necessary. When two monitoring devices have been set up, concerns may arise about how to 
assign the powers and liabilities between two devices.   
Hence, within a company that appoints both independent directors and supervisors, there 
are two different monitoring devices: independent directors and supervisors. Independent 
directors are essentially board members that have the same power as a non-independent director. 
Independent directors are responsible for monitoring some material business decisions, which are 
specifically itemized in Article 14-3 of the TSEA, such as reviewing a company’s internal control 
mechanism, fundamental transactions, and financial reports.  
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However, according to the literal meaning of the language of Article 14-3 of the TSEA, 
this does not mean that such business decisions are reserved exclusively for independent 
directors. As is the case for the conventional monitoring device in the TCA, theoretically 
speaking, the power of supervisors should include such business decisions, and they can request 
that the board of directors cease misconduct, regardless of whether such misconduct is directly 
related to the responsibilities of independent directors. Thus, the coexistence of two distinctive 
monitoring devices gives rise to at least two problems. One is the free rider problem to the effect 
that each device may have reasons to shirk when each assumes that the other device will do the 
job. In contrast, the other problem is inefficient repetitive monitoring by two monitoring devices. 
Therefore, the coordination between the two monitoring devices may be necessary. It is 
unfortunate that Taiwanese legislation has thus far failed to take such problems into 
consideration. 
In comparison with supervisors, independent directors are vested with powers as regular 
directors except for the delivery of dissenting or qualified opinions. In fact, when there is no 
audit committee, one effect is that some fundamental decisions can be approved only by the 
board of directors, and cannot be delegated to subcommittees. The primary function that 
independent directors have is sounding the alert by delivering dissents or qualified opinions in 
the minutes of board meetings for public disclosure (see Table 9 for details).  
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Table 9: Independent Directors vs. Supervisors   
 Independent Directors   Supervisors 
Authority 
and 
Functions 
 
Monitor the proscribed matters set 
forth in Article 14-3 of the TSEA; 
Attend board meetings; 
Vote at board meetings; 
Deliver dissents or qualified 
opinions; 
Signal concerns by delivering 
dissents or qualified opinions, or 
even resigning. 
 
Monitor all board and managerial 
conduct; 
Attend board meetings; 
Deliver opinions at board  meetings; 
Convene provisional shareholder 
meetings, as necessary;   
Request board to refrain from 
continuing illegal conduct; 
Examine the accounting books and 
documents, and request that board of 
directors or managerial personnel 
make reports. 
Source: Author 
 
In Taiwan, supervisors should be taken into account when developing corporate 
governance policies. With regard to internal monitoring, both independent directors and 
supervisors serve similar functions in the context of internal control. Taiwan appears to have lost 
confidence in the effectiveness of supervisors’ monitoring functions, given the introduction of 
independent directors. The TSEA does not require supervisors meet standards for independence, 
as is the case for independent directors. To put it differently, if independence is the key to solving 
governance issues in Taiwan, what difference could independent directors make? If the 
independence theory is correct, why does current law not require supervisors to have identical, or 
similar, standards of independence?  
One may argue that independent directors have advisory functions, because they have 
certain types of expertise that companies need. However, independent directors are empowered 
to object to important items, so the monitoring function should be the focus of Taiwan’s recent 
independent director reforms. Thus, independent directors are expected to function primarily as a 
 116 
 
monitoring device instead of an advisory role. In order to make sure the scope of responsibility 
of independent directors, Article 26 of the Best Practice Principles suggests that a listed company 
stipulate the scope of duties of their independent directors.327 
4.2.4.6 Mandatory Nature of Taiwanese Corporate Laws 
Why does Taiwan need to codify the institution of independent directors? In the U.S., the 
development of the institution of independent directors emerged from the marketplace without 
formal regulations. Companies voluntarily appoint independent directors to suit their governance 
needs for a variety of reasons, including the benefits of better performance and greater deference 
from courts.328      
The Taiwanese government prefers to codify such an institution, and has left little room 
for companies to develop individually desirable governance practices. The mandatory rules 
stipulate that the term “independent directors” refers exclusively to independent directors 
appointed under procedural rules proscribed in the TSEA (see Table 10). The nomination and 
election procedures are also mandatory, with no room for modifications.329 Hence, Taiwanese 
companies have little room to build their own governance systems freely. 
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329
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Table 10: Legal Procedure for Appointing Independent Directors 
Procedures Requirements 
Amending articles of 
incorporation 
Need to convene shareholder meeting and need a quorum 
and two-thirds of voting shares 
Independence Standard Need to comply with rulings issued  by the competent 
authority 
Nomination and election 
procedures 
Need to use candidate nomination system  
Authority Matters specified in Article 14-3 of the TSEA should be 
absolved by the board of directors and independent 
directors’ opinions should be recorded in board minutes   
Source: Author 
 
The TSEA stipulates that prior to the appointment of independent directors a company 
must add a clause concerning independent directors into the articles of incorporation. Such an 
amendment needs a resolution during a shareholder meeting, which needs a quorum of at least 
two-thirds of the voting shares and approval by at least 50 percent of such a quorum. Given the 
concentrated ownership structures, and the fact that many individual investors are not interested 
in attending shareholder meetings, such an amendment usually fails without the support of stock 
block-holders. Independent directors are expected to provide effective monitoring function of 
management, without undue influence from other groups or individuals, particularly in situations 
where controlling shareholders exert control over the board of directors and supervisors. It is 
difficult to expect large shareholders to support an amendment adopting independent directors.  
In addition, given that the institution of independent directors is an unfamiliar notion to 
many Taiwanese companies, companies might have reservations about them and might stop 
hiring independent directors if they believe that they do not fit in with the company culture. 
However, once the clause regarding independent directors becomes effective, the company 
should elect independent directors in accordance with the articles of incorporation. That means 
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that the costs for companies to relieve themselves of independent directors would require another 
amendment to the company’s articles of incorporation.    
Companies that want to appoint independent directors or an audit committee should 
comply with the procedures established by law and regulations. In addition to a clause 
concerning independent directors, independent directors should be elected through the candidate 
nomination system, a procedure in which only board of directors and big shareholders (those 
with more than 1% of all outstanding shares) have the right to submit a slate of independent 
directors. After the elections, the only power that independent directors have would be the right 
to file objections regarding important items that have been specified in Article 14-3 of the 
TSEA.330 However, independent directors’ objections cannot invalidate items that have been 
approved by the majority of the board of directors, and the only effect is that such objections are 
recorded in the minutes of the board meeting. In comparison with non-independent directors, the 
right to object to particular items appears to be the only privilege vested in independent directors. 
In fact, a non-independent director also can express their opinions about a particular item. 
Therefore, whether or not the objection should be recorded in the minutes is the only different 
privilege that distinguish independent directors from non-independent directors. 
Reviews and discussions with the board of directors give independent directors 
opportunities to discover irregularities and illegalities when they attend the board meetings. The 
TCA stipulates that if any director is not given prior notice before a board meeting, resolutions 
made at such meetings are void. Hence, management has no way to avoid being monitored by 
independent directors when important items need to be taken up at board meetings. 
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Professors Lipton and Lorsch argue “changes in board practices [shall] be implemented 
by individual boards, with no changes in laws, stock exchange rules, SEC regulations, or new 
court decisions. Trying to change regulations or laws will be politically difficult and at best very 
time consuming.”331 Taiwanese policymakers may need to think about this statement seriously.  
4.2.4.7 Un-Examinable Independence  
In Taiwan, the independence issue is critical. Attempts to build an effective system of 
checks and balances have made it clear that independent directors are expected to deliver 
dissenting quality opinions in board meetings when the prospective transactions appear 
suspicious. Within the system, it is assumed that board decisions made without hearing the 
voices of independent directors are likely to be appropriate. The institution of independent 
directors would theoretically have a bonding function for quality of board decisions, which do 
not involve self-interested deals or other illegal activities.332  
In Taiwan, the controlling shareholders can usually elect the majority of the board of 
directors, or even the entire board, which means that “the real objectivity and independence, and 
therefore the real value, of nominally independent directors can be undermined.”333 Taiwan had 
adopted legislation that assumes that independent directors avoid being unduly influenced by 
management and make objective decisions that are in the interest of shareholders. However, 
determining what constitutes true independence remains an open question.334 
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As explained previously, derivative suits tend to not be exercised by shareholders in 
Taiwan. 335  Thus, there are few or no opportunities to review the true independence of 
independent directors in litigations. In the absence of effective judicial reviews, shareholders and 
investors can hardly challenge the credibility of independent directors. In other words, ex post 
judicial review of director independence determining true independence of directors is almost 
unavailable in the Taiwan’s legal system.336 Taiwanese independent directors currently are only 
subject to formality checks that will be performed by companies’ self-compliance, stock 
exchange, and the competent authority.337 
The reputation of each independent director may be the only way to ensure his or her 
independence. Independent directors who want to maintain their reputations may avoid 
compromises with management and controlling shareholders regarding suspicious transactions 
that are likely to harm the interests of shareholders.   
Many U.S. companies have nomination committees consisting entirely of independent 
directors, and the committee has power to propose the slate. This is done in order to avoid undue 
influence on the nominations of independent directors. Such a method can protect the 
independence of independent directors from undue influence by management.338 To help ensure 
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the true independence and objectivities of directors, a nominating committee consisting entirely 
of independent directors should be responsible for nomination of directors.339  
In Taiwan, there is no similar legal notion regarding the nomination committee, and most 
Taiwanese companies do not have such committees. In contrast, the “candidate nomination 
system” allows management and major shareholders to manipulate their favorite candidates into 
being elected as independent directors. The result is that the independence of Taiwanese 
independent directors remains in doubt. 340                       
Corporate literature indicates that the dominant leader of the group may heavily influence 
independent directors who can deliver dissenting opinions on certain suspect transactions. 341 In 
most Taiwanese companies, the CEO (or general manager) and board chairman are often the 
same person (or several individuals supported by the same controlling shareholders), so 
independent directors are less likely to engage in frank discord against management. 
As proposed in the initial draft of TSEA that requires mandatory appointment of 
independent directors, such requirement can be a way to promote independent director review of 
self-dealing transactions.342 However, such requirement cannot do much to make the directors 
truly independent.343 The bottom line is that even if independent directors are truly independent, 
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restoring investor confidence in the integrity of the Taiwanese system of corporate governance, 
given recent scandals, requires objectivity and judicial intervention.344 
4.2.4.8 Passive Institutional Investors and Apathetic Taiwanese Shareholders  
One reason for the rise of independent directors in the U.S. companies is the advocacy by 
institutional investors.345 Along with addition of independent directors to the board, institutional 
shareholders will continue to monitor directors and their performance.346   
Unlike the U.S. institutional investors who hold majority of equity in the listed 
companies,347 institutional investors in Taiwan tend to be passive regarding governance issues, so 
companies feel little pressure to adopt better governance practices. Share prices are the primary 
concern of institutional investors. Individual investors contribute most of the capital in Taiwan, 
and the governance issues may not interest them. Taiwanese shareholders may have little interest 
in whether or not directors are independent, but they do rate managerial performance by voting 
using the “Wall Street Rule” if the management fails to meet their standards of performance.348 
The U.S. institutional shareholders have long been advocating to push boards have a 
majority of independent directors.349 Also, institutional investors may help companies to identify 
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qualified candidates of independent directors whose “specific charge of being independent of 
management and accountable for advancing shareholder interests.”350 
4.2.4.9 Summary 
In addition to the U.S. debate associated with the effectiveness of independent directors, 
some Taiwanese commentators also show their concerns in this regard. First, the independence 
matters but the independence is very difficult to be ensured in Taiwan’s society. Most leaders of 
Taiwanese companies generally prefer to hire independent directors with whom they are familiar. 
A controlling shareholder, of course, will look for good candidates according to their personal 
preference. They will judge the candidates primarily based on their prior “Guan Xi (i.e., 
relationship)” with candidates. The Guan Xi generally provides reliable information as primary 
resource letting people know others in Chinese (and Taiwanese) society.
351
 The best strategy for 
a controlling shareholder is to invite someone who has the Guan Xi with her if possible. As 
mentioned, the presence of controlling shareholders is common and they normally can decide 
who will be elected as independent directors. It is less likely that the favorable candidates will 
monitor against their supporters.   
Taiwan has a different internal governance system in which the board of directors is a 
managing device rather than a monitoring device. Independent directors in nature are deemed as 
monitors against management, so it may raise questions when independent directors (monitors) 
are introduced into the board of directors (management) because an independent director is 
responsible for both management and monitor. How independent directors can monitor decisions 
and behavior by them is quite doubtful.       
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It is no doubt that substance is more important than form when speaking of independent 
directors. Directors who are labeled as independent directors may have significant importance in 
corporate governance but they must be utilized responsibly.
352
 However, due to any reasons, 
when independent directors are not truly independent, the label will be meaningless. It may raise 
a problem for investors of Taiwanese companies who have given these prima facie labels weight 
in making investing decisions. Similarly, courts will confront the same problem when the 
transaction in question has passed by the independent directors. Delaware courts have 
distinguished the concept of an "interested" director from that of an "independent" director
353
 and 
have realized labeling could have an unfair effect without appropriate sensitivity.
354
 By the same 
token, Taiwanese courts may have to develop a legal standard to determine the legality of 
behavior involved with monitoring by independent directors.   
A research on Taiwanese independent directors of listed companies conducts a survey in 
order to explore a question as to what independent directors consider to be the most important 
key to effective function.  The survey contains pre-specified choices: “the lack of sufficient time,” 
“the difficulties in accessing information,” “the colleague relationships,” “insufficient pecuniary 
incentives,” “the lack of certain types of professionalisms for effective monitoring,” 
“expectations for re-nomination,” and  “no difficulties to effectively execute powers.” 
“Insufficient time” and “the difficulties in accessing information” are ranked as the first (28%) 
and second (18%) most important factors in the effective functioning of independent directors.
355
 
That survey indicates that even in situations where independent directors have true independence 
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from management and controlling shareholders, they may have insufficient time and information 
to make decisions. In addition to the lack of time and information, Taiwanese independent 
directors face other challenges when trying to be effective monitors. Of the respondents, 57% 
responded that they did not experience any difficulties when they effectively executed their 
powers.
356
 
However, that survey may not have revealed the complete picture regarding the 
difficulties that Taiwanese independent directors face. Whether or not they are truly independent 
remains uncertain (and can remain unchallengeable through derivative suits in Taiwan). 
Basically speaking, Taiwan’s society has emphasized Guan Xi rather than the rule of law, and 
that characteristic will be serious detriment to the effectiveness of Taiwanese independent 
directors.
357
 Taiwan’s current legal system states that the FSC, MOEA, and Taiwan’s stock 
exchanges are probably the only mechanisms that might ascertain truly independence of 
independent directors. 
4.3 Question Three: Why Do Companies Need Independent Directors?  
4.3.1 Costs and Benefits 
U.S. scholars suggest that one reason for the rise of independent directors since the 1960s 
is judicial deference to decisions made by independent-majority-boards,
358
 and companies (and 
the management of such companies) have incentives to hire additional independent directors for 
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their boards in order to avoid trivial and strike lawsuits brought by shareholders.
359
 Saving on 
costly litigation expenses is an inducement for companies seeking to avoid being harassed by 
legal actions by shareholders to appoint independent directors.
360
 In contrast, costs will be 
incurred in searching for candidates who meet certain eligibility and expertise.  
Most Taiwanese companies are accustomed to having supervisors as a monitoring device, 
and having two monitoring mechanisms would incur more expenses. Thus, unless the expected 
benefits exceed the expected costs, companies may often prefer to not hire independent directors. 
Economical rationality is an essential consideration with regard to whether the policy of 
independent directors will work in Taiwan. Companies may attempt to use whatever corporate 
governance practices they prefer, even in the face of legal constraints. For example, companies 
subject to mandatory policies may have ways to get around such legal constraints, such as 
recruiting nominally independent directors instead of truly independent directors. Thus, if most 
companies assume that independent directors are inappropriate for their companies, this may 
indicate that a mandatory policy should not be maintained.  
Some companies may hire independent directors not because of economic considerations 
but rather as the result of legal pressures. Encouraging companies to voluntarily appoint 
independent directors involves the competent authority loosening legal requirements, which ask 
that all directors and supervisors have a certain ownership percentage of their company’s shares, 
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and will be fined if they fail to maintain a prescribed percentage.
361
 As a result, some companies 
have noneconomic incentives to hire independent directors. The TWSE’s Listing Rules require 
Newly-Listed Companies to appoint independent directors when they apply for listing. This 
mandatory policy arbitrarily decided which governance practices should be applied to such 
companies without allowing them to develop individual versions of economic rationality. Unlike 
larger firms, it is likely that small firms do not want to have independent directors because they 
may have smaller budgets that do not allow them to pay the expenses incurred by a larger board 
of directors.
362
   
The first question relates to whether or not benefits exceed expenses. If they do, then the 
second question should be whether the overall costs of having independent directors offset their 
effectiveness. The answers to these two questions are not self-evident. The truth is that the costs 
and benefits vary from company to company, and it is difficult to arrive at a universal conclusion 
that is applicable to all companies.  
Recruiting independent directors can cause problems for smaller, more specialized 
companies, due to the potential liabilities and risks they face. Smaller companies with 
specialized operations face difficulties in searching for, and hiring, eligible candidates with the 
requisite knowledge in specific industries.363 
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Like SOX, the TSEA and TWSE’s Listing Rules create a need for additional independent 
director candidates.
364
 However, the increased demand for independent directors may face a 
supply diminished by the increasingly stricter independence standards, and it may make difficult 
for more companies to hire capable independent directors.
365
 As a matter of fact, after the TSEA, 
more than half of existing Taiwanese listed companies have merely reappointed their existing 
board outsiders as independent directors or independent supervisors.
366
 
4.3.2 Value of Inside Directors 
Insider directors admittedly can contribute to shareholders’ interests. They usually have 
industry knowledge or company-specific knowledge that can help them craft a business strategy 
for a company. One may argue that some firms whose boards are dominated by insiders may be 
better because insiders have more time devoted to the company and can use their company-
specific knowledge to perform better than outside directors. For public companies, that should 
not be the norm. In some cases, a blended board composition consisting of independent directors 
and knowledgeable insiders may be optimal. In addition to contributions by insiders, having a 
majority of independent directors can provide some assurance of integrity of management.
367
 
An inside director who is also a full-time senior employee is supposed to have more 
informational advantages than outside independent directors who usually devote small portion of 
their time and effort to the company. Thus, the decisions made by those inside directors are more 
likely to be informed than decisions made by independent directors.
368
  Those inside directors 
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may have made significant investments in the firm-specific human capital.
369
 To be a senior 
employee in one company, she has to invest considerable time to learn how to do her jobs more 
effectively than others.
370
 Much of this knowledge may be very specific to her company.
371
 Such 
an inside director is in a better position to make quality decisions than an outsider is.
372
  
Some companies may maintain the current number of inside directors whose expertise 
they need.
373
 To meet the majority of independent directors as suggested by many U.S. corporate 
scholars, a company may increase its board size in order to maintain desirable numbers of inside 
directors and independent directors.
374
 The increased board size may be beyond its optimal 
size.
375
 Also, the growing demand for independent directors will likely increase the costs of 
hiring directors.
376
  Due to the presence of independent directors who may have adversary 
attitude against non-independent directors, many valuable directors may be dissuaded from 
serving on the board.
377
 Thus, boards might perform more effectively if they contain a mix of 
independent directors and inside directors.
378
  
Inside directors supported by controlling shareholders have benefits in some aspects. First, 
they can help company access to financing in emergencies in which arm’s length financing is 
limited.  Second, they can provide monitoring on management if there are no shareholders whose 
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ownership is not big for them to monitor management (instead, they will walk away with selling 
their shares). For some companies, these benefits regarding financing and monitoring provided 
by controlling shareholders may be more valuable than benefits produced by monitoring of 
independent directors. This is also an example that independent directors do not fit all companies.   
4.3.3 Conclusion 
The above rationale shows that even though corporate commentators suggest “there 
should be a heavy majority of purely independent directors on every board” for public 
companies, a mandatory rule may not be appropriate for all types of companies. Companies 
should instead consider adopting independent directors on a voluntary basis and develop their 
own governance practices as they see fit.379 After all, “what is a proper board for one company 
may not be good for another,” so each company should have free hand to decide what is best for 
its needs.380 
This dissertation will show that the number of listed companies that appoint independent 
directors remains relatively low (e.g., 293 out of 758 in 2010). It appears that the market does not 
desire independent directors so much. 
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4.4. Statistics Data  
4.4.1 Numbers of Taiwanese Listed Companies with Independent Directors  
This section focuses on the statistics data about the numbers of independent directors and 
audit committees in Taiwanese listed companies, which may be able to offer implications of how 
desirable independent directors are in practice.  
Figure 6: The Numbers of Listed Companies with Independent Director(s) and the 
Numbers of All Listed Companies from 2005 to 2010   
 
Source: Taiwan Stock Exchange 
 
Figure 6 shows that the number of listed companies with at least one independent director 
was 224 (32.41% of all listed companies) in 2005 and the number increased to 293 (38.65% of 
all listed companies) in 2010. There may be some explanations for the increase. The obvious one 
should be attributed to the mandatory policy of the Listing Rules that requires Newly-Listed 
Companies appoint at least two independent directors while apply for listing. The increase also 
may indicate that the importance of independent directors have gradually been emphasized by 
the market so they become more and more desirable to the listed companies.   
224 224 226 263 
284 293 
691 688 698 741 741 
758 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
# of companies with ID # of all listed companies
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It may be possible to know whether or not a company voluntarily has an independent 
director, by looking at its listing date (before or after the Listed Rules). Some of the companies 
listed after the Listed Rules may already have independent directors at its own discretion. As can 
be seen in this Figure, the number of overall listed companies is increasing year by year (from 
691 in 2005 to 758 in 2010), which means 67 Newly-Listed Companies are subject to the Listing 
Rules. Compared with the increase of the number of companies with independent directors (69), 
it indicates that most of the Newly-Listed companies keep hiring independent directors for the 
next term, even though they are no longer subject to the Listed Rules, which is applicable only at 
the listing review. However, this also could be explained from other perspective. This may be 
costs and difficulties that they should face (for example, amending articles of incorporation 
according to TSEA) if they want to get rid of independent directors. In fact, this probably is the 
reason why few companies opt to hire independent directors if they did not do so when going 
listed. For example, in comparison with 2005, only 9 additional listed companies opt to hire 
independent directors in 2006. Even so, companies will get rid of independent directors if 
necessary. Take listed companies which had independent directors in 2005 for example, 15 
companies stop hiring independent directors in 2006 and the number of these companies keeps 
increasing in next three years (cumulatively 45 in 2007, 66 in 2008, and 86 in 2009).381    
Finally, this Figure shows that independent directors, overall speaking, remain not so 
desirable for the majority of listed companies, even though it is highly recommended by TWSE 
as a good governance practice. Taking all factors into consideration, status quo probably would 
be a best strategy for most listed companies.  
                                                          
381
 The computation is based on data of every December from 2005 to 2009. The data is available at TWSE’s 
Market Observation Post System, http://mops.twse.com.tw/index.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2012).  
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Figure 7: The Proportions of Companies with Independent Director(s) in Top Five 
Industries (2005-2010)382 
 
Source: Taiwan Stock Exchange 
 
Figure 7 presents the proportions for listed companies with independent directors in five 
industries. As this Figure shows, more than 50% of electronics companies had independent 
directors during the period of 2005 to 2010, which is significantly higher than the average 
(approximately 30%) in the market. That may mean the institution of independent directors is 
more desirable in electronics industry than in others. Similarly, that may be partially explained 
by the fact that the majority of Newly-Listed Companies are in the electronics industry.   
It is worth noting that in the textiles industry the percentages sharply decrease (from 
17.02% in 2005 down to 2.17% in 2010). Such decrease may indicate that textiles companies 
think the independent directors not desirable as a corporate governance practice in their industry. 
Even facing the possible disadvantages changing the status quo (amending articles of 
incorporation), textiles companies prefer not having independent directors. On the contrary, 
financial companies (including banks, insurance companies, and securities dealers) hire more 
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independent directors and all of them have independent directors. However, the reason for the 
sharp increase is based on the mandate of competent authority, but not on their own choices.   
Figure 8: Numbers of Listed Companies with Audit Committee (2007-2010) 
 
Source: Taiwan Stock Exchange 
 
Figure 8 contains the data only from 2007 when the concept of audit committee was 
officially adopted, under the meaning of the TSEA. It appears that there were only a few listed 
companies that established an audit committee. Under the TSEA, a company with audit 
committee cannot hire supervisors. Before the audit committee is introduced, it is no question 
that all Taiwan’s companies, for a very long time, get used to work with supervisors as the 
primary monitors. The establishment of an audit committee inevitably would have a great deal of 
impact on the way which internal governance system works within a company that always hires 
supervisors as monitoring device. Such shocking impact may be so unbearable as to dissuade 
most companies from setting up an audit committee replacing supervisors.  
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Figure 9: Companies with Audit Committee by Industries (as of May, 2011)  
 
Source: Taiwan Stock Exchange 
 
As seen in the Figure 9, most of listed companies that have an audit committee are in the 
electronics industry. It may be concluded that audit committees are more desirable to electronics 
industry than to other industries. However, due to a small number of the data, such statement 
may be much more speculative than conclusive.      
Figure 10: Average Percentages of Ownership Held by Foreign Investors (Financial 
Institutions, Judicial Person, and Trust Fund) in All Listed Companies (2005-2010)  
 
Source: Taiwan Stock Exchange 
 
Generally, foreign investors care the governance issues more than local investors. As the 
appointment of independent directors is deemed as a good governance practice, it is possible that 
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investors would take it into consideration while deciding to invest any given company. Figure 10 
reflects the preference that such kind of investors may have. As seen in the Figure, foreign 
investors, on average, hold more ownership in the companies with independent directors than in 
those with no independent directors. Although the differences seem small, some companies may 
like to induce more capital from the foreign investors who prefer the presence of independent 
directors, by appointing some independent directors. Overall, the capital market seems not to 
provide strong incentives for many companies to reinforce their internal governance systems 
associated with independent directors.   
Figure 11: Average Percentages of Ownership Held by Foreign Investors (Financial 
Institutions, Judicial Person, and Trust Fund) in All Listed Electronics Companies (2005-
2010) 
 
Source: Taiwan Stock Exchange 
 
As above, electronics companies, for some reason, prefer the independent directors to 
those in other industries. In the electronics industry, the ownership differences (between 
companies with independent directors and companies without independent directors) held by 
foreign investors remain insignificant (see Figure 11 for details). Due to that fact, in addition to 
foreign investors’ preferences, there may be some reasons that electronics companies favor 
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independent directors since the market forces seems not vigorous enough to force companies to 
appoint more independent directors.  
4.4.2 Who Are Independent Directors in Taiwan? 
            Table 11 presents the occupations of independent directors in Taiwanese listed 
companies; most of them are directors, professors, managers, and CEOs.  
Table 11: Occupations of Independent Directors in Taiwanese Listed Companies
383
  
Occupation  Total number Percentage 
Corporate Director 155 29.03 
Professor 133 24.91 
Manager 66 12.36 
CEO 65 12.17 
Accountant 39 7.30 
Lawyer 24 4.49 
Government Officer  10 1.87 
Politician 10 1.87 
Physician 2 0.37 
Others 30 5.62 
Total 534 100 
Source: Taiwan Stock Exchange (as of October, 2008) 
  
 Like independent directors in the U.S., lack of incentive will be another issue that could 
undermine the effectiveness of independent directors. There are no regulations regarding how 
independent directors are to be compensated, except that the compensation given to independent 
directors and supervisors can be separated from that of other directors. It might be true that the 
more legal responsibilities they carry, the more independent they would presumably be in 
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conducting their jobs.
384
 However, the uncertain and heavy legal risk also lowers the willingness 
of desirable candidates to be independent directors.  
Table 12 illustrates the average annual compensation that an independent director in 
Taiwanese listed companies has received. The compensation rate grows from 20,400 dollars in 
2004 to 39,100 dollars in 2007, which may have provided independent directors with monetary 
incentives to offer robust monitoring. Also, this Table shows that independent directors in 
companies with an audit committee have been compensated more than those in companies 
without an audit committee. That may indicate that independent directors, also audit committee 
members, have to spend more time on monitoring which includes the tasks that conventional 
supervisors are supposed to carry out. 
Table 12: Average Annual Compensation for Each Independent Director of Listed 
Companies
385
 
Average Annual 
Compensation 
2004 2005 2006 2007 
Independent Director 612,000 
(20,400) 
801,000 
(26,700) 
923,000 
(30,766) 
1,173,000 
(39,100) 
Growth Rate n/a 30.88% 15.23% 27.09% 
Non-Independent 
Director  
n/a 1,828,000 
(60,933) 
1,941,000 
(64,700) 
2,146,000 
(71,533) 
Growth Rate n/a n/a 6.18% 10.56% 
Independent Director in 
Companies with Audit 
Committee 
2,656,000 
(88,533) 
3,364,000 
(112,133) 
4,440,000 
(148,000) 
4,199,000 
(139,966) 
Growth Rate n/a 26.66% 31.99% -5.43% 
Unit: New Taiwan Dollar (NTD); 30 NTD= 1 USD (shown in parentheses) 
Source: Taiwan Stock Exchange 
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4.5 Policy Implications 
4.5.1 Will Taiwan’s Reforms Continue to Go Forward?  
It is no question that the institution of independent directors in Taiwan has many potential 
problems, so most commentators are not satisfied with current internal governance system and 
keep to advocate further reforms. However, it appears that most listed companies prefer 
traditional supervisor system than the U.S.-styled committee system. Also, even Taiwanese 
companies with independent directors tend to have few independent directors on their boards. 
Previous policymaking experience indicates any government’s reforms towards a mandatory 
policy are expected to encounter a huge pressure from the industry. Thus, for Taiwanese 
policymakers, there will not be enough political incentives for them to take an aggressive reform, 
unless another shocking scandal like Procomp or Reba strikes Taiwan so seriously that voters’ 
angry pushes overwhelming pressure on policymakers. Now, Taiwan is completely democratic 
and both major political parties have much potential in taking power by earning the support of 
majority voters. Therefore, once another serious shocking scandal breaks out again, the voices of 
voters can be a form that pushes the corporate governance reform forward. Currently, Taiwanese 
policymakers, however, may prefer keeping a conservative policy about independent directors in 
the near future.  
4.5.2 Create Friendly Environment for Independent Directors   
In the theoretical debates in the U.S. and Taiwan, there is no clear answer to the question 
regarding whether independent directors can be an effective governance mechanism that lowers 
the possibilities of corporate wrongdoing committed by management (controlled by controlling 
shareholders). Since the institution of independent directors has become a formal mechanism in 
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Taiwan that is believed to benefit companies in some aspects, how to make this mechanism work 
should draw our attention. This dissertation concludes that current institution of independent 
directors in theory is less likely to function in an anticipated manner, because current legal and 
business environment in Taiwan is unfriendly for such institution to work, as analyzed above. As 
a result, in order to facilitate independent directors to function as much as possible, Taiwanese 
policymakers must consider creating a friendly environment in which independent directors can 
comfortably carry out their jobs.        
In order to mitigate the problems associated with controlling shareholders’ dominance in 
the boardroom, Taiwanese policymakers have proposed some amendments to some articles of 
the TCA. They include: 
4.5.2.1. Mandatory Cumulative Voting in Directorial Elections 
In Taiwan, where controlling shareholders may be ubiquitously present, the mandatory 
cumulative voting may be useful in some situations because it allows minority shareholders, who 
possibly have different interests from controlling shareholders’, to elect at least one (independent) 
director representing them, and accordingly that can strengthen a culture of director 
independence.
386
 
According to the Article 198 of the TCA, the cumulative voting is a non-mandatory 
default rule for the directorial elections. Under cumulative voting, whereby shareholders support 
one candidate with all of their votes (i.e., the number of shares timing the number of board seats 
to be elected), minority shareholders can take advantage of securing a seat in the boardroom. 
However, companies can adopt other election methods that facilitate controlling shareholders to 
                                                          
386
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secure more board seats than in the cumulative voting. To avoid this, a bill is proposed to make 
the cumulative voting mandatory to all companies. Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan passed the bill on 
Dec. 14, 2011. 
A disadvantage of mandatory cumulative voting is potential disharmony in the 
boardroom if there are many sects among directors that have different kinds of interest. Such 
disharmony in boardroom sometimes could lead to an inefficient board whose members have a 
grudge against others. Independent directors who are truly independent can solve this problem 
because minority shareholders trust monitor provided by independent directors more than by 
controlling shareholders’ representatives. Therefore, if some candidates are truly independent 
from controlling shareholders, minority shareholders will be comfortable when supporting these 
candidates. Instead of sending their own candidates who may have a grudge against controlling 
shares into boardroom, supporting truly independent directors in the election seems to be better 
off for shareholders as a whole. However, minority shareholders may lack sufficient information 
to determine whether a particular independent director is truly independent from controlling 
shareholders. In this situation, minority shareholders may prefer supporting their own candidates 
to independent director candidates nominated by controlling shareholders.  
Cumulative voting still has functions in the introduction of independent directors. When 
several groups of minority shareholders are unable to have their own candidates elected even 
under cumulative voting, they can instead propose a slate. If some of independent candidates are 
trustworthy to them, the slate can be a good coordinator guiding them to vote a preferred quality 
director, who can do the monitoring for them. In contrast, without cumulative voting, minority 
shareholders will not likely to get their favorite candidates elected in the director elections with 
straight voting.                                 
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4.5.2.2 Mandatory Disclosure in Making Self-Interested Decisions 
A bill was proposed that an interested director should disclose his or her conflicts of 
interest in any board decision before such a board decision is to be made. In case the interested 
directors fail to make disclosure, the board decision associated with any conflicts of interest 
between the company and directors should be void. This can alleviate the problem that the 
controlling shareholders embezzle the corporate assets through related-party transactions 
approved by the board primarily consisted by their affiliates. For a public company that appoints 
independent directors pursuant to the TSEA, any related-party transactions should be approved 
by the board of directors. In the circumstances, independent directors are expected to review and 
verify that the proposed transactions will be made at arm’s length. However, no investigation 
power is vested with independent directors and a problem of informational asymmetry will be 
raised unless disclosure of material information is made by the interested director or persons 
involved. Thus, informational asymmetry will makes such review and verification by 
independent directors meaningless. The proposed provision will force the interested directors 
voluntarily disclose information to the board, which alleviate the informational asymmetry 
problem that independent directors will encounter in monitoring board’s behavior. Taiwan’s 
Legislative Yuan passed that bill on Dec. 14, 2011.      
4.5.2.3 Imposition of Liability on Shadow Directors 
Under Taiwanese laws, controlling shareholders do not owe any obligation to other 
shareholders. Even when they become directors, they owe the fiduciary duty only to the 
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company rather than shareholders.
387
 If they wish to escape possible liabilities as a director, they 
can appoint a “dummy director” who will act in accordance with her instructions. Such so-called 
“shadow director” do not have responsibility for the wrongdoing committed by her dummy 
director unless there is clear evidence proving her instructions cause wrongdoing. 
To solve this problem, a new proposed provision of Article 8 of the TCA provides that a 
shadow director shall be liable for her wrongdoing. Under the new provision, a shadow director 
shall have fiduciary duty and take criminal responsibility as if she were an actual director. What 
is the scope of fiduciary duty for a shallow director is not clear since the provision is quite new. 
One thing is certain that imposition of criminal liability should be the most striking effect to 
shallow directors. Under the rules of criminal laws in Taiwan, people shall not be punished 
unless a statute clearly says so. Previously, without a provision with respect to shallow directors, 
they usually can escape criminal liability when they use dummies to commit wrongdoing for 
their benefits, unless there is persuasive evidence that could prove shallow directors’ behavior 
causes such wrongdoing.  
Additionally, a proposed Article 23 of the TCA provides that the shareholder meeting can 
exert the right of disgorgement to force a fiduciary in violation of her duty to return the profits 
obtained by her illegal acts to the company. Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan passed these two 
provisions on Dec. 14, 2011.      
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4.5.2.4 No Directors and Supervisors Appointed by Same Institutional Shareholder 
The current Article 27 of the TCA provides that an institutional shareholder can appoint 
representatives that serve as both directors and supervisors. A controlling shareholder who 
makes some arrangements to secure dominance in the execution (board of directors) and 
monitoring (supervisors) within a company can manipulate this Article. Article 26-3 of the 
TSEA makes Article 27 of the TCA inapplicable only to public companies. Almost all 
Taiwanese scholars criticize the current Article 27. They believe that the Wang family, in the 
Reba scandal, manipulated this Article to secure the most board seats of all the affiliated 
companies. Before Reba, a bill that deleted this Article encountered a great deal of opposition 
from the industry, so it failed to get approval from legislation. Another reason that Taiwanese 
policymakers keep this controversial Article is the government’s intention to secure its 
dominance in some types of companies involved with businesses that offer public goods or 
services such as electricity, gasoline, water, and public transportation. If the government holds 
less than 50% of the shares of a company, then that company will not be deemed a state-run 
company so that the government’s representatives are not subject to the supervision of the 
Legislative Yuan. Thus, there are few incentives for the government to delete this Article. 
A bill passed by the Legislative Yuan on Dec. 14, 2011 provides that an institutional 
shareholder cannot appoint several representatives concurrently elected by both directors and 
supervisors, and that can mitigate the dominance of controlling shareholders, in terms of internal 
governance system in Taiwan. Unfortunately, an institutional shareholder can still have several 
of its representatives elected as directors or supervisors, so a controlling shareholder can keep its 
dominance in the boardroom by well manipulating this Article.  
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4.5.2.5 Others 
When independent directors are not truly independent in fact and tend to be influenced by 
a controlling shareholder, the approval by independent directors seems an insufficient safeguard 
against related-party transactions.
388
 Thus, scholars argue that it can be valuable to give approval 
power for larger transactions to non-interested shareholders.
389
 Some commentators suggest that 
independent directors and supervisors be elected by counting heads rather than by counting stock 
shares and votes, which is the only current method. If independent directors were to be elected 
by counting the numbers of shareholders, then controlling shareholders would have less control 
over election of independent directors. This method would empower small shareholders since 
one of the responsibilities of independent directors is to protect the interests of small 
shareholders.
390
 
4.5.3 Mandatory Independent Director Policy is Not Appropriate  
This dissertation argues that mandatory appointment of independent directors is not 
appropriate for Taiwan, based on the following reasons: 
The effectiveness of independent directors remains doubtful, at least from theoretical 
point of view. Especially in Taiwan, independent directors will face many kinds of difficulties as 
they carry out their anticipated tasks. Specifically, some factors (such as uncertain independence, 
information asymmetry, the presence of shareholders, the majority of insiders on boards, weak 
power vested with independent directors, and no functional committees) will be making 
independent directors ineffective. 
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In a given company which hires no independent directors, minority shareholders can have 
their representatives elected as directors who can monitor board behavior for them. Due to the 
potential conflicts of interest between different groups of shareholders, they will monitor against 
each other, and thus an internal checks and balances system can be created. Independent 
directors may be unnecessary in this type of situations. Besides, non-independent directors 
supported by minority shareholders have more time and interest in monitoring than an 
independent director. Thus, in some companies, such non-independent directors may be more 
effective monitors than independent directors.              
Currently, although scholars have stressed the importance of independent directors, they 
seem to be undesirable for most mid-size and family-founded (except for few interested in 
inducing foreign investments or oversees listing) Taiwanese companies. Even though companies 
are required to appoint independent directors, they are likely to look for the candidates who are 
unwilling to involve active monitoring against management. In short, if companies do not have 
enough incentive to hire independent directors, they may easily become “rubberstamps” working 
for management or controlling shareholders rather than all shareholders.                   
As mentioned, a mandatory policy would be inappropriate for Taiwan. The current 
settings for independent directors seem better than a mandatory policy. Now, only Newly-Listed, 
financial, and large-size companies shall appoint independent directors. Under the TWSE’s 
Listing Rules, Newly-Listed companies can opt not to hire independent directors after being 
listed. Imposing the mandatory appointment of independent directors on financial and large-sized 
companies will not cause much shock for them, because they normally have more abilities to 
bear the costs of hiring independent directors. However, this may not be the case for small-sized 
companies. 
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Currently, the majority of the existing body of corporate law literature tends to merit the 
functions of independent directors in the context of corporate governance. However, there have 
been many scholars insisting that independent directors are not the solution for every corporate 
governance problem.
391
 One size does not fit all. Every single company will have their unique 
needs and should have freedom, under the permitted governance structure by laws, to develop 
the desirable accountability mechanisms tailored for their special needs.
392
 After all, “what is a 
proper board for one company may not be good for another,” so each company should have 
freedom to decide what is best for its needs.393 In other words, there may be no single optimal 
corporate governance model that is applicable to all companies in all situations.
394
    
4.5.4 Supervisors and Independent Directors Should Not Coexist  
Supervisors and independent directors should not coexist in one company due to their 
overlapping functions and a free-riding problem. Thus, a company with supervisors must not 
appoint independent directors. The board of directors is still a managing device and supervisors 
will be the monitoring device that oversees the managerial behavior. On the contrary, companies 
that appoint independent directors must not have supervisors. Whether to appoint either 
supervisors or directors should be optional for companies. 
Some may argue that independent directors can cooperate with supervisors who lack 
managing information for a better monitoring. Ideally, this could happen. However, this 
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argument is premised on a good coordination between independent directors and supervisors. 
Without a well-established coordination, free-riding and repetitive monitoring will inevitably 
occur.  
4.5.5 Conclusion 
In the U.S., good corporate governance may be predictable from board independence, the 
existence and role of the audit committee, or efficient takeover market. For Taiwan, only 
emphasizing the importance of the board independence seems senseless unless some 
preconditions are met. As Professor Black stated, some developing countries “need honest judges 
and regulators, good disclosure rules, and the beginnings of a culture of honesty before it makes 
sense to worry whether public company boards have, say, a majority of independent 
directors.”395  
The most difficult challenge for Taiwanese independent directors to overcome is the 
influence from controlling shareholders who can control majority of the board and supervisors as 
well. In fact, their actual independence (from the controlling shareholders) remains questionable. 
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Chapter Five: An Empirical Analysis on the Effectiveness of Independent Directors in 
Taiwan—Do Independent Directors Matter on Firm Performance?396 
The reasons why Taiwan has introduced an institution of independent directors have been 
explained in Chapter Four. As such institution is relatively unfamiliar to Taiwanese companies, 
how it has been functioning so far is arguably unclear. In this chapter, this dissertation will 
launch an empirical project examining the effectiveness of independent directors in Taiwan. 
Admittedly, there are many ways to examine the possible contributions of independent directors. 
Here, this dissertation focuses on the firm performance, which is straightforward and can be 
reflected in concrete figures. I hypothesize that the presence of independent directors makes 
Taiwanese listed companies perform better. The null hypothesis is that there is no association 
between the presence of independent directors and firm performance. As will be explained later, 
the sample consists of Taiwanese listed electronic companies that have appointed independent 
director(s) (Companies with independent directors) and those that have never hired any 
independent directors (Companies without independent directors) between 2005 and 2008. The 
total observations are 424 (106 per year) for Companies with independent directors and 352 (88 
per year) for Companies without independent directors. This project will use Tobin’s q as a 
measure of firm performance, which is the dependent variable. Independent variables include 
board size, presence of independent directors (dummy), firm age, firm size, the number of block-
holders (holding more than 5% of outstanding shares of the company), year (dummy), and an 
interaction between independent directors and block-holders. The regression results can reject 
null hypothesis, and suggest that there is significant correlation between the presence of 
independent directors and firm performance.    
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5.1 The Purpose of this Empirical Project 
Since Taiwan’s introduction of independent directors, some commentators have believed 
that independent directors can, due to the qualifications of independence required by relevant 
regulations, avoid the undue influence and interference from the management (e.g., inside 
directors and officers), and more importantly, from the controlling shareholders, while making 
decisions in the boardrooms. If this theory is true, with the presence of independent directors on 
board, there will be an effective and robust mechanism of internal control so as to deter the 
management and controlling shareholders from committing wrongdoing, such as self-dealing 
transactions, which benefits the wrongdoers at the expense of minority shareholders. However, 
others contend that it is more appropriate for Taiwan to consider how to make supervisors 
function in an effective way, than to just borrow a new concept from the foreign jurisdiction (i.e., 
the U.S.), which may not fit into Taiwan’s legal and business environment. 
As illustrated in previous chapters, TWSE’s Listing Rules require companies to appoint 
at least two independent directors while applying for listing. Such rules are mandatory to all 
Newly-Listed Companies. The Listing Rules, to some extent, appear to adopt the theory that 
suggests that independent directors are good for companies. Even so, scholars argue that it needs 
some supporting empirical evidence, when any major codification for corporate governance is 
made.
397
 The introduction of independent directors should be treated the same because of its 
tremendous impact on Taiwan’s corporate governance system. Stimulated by the Procomp 
scandal that is believed to be one of the most shocking cases in Taiwan’s history, Taiwan’s 
policymakers seem to go forward with codifying independent directors in the TSEA too fast 
without seriously taking empirical evidence into consideration. Since the theoretical debate is 
                                                          
397
 Clark, supra note 172, at 312. 
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likely inconclusive, at this point, empirical evidence may provide some implications for 
Taiwanese policymakers.   
5.2 The Values of Independent Directors  
In the U.S., the board of directors is vested with almost all powers concerning the 
operations of the company. In fact, managers are the persons who run the daily affairs for the 
company. Under the separation between ownership and control, management has the power to 
run the business, but it may not care too much about the firm performance, because those who 
make up management are not owners of the company, and the agency problem arises. The 
agency theorists argue that agents (i.e., management) will likely pursue their own interests at the 
expenses of owners, if they are not being effectively monitored. In the corporate governance 
context, recent literature supports that the board of directors can effectively monitor management 
on behalf of shareholders.
398
 However, for various reasons, management (such as CEOs) may 
control the board members,
399
 and it is unrealistic to expect the board, which consists of insiders, 
to effectively monitor management because of their allegiance to CEOs, the persons who 
nominate them.
400
 To deal with this problem, the conventional wisdom of U.S. corporate laws 
argues that the board should be independent from management so as to reduce agency costs, 
because it can more effectively monitor management than a non-independent board can.
401
   
Basically, there are two main functions of the board of directors are expected to have: one 
is the advisory function, and the other is the monitoring function. Regarding the advisory 
                                                          
398
 E.g., Fosberg, supra note 131; Hillman & Dalziel, supra note 264.    
399
 Many scholars agree the fact that most U.S. medium to large size companies are run by the management team 
that holds a small fraction of the company’s shares. Fosberg, supra note 131, at 24.   
400
 The self-monitoring incentives of inside directors are limited “since they benefit from some of activities which 
they were placed on the board to stop.” Due to the conflicts of interest, they are not expected to offer an effective 
monitoring on the management. Id. at 24.   
401
 Hillman & Dalziel, supra note 264, at 385.    
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function, independent directors are usually business veterans or experts in some professional 
areas that may serve the company’s need, so they may be able to help management form 
business strategies that improve the company’s competitive advantages. With respect to the 
monitoring function, an independent board may prevent self-dealings that would harm the 
interests of shareholders from happening by offering a robust review on suspicious transactions. 
Board monitoring also lessens the possibilities that management would shirk its responsibilities. 
Afraid of being dismissed, management has incentives to perform in a satisfactory manner. By 
actively replacing incompetent managers, the board of directors could recruit new managers for 
better performance. Overall, by effectively monitoring on management’s behavior, the board of 
directors will be able to align managers’ interests with shareholders’ interests.  
It is a belief that the U.S. agency theory is also applicable to Taiwan’s companies. 
Therefore, with an attempt to build a better governance system, the Listing Rules provide that 
some types of professional expertise (such as legal, accounting, or financial) or experience that 
the company needs will be a prerequisite in order for someone to be an independent director in 
Taiwan, for they are expected to provide professional advice that will help the company run 
better. Admittedly, monitoring should be the most important function that Taiwan’s legislature 
expects the board of directors to have, because Taiwan’s introduction of independent directors is 
primarily motivated by some serious corporate scandals like the Procomp scandal. However, it 
may be difficult to measure how effectively a board might decrease the possibilities of 
management committing wrongdoing.
402
  
                                                          
402
 A research conducted by Lin by interviewing Taiwanese independent directors. Most of interviewees expressed 
their inabilities to dig out more information than which they were given from the insiders. Based on such findings 
and inherent limitations for independent directors in theory, Lin concluded that Taiwanese independent directors 
were not able to detect the irregularity in the related-party transactions, in which Taiwanese controlling shareholders 
and management used to embezzle the corporate assets. YU-HSIN LIN, INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS, supra note 67. 
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Instead, positive economic contributions by independent directors may be another 
perspective in determining the effectiveness of independent directors. In addition, it would be 
impossible to observe or know for certain whether a board of directors provides effective 
monitoring in reality, but a board’s structure may more or less suggest how effective its 
monitoring is. Specifically, if a board of directors is dominated by insiders (CEO and other 
senior officers) or by controlling shareholders, no effective monitoring can be anticipated. In 
contrast, a board primarily consisted of independent directors (who have no financial ties with 
managers and controlling shareholders) is presumptively able to objectively assess managerial 
performance and to avoid possible exploitations that harm the interests of shareholders 
(especially minority shareholders). Unlike a board that is heavily influenced by management or 
controlling shareholders, an independent board may be more likely to dismiss underperforming 
managers. Therefore, a board of directors with more independence from managers and 
controlling shareholders is believed to be good governance practice, which may have positive 
economic contributions to the company. As a result, an independent board can, in theory, reduce 
the agency costs and create values for shareholders, by effectively monitoring managerial 
activities, which may deviate from shareholders’ best interests in some conflicting situations 
arising from the scenario of separation between ownership and control.
403
  
Knowing the possible contributions that an independent board may have, this dissertation 
focuses on firm performance, because these types of contributions are most straightforward. As 
the TWSE introduced independent directors only a decade ago, the evidence with respect to firm 
                                                          
403
 It should be noted that Taiwan’s supervisors are also responsible for overseeing the legality of management 
conduct and to maintain the integrity of financial reports, but they have no authority to review the legitimacy or 
appropriateness of managerial conduct. As agreed by most Taiwanese commentators, supervisors usually are 
“bubbleheads” for senior managers or controlling shareholders and rarely effectively function as a monitoring 
device. Thus, the quality of supervisors’ monitoring seems that it would impact how well a firm runs, but in reality 
their influences tend to be insignificant. Their presence may be too slight to be perceived.    
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performance is very critical. To Taiwanese policymakers, such evidence can be taken into 
consideration when they examine the current policy and think of any further reforms. Currently, 
the appointment of independent directors is optional for most public companies, but mandatory 
for Newly-Listed Companies under TWSE’s Listing Rules. A thorough examination for the 
economic effects on companies with independent directors is necessary for policymakers when 
assessing whether or not a current policy needs to be maintained or modified.  
In short, this project will focus on the question of whether the companies with 
independent directors perform better than those without independent directors.  This dissertation 
will focus on companies’ performances after having independent directors, and will examine 
whether the U.S. corporate law wisdom of independent directors could also be applied in Taiwan. 
This project hypothesizes that companies with independent boards perform better than those 
without independent boards. As will be explained later, this project will focus its research only 
on Taiwan’s listed companies in the electronics industry. The hypothesis and null hypothesis are 
as follows: 
H1: The presence of independent directors makes Listed Companies perform better in Taiwanese 
electronics industry. 
H0: There is no association between the presence of independent directors and firm performance 
in Taiwanese electronics industry. 
5.3 Literature Review 
There has been a great deal of literature that has explored the possible benefits that 
independent directors can bring to companies, from a variety of different perspectives. For 
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example, regarding the cost of debt, an empirical study found that board and audit committee 
independence were associated significantly with lower costs of debt because the credibility or 
integrity of the company’s financial reporting, which would be processed under the monitor of 
the board of directors and of the audit committee, was very important to creditors in evaluating 
the risks.
404
 Beasley’s research indicated that a larger proportion of outside directors on the board 
of directors significantly reduced the likelihood of financial statement fraud, but the presence of 
an audit committee did not have the same result.
405
       
Regarding the correlation between independent directors and firm performance, the 
evidence is usually mixed in the body of previous literature.  Baysinger and Butler found that an 
increase on board independence tended to lead to better corporate financial performance.
406
  
Millstein and MacAvoy found that firms with active and independent boards performed better 
than those with passive and non-independent boards.
407
  Rosenstein and Wyatt argued that the 
appointment of outside directors was positively associated with reactions on stock prices.
408
  
Wagner, Stimpert, and Fubara’s study also suggested that the greater presence of outside 
directors was associated with higher performance, but they also found similar results regarding 
inside directors.
409
  In the context of a takeover, Byrd and Hickman’s findings suggested that 
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 Ronald C. Anderson et al., Board Characteristics, Accounting Report Integrity, and the Cost of Debt, 37 J. ACCT. 
& ECON. 315 (2004). 
405
 Mark S. Beasley, An Empirical Analysis of the Relation between the Board of Director Composition and 
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FIN. ECON. 175 (1990). 
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bidders whose majority of board of directors consisted of independent outside directors had 
significantly higher abnormal returns on the date of bidding announcement than others.
410
   
However, Fosberg found no relationship between the proportion of outside directors on 
the board and various variables, such as ROE (return on equity) and S/TA (sales to total assets 
ratio), as measures of managerial performance.
411
 Hermalin and Weisbach found no evidence 
supporting that a relationship between board composition and firm performance existed.
412
  
Klein’s research also found no association between firm performance and board composition.413  
In addition, Bhagat and Black suggested that firms with more independent directors were not 
better than other firms with regard to performance.
414
 Hermalin and Weisbach even suggested 
that board composition was endogenously chosen and that might explain why it had no 
correlation with firm performance.
415
  
In Taiwan, the evidence is controversial too. Some research found that board 
independence (or the appointment of independent directors) was correlated with firm 
performance,
416
 but others did not found the same results.
417
 Generally, most previous empirical 
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literature in Taiwan supports that there is a correlation between independent directors and firm 
performance, but the recent literature reports the negative findings.
418
  
5.4 Sample and Data Collection  
The data used in this part will mainly be from an electronic database compiled by 
TWSE’s Market Observation Post System (MOPS), which provides the annual reports, 
ownership held by directors, numbers of independent directors, and financial figures of Taiwan’s 
listed companies.
419
 In this system, although the Listing Rules were promulgated in 2002, the 
numbers of independent directors are available only from January of 2005. Due to the limited 
available data and to create the sample, this project includes listed companies that have ever 
appointed independent director(s) as a major part of the sample (from January 2005 to December 
2008). As to the definition of independent directors for this empirical project, an independent 
director is one who has (1) no financial or business ties with the company; (2) no marriage or 
immediate blood relationships with the company’s big individual shareholder (an individual 
holding more than 1% of outstanding shares) or top-ten shareholders; and (3) no employment 
relationship with the company’s big firm shareholders (a firm holding more than 5% of 
company’s outstanding shares) or top-five shareholders.420    
In order to control the differences among industries that could possibly affect firm 
performance, the dissertation only includes Taiwan’s electronic companies in sample 
companies.
421
 The reasons include: (1) the majority of listed companies with independent 
                                                          
418
 Len-Yu Liu, supra note 355, at 125.  
419
 The English version of MOPS is available at http://emops.twse.com.tw/emops_all.htm (last visited May 6, 2011). 
420
 Basically, the data are collected from the MOPS, so the definition of independent directors should be in line with 
the definition of TWSE’s Listing Rules.    
421
 The term “electronic companies” here means Taiwan’s listed companies engaging in manufacturing or 
distributing semiconductors, computers and peripheral equipment, optoelectronics, communications and Internet 
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directors consist of electronic companies (for instance, based on the data as of January, 2005, 
there were 224 companies that appointed independent directors, and 157 were electronic 
companies); (2) the second largest population of companies (37 companies in 2010) that had ever 
appointed independent directors is in the finance-related industry (e.g., insurance and banking). 
This type of industry is normally heavily regulated by laws, and their appointments of 
independent directors are normally mandatory, and therefore, this type of industry may not be 
appropriate for this research;
422
 (3) the corporate governance structures and firm performance 
normally vary from industry to industry, and even from company to company. Thus, focusing on 
one particular industry may help avoid too many noises for this project’s purpose.  As explained 
above, the population of sample companies in this project will entirely consist of Taiwan’s listed 
electronic companies. 
  It should be noted that the appointments of independent directors do not necessarily 
begin from the very first date of the year (i.e., Jan. 1). In addition, in situations such as 
resignations, retirements, or deaths of independent directors, companies may, for a certain period 
of time, have no independent directors on boards. Furthermore, although the Newly-Listed 
Companies have obligations to have two independent directors while applying for listing, the 
Listing Rules do not apply when the company re-elects new directors for the next term, which 
means some of them may not continue to hire independent directors if they think it unsuitable or 
unnecessary. Thus, the position of independent directors is often vacant among Taiwan’s listed 
companies. To avoid a lot of elimination of samples because of such vacancies, this project 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
equipment, and other electronic parts or components. As the diversity of businesses in which a company may engage, 
it may be not easy to categorize a company into a particular industry. Here, the electronic companies here will be 
those categorized by TWSE into the electronics-related industries.  
422
 In some literature, to keep homogeneity of the sample, the financial companies, such as banks and insurance 
companies, will be excluded as they are normally subject to different and strict regulatory constraints than other 
companies. See Kam-Ming Wan, Independent Directors, Executive Pay, and Firm Performance, available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=392595. 
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computes the average numbers of independent directors on a monthly basis. For example, if one 
company has two independent directors for only six months during a whole year, that company 
will still be counted and the average number will be 1. However, in a case where the average is 
below 1.00, that means the company does not have an average of one independent director on 
board, and this project assumes that the presence of independent directors would be too slight to 
affect firm performance, so the company is eliminated from the sample. Based on this criterion, 
there are 106 Companies with independent directors to comprise sample, and 424 observations 
between 2005 and 2008. 
For the comparison purpose, this project also randomly selects 88 Companies without 
independent directors (one-third of companies that never hire any independent director between 
2005 and 2008), as the other main part of the sample (352 observations between 2005 and 2008). 
As a result, the total number of sample companies will be 194 (106 Companies with independent 
directors and 88 Companies without independent directors) and there are 776 observations in 
total.     
5.5 Variables  
5.5.1 Dependent Variable  
Based on the aforementioned hypothesis, in order to investigate whether board 
independence has a significant association with firm performance, firm performance will be the 
dependent variable, but how to measure it will be an open question. There may be no single ideal 
way to measure firm performance, and a variety of accounting and financial measures have been 
utilized in previous empirical literature. This project will choose Tobin’s q as a measure of firm 
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performance. Tobin's q is understood as the ratio of the firm's market value to the replacement 
cost of its assets, but how to compute q raises another question.  
This project computes Tobin’s q as Q = (Market Value of Common Stocks + Book Value 
of Preferred Stock + Book Value of Long-Term Debt)/Book Value of Total Assets.
423
 In the 
equation for Q, market value of the firm's common stocks equals the number of common shares 
outstanding times the company’s share price on the last trading day of each year (e.g., December 
31).  The preferred stock may not have a precise basis to measure the market value; this project 
instead uses the book value of preferred stock as market value in the equation.
424
  
5.5.2 Independent Variables  
The independent variables in this project will include a number of factors that could 
affect firm performance. They include:   
 Presence of independent directors (dummy=1; otherwise=0) ; 
 Board size (number of all directors);425 
 Firm age (years from establishment); 
 Firm size, proxied by log (revenues); 
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 Bhagat & Black, supra note 414, at 242.  
424
 Id. For this research’s purpose, this will only have a very slight impact on the computation of Tobin’s q, because 
there was only one company in the sample which issued preferred stock, and the ratio (preferred stock/overall 
outstanding stock) is relatively small.   
425
 The number of directors also changes during the year, due to directors’ resignations, retirements, and other 
similar reasons. The annual reports of sample companies reveals when such vacancies occur. The dissertation 
computes the number of directors at a cut-off date (i.e., June 30 of each year). For example, if one of four directors 
was dismissed before June 30, the number of directors would be calculated as three; otherwise, the dismissed 
director would be counted, and the number will be four.       
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 Number of block-holders who have more than 5% of all outstanding shares of 
the company; 
 Year (dummy) (2005=0; 2006=1; 2007=2; 2008=3).   
Additionally, this project also finds IND and BLOK have an interaction during the 
variable diagnoses, so another independent variable (“IXB”=IND multiplying BLOK) is to be 
created to examine the effect of such a coexistence on firm performance. See Table 13 for 
definitions for all variables used in the regression. 
Table 13: Variables & Definitions 
Abbreviations of 
Variables 
Definitions  
Q (firm performance) (Market Value of Common Stocks + Book Value of 
preferred Stocks + Book Value of Long-Term Debt)/ 
Book Value of Total Assets  
ID (presence of 
independent directors) 
Presence of independent directors=1; otherwise= 0 
BOD (board size) Number of all directors 
AGE (firm age) Years from establishment 
SIZE (firm size) Firm’s annual revenues (log)   
BLOK (number of 
block-holders)  
Number of block-holders who have more than 5% of 
all outstanding shares of the company 
YEAR (data year) 2005=0; 2006=1; 2007=2; 2008=3 
IXB (interaction b/w 
IND and BLOK) 
IND multiplying BLOK  
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5.6 Descriptive Statistics 
As Table 14 shows, the mean for Q is 1.2431 and mean for BOD is 6.8041. It is also 
worth to note that the maximum number of block-holders in sample companies is 7, and the 
mean is 1.7796. This illustrates the fact that block-holders (or even controlling shareholders) are 
very common in Taiwanese listed companies, which is very different from what is usually seen 
in U.S. public companies.  
Table 14: Descriptive Statistics  
Variables Minimum Maximum Mean Median Std. Deviation 
Q 
Q(log) 
IND 
BOD 
AGE 
SIZE(log) 
BLOK 
YEAR 
IXB 
.0937 
-2.3676 
.0000 
3.0000 
2.0000 
12.1104 
.0000 
.0000 
.0000 
9.3800 
2.2386 
1.0000 
23.0000 
58.0000 
27.1032 
7.0000 
3.0000 
6.0000 
1.2431 
-.0486 
.5463 
6.8041 
17.0674 
18.8058 
1.7796 
1.5000 
.9626 
0.9310 
-.0714 
1.0000 
7.0000 
15.0000 
18.0944 
1.0000 
1.5000 
.0000 
1.0921 
.7086 
.4981 
2.0103 
9.4400 
3.7077 
1.3292 
1.1187 
1.3000 
Source: Taiwan Stock Exchange 
N=776 
Q= Tobin’s q 
IND= the presence of independent directors (dummy=1; otherwise=0)  
BOD= the number of all board members 
NINS= shares held by all non-independent directors (%) 
AGE= firm age 
SIZE= firm size, proxied by annual revenue (log) 
YEAR= dummy 2005=0; 2006=1; 2007=2; 2008=3 
BLOK= the number of block-holders 
IXB= IND timing BLOK  
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5.7 Regression Results and Implications   
This project will fit the data using a regression model with ordinary least squares (OLS) 
estimation. Under the constant variance assumption, the OLS estimator is known to have the nice 
property of being unbiased with minimum variance. However, the result of the residual analysis 
suggests a mild violation to the assumption, i.e. there is heterogeneity in the variances. The 
consequence is that the inference for the coefficients may be misled. To fix the problem, for the 
estimation we consider using the weighted least squares (WLS) methods. The steps are as 
follows: 
1. Variable selection and multi-collinearity test; 
2. Run the OLS regression; 
3. Run the WLS regression; 
4. Run OLS and WLS regression using one-year lag data for Tobin’s q. 
This project obtains the weights, wi = 1/hi. The weights can be understood as the 
adjustment on the observations to correct their influence over the parameter estimates. 
Specifically, an observation with lower precision should not be treated as equally importantly as 
an observation that provides more precise information, otherwise the estimation would be 
ineffective. Therefore, in the estimation procedure we "reweight" the data using the weights in 
order to correct the "importance" of each observation. 
First, this project runs the regression with all 7 independent variables (BOD, IND, AGE, 
SIZE, BLOK, YEAR, and IXB). After diagnoses for multi-collinearity issues and variable 
selections, SIZE and BOD are eliminated from the independent variables. This project proceeds 
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with another regression with five variables (AGE, IND, YEAR, BLOK, and IXB). Regression 
result is reported below.       
Table 15: OLS Estimates  
Q is the dependent variable as a measure of performance, proxied by log. t-statistics are in 
parentheses. p<.05 marked with * and P<.01 marked with ** P<.001 marked with *** 
(N=776) 
 
 
 
Table 15 suggests that all five independent variables have significant correlations with 
firm performance. However, as the data are across four years from 2005 to 2008, there will be a 
heteroskedasticity issue for the penal data. To deal with that issue, this project continues to run a 
WLS regression. The WLS result is reported below.  
Table 16: WLS Estimates  
Q is the dependent variable as a measure of performance, proxied by log. t-statistics are in 
parentheses. p<.05 marked with * and P<.01 marked with ** P<.001 marked with *** 
(N=776) 
     
 
This project also notices that it may take time for independent directors to make 
contributions to the company. For this reason, I use one-year lag data for independent variables 
AGE IND BLOK YEAR IXB Adj-   
-.016 
(-5.752)*** 
.269 
(3.371)** 
.051 
(1.990)* 
-.185 
(-8.751)*** 
-.081 
(-2.312)* 
.157 
AGE IND BLOK YEAR IXB Adj-   
-.004 
(-2.438)* 
.413 
(5.363)*** 
.033 
(1.217) 
-.199 
(-10.170)*** 
-.102 
(-2.790)** 
.160 
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in the equation to run the regressions. For example, 2006 Tobin’s q will be dependent variable 
and independent variables are 2005.  The OLS and WLS are reported below.
426
   
Table 17: OLS Estimates (one-year lag) 
Q is the dependent variable as a measure of performance, proxied by log. t-statistics are in 
parentheses. p<.05 marked with * and P<.01 marked with ** P<.001 marked with *** 
(N=582) 
 
 
 
Table 18: WLS Estimates (one-year lag) 
Q is the dependent variable as a measure of performance, proxied by log. t-statistics are in 
parentheses. p<.05 marked with * and P<.01 marked with ** P<.001 marked with *** 
(N=582) 
 
 
As the WLS result in Table 16 (basically same result in Table 18) indicates, Age and 
Year are negatively and significantly correlated with firm performance, which indicates that 
older firms may have less competitive advantages than younger ones. This is probably because 
younger companies have utilized more of their resources on innovative research, which is very 
important in the electronics industry. In contrast, IND and BLOK are positively associated with 
firm performance (even though insignificant for BLOK). Both independent directors and block-
holders benefit firm performance. Interestingly, the coexistence of independent directors and 
block-holders may have negative effect on firm performance, which may indicate there can be a 
confliction between them leading to inefficiency in terms of operation of business. Thus, the 
                                                          
426
 This project loses one-year observations (194) because the data of 2009 for Tobin’s q are not available.    
AGE IND BLOK YEAR IXB Adj-   
-.016 
(-4.946)*** 
.217 
(2.235)* 
.053 
(1.631) 
-.173 
(-5.705)*** 
-.070 
(-1.591) 
.108 
AGE IND BLOK YEAR IXB Adj-   
-.009 
(-3.934)** 
.251 
(2.811)*** 
.057 
(1.749) 
-.186 
(-6.858)*** 
-.081 
(-1.839) 
.107 
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above result rejects the null hypothesis, and concludes that independent directors may have made 
Taiwanese listed companies perform better in the electronics industry. 
5.8 Conclusion 
In conclusion, the regression results suggest that independent directors may positively 
contribute to firm performance. Based on this finding, Taiwanese policymakers have some 
empirical grounds to support a more aggressive independent director policy in the future. 
However, with the presence of block-holders or controlling shareholders, independent directors 
may not be able to function effectively in terms of firm performance. This implies that the future 
independent director policy of Taiwan should pay more attention on this issue. Finally, the result 
is consistent with the arguments previously presented in this dissertation that Taiwanese 
independent directors are unlikely getting rid of influence from big shareholders. 
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Chapter Six: Conclusion 
After news of many corporate scandals broke out, Taiwanese policymakers realized that 
the internal governance system in the TCA was ill designed and they sought reforms to build a 
more effective governance system. As U.S. corporate laws are becoming more and more 
important to Taiwan, and the corporate governance issues have been emphasized in the 
competitive global capital market, in order to deal with its own governance problems, Taiwan 
introduced the institution of independent directors, which has long been advocated as a good 
corporate governance practice in the U.S.      
The U.S. corporate conventional wisdom argues that independent directors will benefit 
companies in some aspects, but it is believed that they will face some inherent limitations while 
carrying out the monitoring tasks. The most serious issue is how to make sure an independent 
director has true independence from management. In addition to the limitations that U.S. 
independent directors normally face, Taiwanese independent directors also encounter other 
constraints arising from characteristics of Taiwan’s business environment. Under the Taiwan’s 
laws and regulations, I argue that independent directors have few chances to rid themselves of 
the controlling shareholders’ influence. Even in absence of shareholders who have dominance in 
the boardroom and supervisor system, independent directors will still encounter difficulties in 
carrying out the monitoring tasks while insiders are unwilling to disclose the material 
information before any board decision is to be made. In conflict-of-interest transactions (or, 
related-party transactions), which have frequently been utilized as a form of embezzlement, it is 
likely that independent directors are unable to detect wrongdoing or even illegality. As a result, 
this dissertation concludes that Taiwanese independent directors will function in a very limited 
way. The current set-up of independent directors is a mixed product under various types of 
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pressure from different interest groups (e.g., investors, voters and the industry). Even if Taiwan 
implements more aggressive reforms and adopts the mandatory independent director policy for 
all listed (or even public) companies, that may be useless because companies will  likely use any 
methods to bypass the mandatory rules. Therefore, the current set-up may be a necessary 
compromise. After all, an optimal corporate governance system cannot be expected in a short 
time.  
Even though there are some theoretical flaws in Taiwanese settings regarding 
independent directors, this dissertation finds that the presence of independent directors is 
significantly correlated with firm performance in the electronics companies, which means that 
independent directors as monitors may have made positive contributions to companies on whose 
boards they serve. However, combined with presence of block-holders, the presence of 
independent directors has negative association with firm performance. This result indicates that 
the coexistence of independent directors and block-holders may become a problem for 
companies in terms of operation of business. This empirical result is consistent with the 
argument that independent directors are not likely to be effective monitors at the presence of 
controlling shareholders or block-holders. Taiwanese policymakers should take this into 
consideration in making future policy of independent directors for Taiwan.     
As a matter of fact, the institution of independent directors remains relatively unfamiliar 
and undesirable to most Taiwanese companies. Currently, Taiwan is in an experimental stage 
regarding this institution, and has been trying to create a friendly environment for independent 
directors. It is unclear whether this institution will function as an effective monitor in a satisfying 
manner in the near future. Since Reba, Taiwanese listed companies have not experienced 
additional serious scandals. Politically speaking, with a lack of momentum for more ambitious 
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policy with respect to corporate governance issues, it is very likely that current policy will be 
sustained for a while, unless another serious and harmful scandal strikes Taiwan again. 
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